Boeing may be now well and truly fucked
havecoffeewillwrite.com
havecoffeewillwrite.com
It's very likely that they are overrun by a bunch of MBA-ridden suits rather than engineers (not claiming all engineers are benevolent but that cultural shift always results in an erosion of quality), like most companies of its type. And no good decisions will be made.
I have always said (although without any supporting data), that the safest time to fly is probably after a plane crash because most airlines are probably double and triple checking their planes to be safe.
But that's not true of the 737-MAX. You can't fix what they've screwed up. Because the fundamental design change was borne out of greed, and not good engineering. I'll continue to avoid the 737-MAX like I'm sure many others will.
I agree with you, Boeing should have done a clean sheet redesign of the aircraft for this segment, not patch up the 737 for another decade of production - but I cant really tell them the reasons they made this choice are bad - airlines like and want more 737's, a completely new type creates a bunch of extra costs on all parts - so a choice was made, and now Boeing will live with the consequences.
https://nader.org/2019/04/04/boeings-homicide-will-give-way-...
https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/24/initial-analyst-reaction-t...
I thought the boeing plane only needed the system because their engines were positioned so far forward, and that the airbus plane didn't have that problem, so shouldn't airbus not need the stall system?
In normal operation it takes the input from the pilot and decides how to accomplish what it thinks the pilot wants. For example, if the pilot pulls all the way back the plane will translate that into the maximum safe climb rate. You can think of it as the pilot expressing a desired state and the plane figuring out how to get there.
>In an emergency, if the avionics computer goes crazy and starts making the plane do barrel rolls, can the pilot override it and take manual control?
AFAIK there's no way to disable the flight control. The computer is supposed to be reliable enough to not do crazy stuff and it accounts for sensor errors. Based on what sensors are malfunctioning different safety features are disabled. For example, if it can't get a reliable angle of attack reading the stall prevention is disabled.
As far as I know, if the autopilot can't make reliable decisions, it rings alarm bells and disengages fly-by-wire. Looks to me like quite elegant design.
The 737 Max 8 is different because the MCAS system actually overrides the pilot's input, rather than just sounding a warning to alert the pilot to a potentially dangerous situation.
The TL;DR? If people don't want to fly the MAX, there's nothing Boeing can do to fix it. They're better off abandoning the design and doing the clean sheet plane they should have done from the beginning.
Thanks for the TL;DR - as the site didn't work for me. Also, the analysis is spot on.
Mind you, the entire MCAS issue would be mitigated, if the plane were re-certified.
Pilots need to be trained on that difference, because even with the software patches, MCAS will not correctly operate all the time.
- google cache has no entry
- printfriendly fails on the same error
- can't try archive.is right now