How the Kleiner Perkins Empire Fell
fortune.com
fortune.com
For most of its life, KPCB had a web around the firm. Great companies would come in and pitch themselves. So, for the most part, the job was to "only" pick whom to invest in (picking is just as hard!). As an extreme outsider, it seems that their operating rubric is so focused on this that they've lost the institutional capacity to spin new webs of their own. They are reliant on outsized personalities delivering the win rather than the institution itself pulling it in.
That's a tricky spot for the firm to be in. And it's a tricker spot to navigate out of. They'll have to rebuild institutional knowledge and prospect like other firms now; a mindset shift that could be hard for most veterans to get into as early on this would have been a negative signal in their careers and for their firm. Now, that it's a requirement; it has to be a tough sell to everyone involved (note: I don't know anyone at the firm. I have simply seen this pattern play out a few times).
They can hire fantastic new investors who know how to hunt, but will the firm be able to listen to them? This is a firm where getting rid of nametags was noteworthy enough to make it into Fortune; imagine how hard a sell getting down into the mud must be.
FWIW, such firms eventually recover. Eventually. They're just too big not to. But it is a painful road until that point. I wish the best of luck to them.
Was this an organic thing of their own doing, or was this due to disruptors, like A16Z?
I've been in SF for 3 years now and haven't really heard anything that impressive about Kleiner, but looking at Crunchbase, they've led the A for Rippling, the C for Plaid, the D round for Intercom, the B round for Figma, the E round for Peleton. They have a bunch of other impressive logos that they've also managed to lock in.
To your point about the web - they clearly still have it. Yes, they're out of the loop and aren't getting the early stage deal flow that they used to (to the benefit of many others), but they clearly have a deep moat still and can get an ok return from that.
Meeker's success with the growth fund happened as KP's early stage venture fund went into decline even though it was the original and the stalwart for decades.
The article mentioned that Meeker left last year with her entire team to start her own fund and one of KP's biggest problems has been the inability to keep its own talent. So "they clearly still have it" is likely in reference to people who have left with their 'web' and KP may not have anything.
Less then 1% of Facebook's value is VC funding.
That's not how it works. LPs create a portfolio mix across asset classes and each LP has generally different mixes based on their risk profile. If you're an LP and can't get into a Sequioa/Benchmark/etc fund but still want to diversify asset classes into VC then a "2x fund" might still be attractive to be able to diversify into. There's so much to unwind here, but long story - it's not that simple at all. I agree with the OP's assertion about Matt Levine's view.
Example: https://twitter.com/ZacharyDeWitt/status/1112554272929910785
Edit: Another point worth noting - hedge funds as an asset class are notoriously not outpacing index funds (and in many cases actually losing value), yet they still get funded: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/business/hedge-funds.html
Kleiner is a great example of this.
Disclaimer: my whole career is on the consumer software side, so I can only speak to that. I have zero insight on Kleiner as it relates to enterprise.
My first time inside KP was in 2003, working out of their office for a few months during a coding internship at Digital Chocolate. Great snacks and drinks freely available made quite impression on me as a college student.
Second time was in 2011 when I came in to pitch my first startup with Aileen Lee. It was a pre-revenue consumer play, not particularly in her wheelhouse of e-commerce, so nothing came of it. She was pleasant and professional. My only complaint was that she/Kleiner didn't seem particularly "hip". Not that VCs are particularly known for their cool factor, but for some reason I had expected something a little less square based on Kleiner's reputation.
I think this otherwise excellent article does a disservice by not mentioning Ilya Fushman joining on their timeline of key events. (It does mention him later, mostly in passing). I've never worked with him, but we have mutual acquaintances and have probably been to a few of the same parties. From my perspective as a not-total-outsider, Fushman brings some fresh thinking to a firm that is badly in need of relevancy/culture refresh. If they'd had someone like him there in 2011, for example, that would have made for a much more interesting meeting for me and other other consumer-facing entrepreneurs.
Not sure if and when they'll ever regain the kind of dominance they had at their heyday, but I do think being hipster credibility matters for consumer plays, and with Fushman on board Kleiner now has a solid chance to play in this space again.
So, translating that into English, you were losing money giving something to individual people, but hoped you could do... what? Start charging money? Harvest data? Get bought before you ran out of VC money? This sort of "founder" bafflegab is annoying.
I was a first time founder who started out as a build engineer, then engineer, tech lead, and PM. I’d been bootstrapping for two years and needed to raise. I didn’t know shit about business or venture capital other than that it’s apparently how dreams get made. So I figured out how to position the company to get funded, and got it done.
Did I have a proven revenue model? No, but I had a few plausible directions, and that was enough to get to the next phase, so I didn’t sweat it.
Would I pitch a pre-revenue startup on Sand Hill in 2019? Unlikely.
Maybe that’s obvious to everyone now. But it’s a lot easier to be on the outside making fun of failed projects than to actually forego the cushy salary and go for it as a founder.
Still, thanks for the explanation. I'm just an outsider looking in.
I can go glass half-full or empty on OKR's. They obviously have value, but using OKR's at Google is one of the biggest selection biases possible. Google seems to have done so many things in its history that would be death for other org's.
The episode about firing all managers is a great in-depth story of stupidity. Yet Google succeeded because they had and have an absolute lock on the search market.
Dear Doerr, convince me about OKR's another way.
I would also love to see what OKR's looked like throughout some of the products at Google that they have sunset or flopped. G+, RSS, Wave, Hangouts, etc. - OKR's are a useful tool but they aren't what made Google a $750 billion company.
I was just fresh from LinkedIn, where OKR’s had recently been implemented. I got to see how they systematically eliminated some of the best employees in favor of those who were willing to game the system and create fake goals for themselves.
As I sat in the audience, I thought to myself, “Finally I’m meeting the fabled creator of OKR’s.”
Airware went out of business a few years later.
It's management's job to be vigilant in seeing/hearing and looking for those perverse incentives and then determining if the trade off is acceptable.
Google+ was famous for always having the bigliest OKRs while being an albatross of a product sucking the life and talent out of the company's products
Google's OKRs are relatively lightweight way of doing that.
Everyone fights the last war.
After that, KP installed their own CEO with old analog modem background, fired the extremely experience VP of engr, hire/fire 3 CTOs and hire 160 people to "scale" the company and burn all the cash without deliver one single product in the next 6 years. The CEO also manager to get rid of all 3 founders.
Disclosure: previously worked at a Kleiner-backed startup, but have no stake in it anymore.