The MAX can be fixed by addressing the flaws in MCAS, and it will be in the end. The production will resume, the MAX will be a slightly less commercial success than it should have been, Boeing will be fined a few Billions for its failings, the FAA will have to take an hard look at itself, and everything will be ok.

I just hope the correct conclusions will be learnt from this crash:

* have a truly independent certification process

* don't fix your physical design issues with software

* don't write and maintain software running on an airplane like the software from the start-up world: significant design flaws are not tolerable for software running in an airplane, even if they can be fixed easily.

* don't hide new systems, if there is a new system, then pilot should be trained

by the way, it's not the first time a new system caught pilot by surprised because they didn't knew about it. SAS Flight 751 is another example, ice ingestion damaged the engines, the pilots reduced the thrust to reduce stress, but an automatic system (ATR, Automatic Thrust Restoration), unknown to the pilots, put the thrust back to full power, disintegrating the engines, the plane fortunately crash landed without fatalities thanks to the pilots skills and a bit of luck.

* Boeing should really think about replacing the 737, the old design is putting too much constraints, preventing a clean design.