> I am following Chomsky, that they're aspects of the same thing; language is a faculty in a specific, recently evolved neurological structure.
That is a bold hypothesis, certainly, but not one that you could use as a basis for argument at this point in time. I also deeply doubt it when viewed in the context of Wittgenstein's language games. A human and a sheep dog can very effectively engage in a language game, even subtle ones such as naming. Nor is it pure behavioral conditioning, as what makes various dog breeds better at particular things is selection for incidence of particular behaviors.
Then you go to a gorilla or a parrot, which can engage in quite abstract language games. Language games with parrots always make you aware of Wittgenstein's lion, though.
For Chomsky's hypothesis to be true, you would need to have a particular inflection point where language games become language, and for that inflection point to be reified as the evolution of a specific neural structure instead of exaptation of lots of aspects in the brain.
It feels too much like Watson and Crick's nonsense "one gene = one protein," which could have been discarded with a modest amount of thought before it was allowed to damage biology for decades.
> I think following thermodynamic efficiency seems a deep inductive step as that allows measure of what is arbitrary or not
Until you look at, say, bower birds and realize that conspicuous waste is a signalling mechanism for fitness. There you have an evolutionary game that rewards thermodynamic inefficiency.