> A second electronic system found on other Boeing jets also alerts pilots to unusual or hazardous situations during flight and lays out recommended steps to resolve them.
The 737 is stuck in the past because given the choice, nobody wants to have to retrain their pilots on more modern systems.
Ding ding ding!
Apologies for not finding an exact link, but here is the wikipedia article for the flight: https://www.wikiwand.com/en/US_Airways_Flight_1549
Now, in the Air France flight, part of the problem was the system trying harder than it should have: it would have sufficed to alert the pilots to the lack of air speed indication and let them figure out what to do, but instead the computers cascade alarm after alarm.
You can see the problem: various pieces of the system were engineered separately, and there was no single system that could have suppressed the downstream alarms so that the pilots could focus on first on understanding the first alarm. Then again, that too might not have been a good design: perhaps a stall alarm should take precedence, say, over a frozen pitot alarm.
Sometimes this is justified -certainly the MCAS incident is a example. Changes like the MCAS should never have been allowed to change a fundamental part of the airplane interface without considerably more processes being met. That said, sometimes opposition to enhancements is trade unionists being trade unionists.
Even on aircraft without fully integrated checklists, many operators have switched to using iPads instead of paper manuals as well.