> On the simulator when the stabilizer was "on a dive" at maximum angle, me and my colleagues weren't able to recover a plane.
> If you follow Boeing bulletin, but start the procedure too late, it will only make things worse. Simpler solution (in case of problems right after takeoff) is to release the flaps at least to the first position. This will disable MCAS and give you an additional time.
Source: https://denokan.livejournal.com/204046.html (Russian)
Google translate: https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=ru&tl=en&u=https%3...
They procedure just disables the electric motor that MCAS is using to adjust the trim down. MCAS will still be sitting there sending trim down commands that get ignored.
Problem is, that electric motor is used by the manual trim adjust buttons too, so they stop functioning too. Following the procedure results in a nose down trim that pilots have to correct by manually turning the trim wheel, and it turns out the aerodynamic forces may be too strong for that procedure.
Gloryfing the good old days of pilot jocks just isn’t supported by the actual data, this incident nonewithstanding.
Of course, commercial pilots would need to have an actual interest in flying manually. The Gimli glider pilot was an enthusiastic pilot outside professional aviation.
I don't know if such an interest is still possible with modern exploitative labor practices.
the plane's crashing, and you're telling the pilots (who you think might be jocks which makes you feel...even less safe?), "No don't turn it off, I have 50 years of data that says systems are safe." perfect example of doing data wrong. crazy dangerous arrogant ideas like this contributed to this tragedy.
when the systems are failing, you better hope you have some pilot jocks / true fixed wing enthusiasts at the controls, who know how to make the systems work for them, or take control if they fail, rather than some data jocks, with blinkered faith in the systems, who count cost of lives as "notwithstanding".
flyers deserve competence from their systems and data, not just from their pilots. we need pilots who have earned their capabilities, and systems that have earned their impression of reliability. current MCAS occupies a privileged position in charge of safety it has not earned.
You can fly (glide) them and even land with most systems switched off, including engines and main power.
https://www.boldmethod.com/learn-to-fly/aerodynamics/3-types...