FAA Grounds All Cirrus Vision Jets over Angle of Attack Issues
flyingmag.com
flyingmag.com
This isn't really a grounding, at least not the way the 737 MAX is grounded. Cirrus jets can't be flown until the AD is complied with, but complying with the AD is a (relatively) simple matter of replacing the angle of attack sensors. Once that's done, the aircraft is airworthy again.
The issue is a "quality escape," i.e. the existing sensors weren't built to spec. There are two screws that attach the vane to the potentiometer; the factory didn't torque the screws properly and didn't apply thread locker to them.
So this is a manufacturing error, not a fundamental problem with the design. I say that just to provide contrast with the MAX issues since the problems are superficially similar, but quite different once you get into the details.
Disassembling something, inspecting it then performing reassembly and properly torquing the screws with locktite per some published procedure is one of those things aircraft mechanics do all day.
Unless the design of the sensor would make it inaccurate after being reassembled (I'm skeptical of this, it wouldn't make sense for a few reasons) this is kind of a dick move to the aircraft owners that they're probably doing in the name of "look how careful we're being"
Any certified mechanic anywhere can do the former with no lead time and if it turns out the threads are close to stripped out from a loose sensor banging around on there then replace the sensor. It doesn't make sense to replace the sensor off the bat unless you just want to be seen "doing something".
I think your cynicism is uncalled for. FAA found an issue that is life threatening to pilots and passengers, just because pilot/mechanics are aware about how careful they are with their planes, does not mean that you invalidate the actual manufacturing issue that is found with these AOA sensors.
"We are aware, we are not stupid, don't tell us what to do." - this is a wrong attitude especially from an Aviation mechanic, unless I am missing something, otherwise please elaborate.
I'm saying the stupid thing here is that mechanics/owners have to trash the part and wait for a replacement when the fix is to apply locktite and assemble properly (assuming sensor is undamaged) which is something any mechanic can do. Sure it might be life threatening but having a mechanic fix the sensor is no different than having a factory worker assemble the sensor and having the mechanic install it. The "bad" sensors are almost certainly going to be turned in to the company and remanufactured. That process will consist of checking them and if they're good to go then they will be reassembled properly. This is exactly what a mechanic would do only a different person will do each step of the task.
>We are aware, we are not stupid, don't tell us what to do." - this is a wrong attitude especially from an Aviation mechanic, unless I am missing something, otherwise please elaborate.
What you're missing is that if the fix is simply a properly assembled part then having the mechanic disassemble the part, inspect it per some spec then assemble it per some procedure is not functionally equivalent to a properly manufactured part, it it literally equivalent to what would happen to the part as part of being properly assembled at the factor. If there isn't something special about this sensor that requires factory conditions to get right the FAA is basically calling the mechanics stupid here. They're basically saying a semi-skilled factory worker can be trusted to assemble the part but a mechanic who disassembles and reassembles even more "critical to aircraft function" stuff all day can't be.
That would NOT satisfy the FAA Corrective Action listed in the linked document. A part replacement is mandated. [0]
[0]: (g) Corrective Action(1) Before further flight after receipt of this emergency AD, replace the AOA sensor with an improved AOA sensor, Aerosonic part number 4677-03 Mod 1 or Cirrus part number 32159-004 in accordance with section 11. ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS, paragraphs A, B, and C of Cirrus Design Corporation SF50 Service Bulletin Number: SB5X-34-03, dated April 16, 2019
(I have no experience here, just pointing out something I think you missed.)
It’s more expensive than a workbench fix, but cheaper than bad publicity and a loss of faith in FAA governance. It’s a shame the cost is being foisted on GA owners though, owning a private plane is expensive enough already.
Obligatory citation; imho, one of the webs's great resources—
Pretty difficult argument to make when most planes do not have AoA sensors!
Here’s a thesis on the topic: https://kb.osu.edu/bitstream/handle/1811/68634/1/AbramsHonor...
Note that many light aircraft have stall warning horns, which are just AoA sensors that only detect when the AoA exceeds a certain amount. In many other planes, you can detect excessive AoA by sound or feel.
Edit: To be more clear, the artificial horizon combined with other sources of information available to the pilot (airspeed, stall indicator) provide the pilot with the same level of situational awareness as knowing his/her AOA outright from a dedicated sensor.
Or consider an aerobatic airplane at the first vertical point in a loop. The airplane's pitch is 90° but the angle of attack is less than 10°.
My point is that the AI combined with the little stall switch on the wing seem to be good enough for the overwhelming majority of cases. Add in airspeed and you're more than covered.
We keep trying to add systems to cover whatever remaining edge cases we find but those systems have failure modes too so we take three steps forward and two steps back. These systems pick up the slack when the pilot might be inattentive but the increased complexity and cognitive load poses other risks.
Attitude indicator? Look out the window! Stall horn? Just feel the pre-stall rumbling through the controls. You can fly a plane with no instruments. None of them are strictly necessary, but it’s a good idea to have them.
Speed I guess makes sense, just amazing how a pilot so easily can slow a plane too much, change the angle too much and have no idea what is up.
The angle of attack will remain in its usual very narrow range at any point when you fly a loop. The critical or stalling angle of attack is typically around 15° - 20° for many airfoils (so your AoA should be less than that). Note that if you fly upside down (negative-G capable aerobatics airplane) you will still have a positive AoA, just on the other side of the wing.
> If the airplane you’re flying is equipped with an angle-of-attack indicator, it will illustrate an abstract concept that pilots learn to recite during ground school but rarely fully comprehend—which is that an airplane can stall in “any attitude” and at “any airspeed.” For me, it took stalling on the back side of a loop (while pointed straight down at a high power setting) for that idea to sink in.
https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2013/may/pilot/...
I would use AoA in relation to the direction of flight, not the up or down orientation of the airplane. Even upside down I still fly quite normally (in straight & level upside-down flight), and the lift created is positive: Up/down in relation to the earth don't change, so the direction of lift does not change. In this context it would be a bit confusing to use negative numbers as you suggest, IMO.
However, since you can set your relative coordinate system and context however you like this is a topic we could discuss this ad infinitum without convincing one another if we insist on our respective PoVs. When faced with the linked question you would have some more explaining to do though, because there are negative AoA and no upside-down flight (now imagine adding that to the question to make it even more confusing...) :)
Edit: Oh you meant flying upside down, not doing a loop?
Yeah, negative AoA is not the same as positive AoA. It makes sense to distinguish them because, unless the wing uses a symmetric airfoil, it will behave differently in the two cases. Given that you also calculate the lift vector as a function of AoA, and for anything to make sense the lift vector is antiparallel in the two cases, the AoA would also be negative.
You mostly need a stall indicator or an AoA during tricky procedures like really short field operations (which in the Aerostar world translates to "just don't"). Jets are a slightly different story however I do not believe the VJ gets fast enough for that to matter.
It should be possible to fly safely using pitch and air speed indicators. And even a loss of air speed should be survivable by using known good configurations.
Why didn't they act like this to commercial aviation?
It seems like the Air France 447 and 737 MAX crashes could have been avoided just by having highly redundant sensors.
This is probably what will have to happen for fully self-flying aircraft, so why not do it now with partially self-flying aircraft?
I am curious how often this happens generally
I’ve been told to consider how issues evolve after they stop being reported, and so I am skeptical whether this is exceptional at all because aircraft groundings are only in the public interest because of the recent worldwide coordinated grounding
This is pretty much the same as a standard car recall, just with more enforcement teeth. FAA says you can't fly until you replace a part that had a manufacturing defect. Replace it and you're good.
"Its ok everyone is bad like us"
Full glass cockpit is also looks pretty sweet.
It's supposed to be cheap for a jet.