I don't see a problem with the idea of delegating aspects of flight to the computer - just fix the software engineering practices that lead to this tragedy. Please. :)
I don't see a problem with the idea of delegating aspects of flight to the computer - just fix the software engineering practices that lead to this tragedy. Please. :)
In a modern fly-by-wire aircraft, "flight envelope protection" is deeply integrated into the control system. It is something that pilots are trained about; when the system is in a degraded mode because of a sensor failure, it tells the pilot, and pilots are trained how to deal with that.
Fly-by-wire brings large benefits such as a reduction in weight, lower assembly costs, lower maintenance cost, and better comfort because fly-by-wire can counteract turbulence. These are passed on to the consumer in the end.
To avoid any investment in engineering or pilot training, Boeing bolted a half-baked "flight envelope protection" system on when moving the engines caused a change in the flight envelope. Too bad they didn't tell the pilots...
I wouldn't say that the 737 MAX should never fly again but the plane should get a new type certificate and pilots should be retrained.
As a passenger one thing you can do is fly Jetblue because they don't have any 737s in their fleet. Also ask airlines about the A220 and E195-2 airliners. These are smaller than the 737 but feel larger from a passenger perspective and also have lower seat*mile cost. Try them out, you'll be impressed!
Boeing's practice of cutting corners is why 300+ people are dead
I'm guessing the next step for FAA and EASA will be to revise the process under which this approval was granted to Boeing.
At least part of the blame lands on the authors of the regulations that led to this.
Clearly Boeing gets lots of blame too. As with most engineering screwups of this magnitude, multiple organizational failures contributed.