Shortcuts all around -- kind of reminds me of MongoDB. Sad it's the primary player...
How is this issue specific to Docker? Anyone can download a random library off github, use a shady linux distribution, or install utility tools loaded with spyware.
I don't think Docker aims to solve issues relating to trusting upstream software. It's a tool to help package applications, just like how tar allows you to package files. What you put in it is up to you.
How is this github any different?
I wonder if docker allows this and on the other hand if that's even feasible for say application images, given that applications must be updated a lot for security reasons. Of course if the Dockerfile's parent reference is not pinned, that does only help to some degree...
docker pull ubuntu@sha256:45b23dee08af5e43a7fea6c4cf9c25ccf269ee113168c19722f87876677c5cb2
To be fair, the docker.io/library/* images are signed but no other images are and there are a bunch of issues with how the signing policies work for users that want to enforce that some images must be signed.
Installing known-vulnerable old versions of legitimate software can be just as bad as installing custom malware.
And as I said, only official-library Docker images are signed. All other images are unsigned and even for third-party repos you can't force Docker to verify all images from a given repo (you have to enable it globally, which breaks the utility of a local "docker build").
[+] Arch is the only counterexample I can think of and I'm not even sure if my memory is correct.
If Github was compromised, it would be easy and obvious to insert malicious code in a repository, but hide those changes from anyone on the github website.
Images on Docker Hub don't even need to share their Dockerfile, to talk of all the source/etc that went into their build.
> Which you can avoid by forking the mainline repo and depending on your fork.
If github was compromised, the it would be pretty easy to generate forks with the same compromised code.
Nobody read the source code for this exact reason: “the community is here to read it so I won’t".
For docker (and npm for all that matters) _a lot_ of important dependencies are basically simple one-off "developments" with a single developer and no userbase at all caring for them, because they don't really solve any consistent problem, being basically just created to increase the visibility of its creator on primitive metrics. The community is there for high-level packages, but the dependencies lurk in test-scripts and seldom-used functions carefully placed by some idiotic digital nomads for their personal CV-polishment (ehm, not looking at you: https://github.com/sindresorhus/shebang-regex). Have a look at where this package is used (basically only in cross-spawn, where there are 10 other similar dependencies), then think about, how much effort creating the dependency hierarchy was, then look up who contributed the changes, where this micro-package was required and finally decide whether this was some thing sane people would do or if it's just for personal gain...
In Debian we review and vet packages.
Strawman. Anyone can use Debian Stable or at least Testing.
Actually only short names go to docker hub, one can setup their own registry and use it via dns names.
Example: docker pull quay.io/letsencrypt/letsencrypt
One day, there's going to be a colossal compromise, and that might finally change where we place security in the priority chain.