40 seconds is an eternity to accomplish the memory items on runaway stab trim non-normal checklist. It’s literally “control column - hold firmly” (already a given, since MCAS only affects manual flight and the increased back pressure required is the cue that something is amiss), “autopilot and autothrottle - disengage” (click-click, click-click), (if runaway continues) “stab trim cutout switches - cutout (both)”, (if runaway continues) “trim wheel x grasp and hold”

All of those are “above the line, memory items” which the crew must be able to recall and execute prior to referencing the checklists in the QRH.

Boeing has some significant fault here, but I’d expect a full performance crew to handle this emergency and suspect the CVR and FDR data will show them in a less than fully flattering light, especially after Lion Air, the emergency AD, safety memos, and general publicity surrounding the previous crash.