> This position is technically called eliminative materialism, that consciousness or the first person experience of reality is an illusion. I find this to be the most absurd idea in the history of ideas, for the simple fact that I have direct experience of consciousness (my own). Or, to quote Descartes: I think, therefore I am.

What is an illusion, but a thing that can be experienced yet is not real?

> Physicalism seems obvious to the current status quo, but if you become more sophisticated with the mind-body problem you will see that it does not really rest on a sold foundation.

The ability to induce altered states of consciousness (such as death) through entirely physical means demonstrates that consciousness is a physical phenomenon.

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

The logical possibility argument for philosophical zombies is essentially flawed. It posits that the conceivability of a philosophical zombie is sufficient to demonstrate meaningfulness, but plenty of conceivable things are not meaningful. Suppose I conceive instead of a person who knows a counterargument to mind-body dualism. Accepting the philosophical zombie argument requires accepting its refutation.