What would happen to these searches if plausible deniability passwords became more widely used?
What would happen to these searches if plausible deniability passwords became more widely used?
If that qualifies as a type of legally actionable obstruction, it would seem that intentionally wiping your device before you cross a border and then reloading data onto it once you arrive at your destination would also qualify.
ETA: To complete the threat analysis, and if they seize two devices, one with a password protected key and a LUKS volume without headers? I'll take LUKS.
Because the person made it inaccessible with the intention of concealing it from law enforcement and others. There is still a means to decrypt the data.
All of the actions described in this thread - whether it's decoy passwords, encrypted volumes with headers, burner devices, or wiping data and then restoring at the destination, all seem like they could be construed by law enforcement as a person obstructing their ability to sift through the individual's data.
(But IANAL either.)
Then you can mail those flash drives around and backup them as you need. I think it is even possible to use Yubikey for dm-crypt in plain mode.