Hacker News Reader

Comment by jazzyjackson | Hacker News Reader

I was trying to find an article I read years ago, about how unsuited the supersonic fighter jets are for air support of ground operations. The main contentions were:

1. Modern jets need long runways (aircraft carrier slingshot notwithstanding) so anytime troops were calling in air support, a supersonic f16 would fly for an hour, have enough fuel for a couple of bombing runs before having to fly back to the closest large airport, compared to what the troops really wanted, a super tucano turboprop, which can take off from the dirt airstrips available anywhere in the country.

2. Modern jets, with their stunning array of passive and active sensors, encourage an eyes-off approach to dropping bombs : pilots can only trust their data, they are not close enough to the ground to recognize who's friendly and who's not.

Alluded in my sibling comment, A10 warthogs would have been perfect for these missions -- I don't know where the unwillingness to fund them comes from. Googling now reveals that Super Tucano turboprops are now being delivered to the afghan airfoce, since that's what you actually need to fight small arms battles in the remote regions of the country.

Closest thing I found was 2015, detailing why modern technology doesn't win the war, 'low and slow' can be a better game plan:

https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/8qxzyv/low-and-sl...

View on HN

I've posted about this a couple times here in the past (though misspelled Tucano), and saw exactly what you are talking about in Iraq.[1] This article and the F-35 make me sad. It's the last of the samurai. For close air support in a low threat environment the Super Tucano and other aircraft are much better at the task and cheaper. For a high threat environment (i.e. China or Russia), expendable, stealthy drones acting as missile trucks are much better assuming somehow the war doesn't go nuclear and we don't lose in space and cyber first. The F-35 is too expensive and epitomizes the trajectory of the battle ship, where more and more money is put into defense of the platform, and it eventually succumbs to cheaper threats. I think the Future of War delves into this concept well.[2] The F-35 is probably more boondoggle then defense.

1. https://hn.algolia.com/?query=super%20tacano&sort=byPopulari...

2. https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/470769.The_Future_of_War

Good stuff, the US is seriously on some Maginot Line crap. I sadly realize there will indeed be another great war, innovation in manned flight will not play a role in the outcome, and what we now denigrate may become in hindsight the pinacle of technological civilization.

It's going to be cyber war and no one is prepared. Here is an example how it may look like:

https://scholars-stage.blogspot.com/2018/07/what-cyber-war-w...

> cyber war

What proportion of chips used in American computers come from the far east?

> For a high threat environment (i.e. China or Russia)

In what fantasy world does anyone actually posit it not devolving quickly into nuclear war with these nations?

We've had MAD for half a century and yet today so many people seem to spruik this idea that conventional direct warfare is possible between nuclear armed states. It's simply not going to happen.

India and Pakistan have been there I think - and lately came close again, though both sides recognized the thin line.

And also, both sides don't exactly follow MAD:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credible_minimum_deterrence

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimal_deterrence

Basically, it's not "I can glass your whole country" but more "I can nuke a few of your main cities, you will survive but it will hurt".

Mostly, only the USA and Russia can follow MAD, the other nuclear powers with a few hundreds warheads, follow Minimal Deterrence.

The exact same sorts of scenario as occurred in the Korean War & Vietnam. I.e. a proxy-war using non-nuclear assets between the great powers. Where do you think the North Vietnamese were getting MIGs from?

Not only were China, USSR, and North Korea supplying MiGs, they were training pilots, providing logistical support, manning AAA batteries, and in the case of the North Korea, flying combat missions [1].

The point isn't necessarily to be able to wage a conventional war against Russia or China. Other countries, like Iran or Syria, potentially have access to the same weapons systems.

[1]: "Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975", pp. 261-263. https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/decla...

It's only not going to happen because there's a conventional deterrent backing up the nuclear deterrent.

Suppose Russia invades Poland. With a conventional deterrent, NATO can deploy ground and air forces to a defensive front and hold Russia to a stalemate. Eventually it would escalate to a nuclear exchange, but only through a stepwise process. Most importantly, this is why Russia doesn't invade Poland.

Without a conventional deterrent, Russian tanks could reach Brussels and the only countermeasure would be a nuclear first strike against Russia. That wouldn't happen. Which means there's no reason for Russia not to invade every non-nuclear-armed country it wants to. Which means every single country in the vicinity of Russia is going to want their own nuclear deterrent, because that will be the only effective defense.

(Also, missile defense is getting good enough that MAD might not survive the 21st century, and then we'll feel silly for not having any other military options.)

>expendable, stealthy drones acting as missile trucks

The 70s called and want their cruise missiles back.

The type of weapon you're describing already exist and are widely used. They are commonly launched by missile destroyers, submarines or large bomber aircraft behind the front lines. You still need a manned fighter at the front lines to find targets to shoot at.

> manned fighter at the front lines

Why a manned fighter? Why not remotely-human-piloted drones?

“Find targets to shoot at.” The man is hardly involved at all. It’s a battle of sensors. It’s a battle over the electromagnetic spectrum and the man in the loop in the aircraft isn’t the critical part. Unless, you lose the battle of the EM spectrum and can’t communicate with a drone. Then a man in the loop could be critical but you’ve probably already lost at that point and would be better off with the “cruise missiles” you deride using ground mapping to find the way to the area and AI for specific target selection. I’m talking more about what aircraft are these days in BVR air-to-air: missile trucks, carrying AAMRAM, which is the real weapon. I’ve flown against F-22s, seen their weaknesses, and wouldn’t base our defense strategy on planes that have become too expensive compared to missiles.

Sure, but one pilot assigning targets to dozens of drones that are just outside the enemy controlled area waiting for instructions can go a long way towards making the pilot extremely effective.

That pilot can also be replaced by, say, 200 kilograms of extra sensors and communication equipment and two or three people in a container in the nearest airbase.

> I don't know where the unwillingness to fund them comes from

The Air Force. Air Force brass has less than zero interest in maintaining the A-10 fleet. Just a few months ago a friend of mine recounted a conversation he had with a base commander. Basically, the Air Force believes the F-35 and UAVs provide superior capabilities than the A-10 for every conceivable mission.

I asked him why the Army doesn't offer to takeover the A-10, but I just got a big shrug. I don't think that possibility is on anybody's radar, by which I infer not even the Army is particularly keen on the A-10.

The Army isn't allowed to operate fixed-wing aircraft. Also, it's entirely possible the Army is more than satisfied with their Apache attack helicopters and no longer needs an anti-tank machine gun with an airplane attached.

The Army does have some fixed wing aircraft, so it's not without precedent. And in any event I figured if the Army loved the A-10 so much they could call the Air Force's bluff and ask Congress to give them a mandate.

What all the evidence suggests to me is that there's overwhelming consensus at the Pentagon to scrap the A-10. Congress, the defense media, and anecdotally every ground trooper from Iraq and Afghanistan disagree, but there you have it.

>What all the evidence suggests to me is that there's overwhelming consensus at the Pentagon to scrap the A-10. Congress, the defense media, and anecdotally every ground trooper from Iraq and Afghanistan disagree, but there you have it.

Grunts love firepower. Back when the M16 was new everyone got full auto. Then the powers that be decided it was overkill and gave them three round burst. Now the marines are fielding the M27....

Just because they eat crayons doesn't mean they don't know what works and what doesn't.

That said, having your CAS system be capable of showing up at mach 1.8 is worth something.

Don’t get me wrong, the GAU8 “Avenger” 30mm cannon the A10 was built around is an utter beast, but it has simply met its match with modern tank armor. It wouldn’t be effective against the most recent few generations of tanks do to increasingly effective armor. It was designed for old Soviet gear, which it obliterates, but it hasn’t been updated and Soviet weaponry has. A modern T14 Armata would be damaged (optics, sensors, etc) but ultimately would most likely survive an A10 gun run. Now for simple infantry ground support, there really is no match for a flying tank! As you’ve alluded to, the AH64 is a very capable flying tank and is very good at the same mission. Bonus points that the hellfire missiles the Apache carries are still quite effective against all currently known armor.

Disclaimer: I flew the Shadow 200 TUAV in OIF II and did targeting for several A10 missions. Nothing quite like a BRRRRRRRRRTTTTTT cutting the thing you’ve put a laser on in half! I still don’t think it would do well against a modern Russian armor division.

In my adult life I’ve only ever seen the BRRRRRRRRTTTTT used on troops in the open/defilade. Those rounds work fine, even on the high tech armor favored by the enemy in Afghanistan, trees.

The "keep the A10" camp is specifically arguing that the A10 is crucial for providing air support to ground troops against insurgent-style opponents, and that there's no equivalent available if the A10s are mothballed.

There's some interesting counter-arguments to that view in this thread; I'm not knowledgeable enough in the domain to have a strong opinion.

Ain't AC-130 Spectre is exactly for that?

They're too vulnerable to fly during the day because they're so big and fly so low.

I love the A-10 and it is better than the fast-movers for anti-insurgency work (Especially if you take cost into consideration). However it is not the best as it is still colossal overkill.

There were plans for light attack propeller aircraft. The US actually bought a bunch of them for the Iraqi airforce and were falling over themselves saying how good they were for the job. The US airforce then trialled their own light attack aircraft (apparently grudgingly) but...

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/01/18/the-air-forces-pl...

and to be honest, ths reasons given are pretty suspect to me anyway.

This is also why the Marines kept the Corsair as far into the jet age as they could.

The GAU8 tears up Toyota pickups slightly faster than road salt (and time is of the essence in a CAS situation) and more cheaply than bombs/missiles.

The A10 is a lot less vulnerable to ground-fire and MANPADS than helicopters, can carry more and loiter longer. It's like a AC130 but cheaper to operate and with more missiles.

While the gun isn't going to be effective against a modern armored division having a high capacity missile truck is worthwhile as evidenced in desert storm.

That said, time to get on scene is very important and the A10 is very poor at that compared to other fixed wing aircraft.

"It's like an AC130 without a howitzer and a totally different machine gun" making it entirely unlike an AC130. The AC130's GAU23 and the GAU8 on the A10 are very different. I also did targeting missions in Ramadi for AC130s, and it was a lot of fun.

Have you ever been in combat with an A10? I have. I was literally the guy putting a laser (from my Shadow 200 TUAV) onto a weapons cache building in Tal'Afar, Iraq and watched an A10 BRRRRRTTTTTT cut the building in 1/2 before it ignited from all of the ordinance inside.

As to showing the A10's effectiveness in Desert Storm, that was what, 1991? The Soviet T90-A was designed to specifically be fine against 30mm GAU8 rounds, and it was released in 1993. Soviet armor divisions also have serious business anti-aircraft like the Pantsir system, which would obliterate an A10 no question. All recent Soviet weaponry, up to and including the most recent T14 Armata would survive strafing from an A10 just fine, and in the meantime provide targetting data to anti-air platforms to take it out.

TL;DNR: Using the weapons from the early 1990s to fight a war now is a great way to lose. The A10 is an amazing machine, but so was the P51 Mustang in its heyday.

"Been in combat"? (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AAI_RQ-7_Shadow)

:-)

It isn’t flown from Nevada like the bigger UAVs. It’s flown from in country, often only 1km from the mission site (although the total effective range is up to around 160km depending on wind direction, wind speed, and altitude). We’re doing convoys, we’re getting shot at, we’re risking our life. We woke up to mortar and missile fire every day. This is what the military refers to as combat, even cooks see combat. Did you? :)

If you get a combat patch and combat pay, it is combat. If your operational flight record says you have 482 combat flight hours, what would you call it (that is the number of hours I got in OIF II 2003-2004). You don’t have to kick down doors and drop bodies with your hands to be in combat. It was the RQ-7A in specific I flew as the RQ-7B is a bigger airframe with better endurance.

Just how many 30mm shells do you think modern tank armor can withstand? The A10 carries a lot of ammo, all to be fired at the same spot.

Also, a tank without optics and sensors is pretty damn useless.

A lot more than you might realize it seems. Here is a good overview of basically how the A10 is simply ineffective as a modern tank-killer.

https://www.quora.com/Can-an-A-10-Warthog-airplane-take-down...

Again, a hellfire missile from an Apache is a much better way to kill a modern tank.

I reach the opposite conclusion from your article.

It is clear that a single GAU-8 shell to undamaged frontal armor will not cause serious damage. Everything else points to the A-10 being highly effective.

Since we don't get to fire at the T-90 for testing purposes, note that smaller and slower shells from the Bradley have taken out the M1A2 Abrams.

Nothing says you can't hit the same location 100 times. For increased accuracy, improving the ammunition is possible. A few years back, DARPA got 50 caliber (12.7 mm) bullets to have active steering. If we can do that in 50 caliber, 30 mm should be easy.

As for the Hellfire, the A-10 has that beat too, with the Maverick. It goes 3 times as far, carrying 7 to 15 times as much explosive. The A-10 can also carry Paveway, JSOW, and various other precision bombs.

I don't think the psychological effect should be ignored either. Having an A-10 visibly loitering over the battlefield will have an effect on the morale and behavior of both sites of the conflict.

Fair enough, but hitting the same spot twice (even that quora article points that out) is never going to happen. In some real world situations 22 rounds will hit a vehicle the size of a T90 if the pilot has 100% perfect aim, something that is totally possible, but unlikely. You're right on the maverick as well, but the A10 is aging. It won't be too much longer before the maximum wear of the titanium frame has happened and the entire thing will have to be rebuilt, something that likely won't happen. What they need, is a modern re-make of the A10, but it won't come from the air force. They love their fast stealth jets too much.

Unfortunately, it might not. Take a look at this: https://baloogancampaign.com/2015/02/02/10-future-us-close-a...

That's not the threat, though. If you're attacking a modern Russian armor division, you don't shoot bullets at it directly. You attack the weak stream of rubles linking it to Moscow, and maneuver around it until it runs out of fuel.

The A-10 is still effective against light cavalry and mounted cavalry using low-armored ground vehicles, which are the units of choice for highly mobile hit-and-run guerilla combatants. Shooting pennies to destroy dollars is a viable strategy, and the A-10 spews nickels instead of launching quarters.

> The Army isn't allowed to operate fixed-wing aircraft.

That is 100% false. The 160th SOAR flies some CASA-212s, the MC-12 and the regular army flies a variety of SEMA and transport fixed wing aircraft. The Army doesn’t fly fighters, but air superiority isn’t their mission, that’s the Air Force’s job. Naval Aviation is really just a weapons system for ships; it’s for force projection rather than air superiority; Marine Aviation is strictly close air support for Marine operations: not force projection or air superiority.

The Army isn’t more than satisfied with Apaches: they’re not going to be buying any more as the FVL program comes online. That program is taking over from the Blackhawks and Apaches. The Apache was designed to fight tanks in Western European Cold War scenarios.

However, the Army actually wants F-35s rather than the Warthog for CAS. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley said as much at a symposium last year. However, he wants the Air Force flying those planes as that has been the traditional division of labor for the Army: the Air Force generally provides CAS. But it doesn’t really matter what anyone says, there is a contingent of people that hate the military and everything the F-35 represents, regardless of the actual quality of the airplane. The critics have never flown the plane and many of those critics have never spent any time in combat situations where an F-35 would be relevant. There are plenty of ridiculous weapons systems that we don’t need (the Crusader artillery system for example,) but the F-35 isn’t one of them. It’s an incredible plane that allows missions that just wouldn’t be possible in a Super Hornet or a Raptor — at least not without unacceptable losses.

> However, the Army actually wants F-35s rather than the Warthog for CAS. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley said as much at a symposium last year.

Is this desire based on technical merits or political/practical realities? What criteria could be used to evaluate which aircraft is "better" for CAS?

Seems that the F-35 has higher operating costs, is less maneuverable, is more fragile, etc. Does stealth have an advantage when one is strafing at less that 10K feet in a (generally) low-threat and low-intensity environment?

Given all the combat engagements the A-10 has had over the decades, wouldn't it be prudent to at least have the F-35 run some "live" CAS missions to see how it does first? IIRC, the F-35 can't even fire its gun yet (until there's a future software update).

That's the problem. The branches of the US military are based on theater of operation, rather than mission.

Close aerial ground support is 100% a different mission profile than for air superiority fighters and air defense batteries.

If I were commander in chief, I would move most of the military to a new Logistics Corps, and put it in charge of all unit and cargo transport, aerial refueling, airdrops, at-sea resupply, construction and fortifications, vehicles maintenance, and permanent base buildings and facilities. Next, the nuclear triangle of long-range bombers, ballistic missile silos, and missile submarines would go into the Strategic Deterrents Corps, along with ballistic missile defenses, launch detection satellites, strategic-threat tracking radars, and hypersonic cruise missiles. The rest can go into Offense, Defense, and Special Teams, or any other arrangement they please. Once logistics, diplomacy, and strategic advantage are already taken care of, the tactics should be adaptable to the conditions of the conflict at hand.

This is why the Marine Corps operates their own air support and the Navy also controls their own aviation.

My understanding, from knowing some Air Force officers and what I read:

Air Force officers manage people. They don't do things. Specifically, they don't risk their own lives. The Air Force is built around NORAD and SAC and ICBMs. Being the organization owning nuclear missiles is their dream state. They recently added space and cyber to that, both of which also don't involve getting shot at. The A-10 is the ultimate in "not our job" to the USAF. UAVs could not get here fast enough.

Unfortunately, they also don't want anyone else to have the whole aircraft thing. So the Army doesn't get to fly fixed wings and the Navy only has that "aircraft carrier" excuse.

The idea that low cost STOL aircraft will suddenly solve the CAS conundrum is a Reddit-baked solution void of any actual data or understanding. I'm a military aviator and the public more than anything needs to understand that as with most things in this world, it simply isn't as simple as you make it out to be.

The data from the war in Afghanistan paints a pretty good picture of capability versus perception. The vast majority of the responses to troops-in-contact came in the form of precision munitions from F-16s or F-15s. What the "troops" want is not a good variable in understanding what the best method of providing CAS is. Everyone wants the A-10, it's sexy. The reality on the ground is that even in a low threat environment such as Afghanistan the A-10 doesn't nearly do the job as good as an F-16 for a number of reasons which I won't get into in a public forum.

The Airforce vision of CAS is precision munitions from both manned and un-manned platforms that present very little risk to both the operators of the platform and the infrastructure that support them. It would be a significant de-evolution of our capability as a military to continue to operate the A-10 purley on nostalgia and public perception of its' capabilities. I don't expect the public at large to look at this situation with nuisance or data, but let's use common sense if anything. The reason why the Afghan Airforce is operating A-29s and armed C-208Bs has much more to do with cost and sustainability than it does to do with effectiveness. In fact you can find multiple articles of Afghan brass complaining about how what we are giving them isn't particularly well suited to the mission they are expected to sustain. A couple of tool boxes and spare PT6 parts will keep that fleet flying for a couple of years. I don't see them really providing a meaningful impact on the battlefield however.

Being close to the ground is the Army's mission and they do it really well. Adding a couple gunned turboprops won't change anything on the ground today or tomorrow. We are training and developing doctrine for a near-peer threat. We've been focused on COIN too long, and developing budgets and technology for yesterday's conflicts is exactly what set us back in the early days of the GWOT. So consider for a moment that the F-35, despite it's many setbacks and runaway budget might actually do the CAS mission quite well. I'll take the laser guided 500LB bomb over a spray of Hyrda rockets when some asshole starts throwing IDF my way. By the time we procure, field, and properly employ something like the A-29 it's basically going to be limited to a low threat environment scout attack role. Hey doesn't the Army do that??!!

So I told you what this soldier wants, and what the Airforce is doing. Hopefully that's good enough.

since when is the a-10 sexy? its old and ugly but effective.

there is no aircraft on the planet that provides close air support as well as the A10. not even most military brass that want to get rid of the A10 will admit otherwise.

troops want the a10 because they dont want a friggen bomb dropped on their head, not because of nostalgia.

You must be a one of those "troops" then since you seem to know what they want?

"there is no aircraft on the planet that provides close air support as well as the A10"

Apache drivers love their guns, don't say that too loudly. Those Marine AH-1 guys hate their lives so they might not care so much you have that opinion. Those Air Force F-15, F-16, F-22 and B-2 drivers might however be a tad salty that despite the fact they are the ones present at those troop in contact missions most of the time they don't get any love because of LUL BRRRRT.

Troops if anything don't want the A-10 because they don't want a friggen strafe ran over them when they could've had a JDAM. But hey, BRRRRRT

Apaches have a habit of getting shot down during daytime operations.

Army pilot here, no they don't.

You're probably thinking of either the AC130 or Blackhawks operating un-escorted.

My cousin was much more impressed by a plane that could stay over their position for an extended period of time in Afghanistan. The A-10 that showed up could do that and that gun could keep a large number of enemy pretty occupied. CAS actually requires being able to stay over the troops, and the F-35 just is not that type of plane.

I won't argue with loiter time, but projecting that force is hard when those distances increase. The solution has and always will be in-air refueling which every other platform can do just as well.

CAS is more than just "staying", if anything it has a lot more to do with "getting there". We're very good at getting a lot of shit down range, what gets there QUICKLY makes the difference to those on the ground.

What kept him alive was the A-10’s ability to stay above him and keep shooting the enemy. Quick is great, but actually covering troops that we put out by themselves is more important.

Again, the fascination despite the facts. Quick is key. That A-10 does the job well in a VERY specific environment. One void of counter air or anti air wherein the launch base is within a reasonable distance to the target. This is highly unique to that AO. Building a CAS capability around a very narrow definition such as that is stupid, and that is why the Air Force isn't doing it.

If someone wants "the facts", are you aware of any publicly available information that does a (in your opinion) fair/accurate assessment of the pros and cons of the available CAS platform options? (Weblogs, forum posts, white papers, etc.)

I still question the Air Force doing it at all if the F-35 is the answer. How long could the F-35 have stayed above the troops that night? The gun capacity is just awful.

Gun capacity on an A10 isn't that hot either. The sex appeal of the GAU is great, but it only has a shade over 1k rounds, and those go by pretty quickly.

What's really interesting is looking at the data; the majority of CAS missions in Afghanistan were performed by the B-1, hardly what comes to mind when you picture that aircraft. But it has high speed, packs a ton of munitions, and has the ability to persist for a long time over the battlespace.

What vacuum do you think military aviation operates in? Honestly. The A-10 will loiter for an hour or two at most depending on loadout. The F-35 will do about the same.

Loiter time isn't as big of a variable as people make it out to be. We'll just throw more assets into the mix. What matters is getting there fast to be able to actually impact the fight in a meaningful way.

The A-10 works fine on dirt runways. Putting the launch base close to the target is thus relatively easy.

That's the easy part! The hard part is putting the munitions and go juice at that launch base, providing security, comms, etc.

A separate question is whether the jack of all trades concept of the F-35 makes sense.

(I mean, that's a source of lots of the problems with the program)

A plane different than the F-35 doing CAS doesn't have to be the aging A-10.

I don't follow your logic, but perhaps you can't answer my question in public --

For someone like the Army, it seems like a drone version of the A-10, which drops a lot of the pilot armor for increased munitions and dwell time, would be a decisive factor in CAS.

If you look at say, the ambush on American forces in Syria by the Wagner group, substantial amounts of fire were provided by helicopters and AC-130s.

So I'm just lost at how a plane which can reach target faster than a helicopter, but provide similar close in support doesn't have a role in such engagements.

That's not to say that stealth penetration, ECW, and targeted strikes aren't important -- eg, providing openings in IAD, hitting fortified targets quickly, etc. Just that given how things with Wagner went, it seems like long-dwell, high munition count CAS is useful.

Again the fascination with the A-10 despite the fact that it isn't a particularly effective CAS platform nowadays will be my constant struggle in a forum like this.

The issue right now isn't with loiter time or payload. Range is the enemy more than anything right now. We fight a global conflict and providing resources anywhere at anytime is alot harder than it sounds. Making A-10s into drones doesn't solve any particular problem. Once the Army fully realizes future vertical lift we'll have a better picture of what "local" CAS will look like moving forward. Right now we team 64s with UAVs all wholly owned and operated by the Army to project force locally.

Response time is key. An F-16 hauling ass from Al Udeid will give me more than an A-10 hauling ass from Al Udeid. Low risk precision is key. A UCAV at altitude raining hate in the from of hellfires presents very low risk to the asset and a great deal of precision for the troops on the ground. The A-10 can act great as a delivery platform, but it is slow and incredibly vulnerable. Time matters for those troops in contact, and providing fast precision is the key ingredient in CAS right now. Sustainment comes in the form of larger platforms such as the B-1 and the B-52. In a low to moderate risk environment you can start throwing in Army assets and special mission stuff like the AC-130. Air power is built as a stack, and the idea to to provide quick reaction to troops in contact with precision munitions. Bring in ISR platforms (or already have them in place) at altitude to develop the battlefield. Finally, sustain air power with larger platforms or locally employed assets (think short range long loiter) such as AH-64s, AH-6s, DAPS, etc.

The reason why the A-10 doesn't have a KEY role in all of this is because after decades at war, lessons were learned. Now the A-10 isn't SUPER BAD at CAS, we've just evolved. An F-35 will do the job just well in that it provides that critical speed, range, payload, precision and all with an amazing capability set. If we ever need to destroy battalions of tanks en-mass with zero risk of effective counter air or anti-air, I'm sure we'll see the A-10 again.

In terms of Khasham, you're also ignoring the dozen or so sorties flown that day by F-22s, F-15s, and B-52s that provided probably more than 80% of the total payload. Not to mention the many un-named ISR and UCAV platforms that probably stayed in the stack for the better part of that week. Going back to the "stack" mentioned above.

Just wanted to chime in that I appreciate the detailed answer!

Edit:

> Making A-10s into drones doesn't solve any particular problem.

Just wanted to call out -- it actually does solve one problem, and one I've heard expressed as a concern, which is the potential loss of pilots involved with low-flying, slow CAS aircraft, such as the A-10. It also substantially changes the performance requirements when you're not trying to safely house a pilot -- fuel capacity, electronics, lighter or smaller craft (if we're talking future planes), etc.

Hence the reason for my suggestion: it shifts the risk envelope in terms of sending them as CAS, while offering a distinct platform from say, Predator style drones, with relatively lighter armaments.

Let me just conclude by saying my information on military hardware largely comes from Wikipedia, may not include various platforms that haven't been widely publicized, and certainly doesn't include accurate information on combat.

Again, I appreciate you taking the time to talk.

> If we ever need to destroy battalions of tanks en-mass with zero risk of effective counter air or anti-air, I'm sure we'll see the A-10 again.

Aircraft peashooters aren't strong enough to shoot down tanks nowadays.

A GAU8 will destroy any armored vehicle today. Tanks aren't armored equally on all aspects, and the top of the tank (where the majority of the GAU's rounds will impact is usually the thinnest. Now the A10 won't survive long enough against a decent opponent to employ the GAU, but that doesn't matter since either a Maverick or a SDB would be the preferred weapon against a tank. The GAU is really intended for soft targets, not tanks.

> Response time is key. An F-16 hauling ass from Al Udeid will give me more than an A-10 hauling ass from Al Udeid.

Why would the A-10 (Or a light attack aircraft) be hauling ass from there instead of already being in the air near the AO since it has a lot more fuel and loiter time (and lower cost per flight hour)? Or being closer since they can launch from more austere airfields.

Also, I have read articles:

* Quoting JTACs saying dialling in the fast movers afer their arrival takes a lot longer than a slow-mover in a near-contact situation which can be a serious issue (and large removes the "haul ass" 8-minute rule advantage)

* Quoting army captains saying the loiter time is so low after the fast movers have arrived that enemy forces basically learned to stop the attack for 30 minutes then resume after the fast-mover has had to go to the nearest tanker to refuel.

I can maybe see the F-35's sensor suite helping with the first one but not the second (Unless it is so good that it can reliably find targets on the ground even when the JTAC cannot be sure).

Or when I read about Special forces literally having to do end-runs around official policy to get some A-29s to support them because the existing kit wasn't doing the job.

I am not an "A-10 forever" type but I find the "F-35 solves EVERYTHING" crowd to be a bit over-zealous and I have read enough about issues with the Airforce (brass especially) and its relationship with the CAS/COIN role to make me wonder about their ability to evaulate without bias.

I'm not arguing that the F-35 solves every problem here. I'm trying to deconstruct this weird interpretation of CAS that many people have.

> Why would the A-10 (Or a light attack aircraft) be hauling ass from there instead of already being in the air near the AO since it has a lot more fuel and loiter time (and lower cost per flight hour)? Or being closer since they can launch from more austere airfields.

That's a bad way to frame it, I could just argue that a bunch of B-1s should have been at altitude already as well. I guess we'll prop up multiple airfields in Syria because .... well we don't have to, we'll just use other equally as good assets that can be rapidly fielded from regional bases. It simplifies cost, provides quick and effective fire all at a much lower risk. Ultimately the ground force commander builds their own stack and helps arrange and field assets before any major operation. In a low threat environment, hell yes have a bunch of A-10s in the stack ready to rock. But what about some ODA in Nigeria that randomly gets ambushed? That's how we need to be talking about CAS.

> Quoting JTACs saying dialling in the fast movers afer their arrival takes a lot longer than a slow-mover in a near-contact situation which can be a serious issue (and large removes the "haul ass" 8-minute rule advantage).

"Quoting JTACs" is like quoting the private news network in my eyes.

> Quoting army captains saying the loiter time is so low after the fast movers have arrived that enemy forces basically learned to stop the attack for 30 minutes then resume after the fast-mover has had to go to the nearest tanker to refuel.

I wouldn't say that the loiter time is what led to that outcome. Being all holed up in a COP on a mountain side isn't the best place to be in the first place. That's why local CAS must also come into the picture somewhere if you plan to sustain operations.

> Or when I read about Special forces literally having to do end-runs around official policy to get some A-29s to support them because the existing kit wasn't doing the job.

Special mission stuff will always be special mission stuff. We still have OV-10s doing high speed shit in Iraq. That doesn't mean we should build more OV-10s. Tailored solutions are just that.

I'm struggling to find analogies here.

Everyone, you need to drive the Ford 35 Mustang. It's not the fastest car but it's pretty fast. If you strap a trailer on the back then sure it now loses all it's maneuverability but it's now a truck, right? So we don't need trucks any more.

Since it's invisible you don't need any combat capability, unless you load it out with 8 pylons and now it's not invisible any more, so now it does need to outfly the enemy. But it can't because it needs to carry all this load.

It needs to take off and land vertically which means it needs a small cross section but it needs to be able to have a high wing load to turn so it needs a large cross section.

It needs to do close air support but it can't get close. It needs to be slow but it also needs to be fast.

It needs to be a bomber and have long range, but needs to be a fighter and have high performance (or energy maneuverability).

It's what Boyd warned everyone about during the last generation, you need to avoid mutli role aircraft as they're not good at anything.

beyond that if the guy in the ground need precise explosive delivery just build laser guided medium range rockets, a ship could bring thousand of those into any theatre with reasonable safety and skip the expensive delivery platform along with all the concerns for the meatbag inside

Laser guidance kits are pretty expensive which is why there’s a push to move to GPS guidance.

gps can't do the things the guy above asked for

>It's what Boyd warned everyone about during the last generation, you need to avoid mutli role aircraft as they're not good at anything.

Like the F-16 or the F-15E? Hillaker said he'd have designed the F-16 differently(more akin to the F-16XL) if he had known it was going to be multi-role.

Right. It wasn't supposed to be multi-role, the original was a beautiful thing to behold before they started hanging all kinds of crap off of it.

Like radar?

Eh, if it went into production as they had envisioned, it would have been built only to F-104 kind of numbers. By compromising a little on the air to air aspect, they gained enormously in the air to ground aspect and overall utility. Most of the sorties have been air to ground for a good awhile now.

Have you ever thought about that it does not have to fulfill all those roles at once and that war is fought in phases which each require a different trade-off?

Yes.

These are the design constraints. Really it should be 2 or 3 different, almost certainly cheaper, aircraft.

For parent commenter, or anyone else interested, I really liked this in-depth interview with Major Dave Burke (Marine Corps pilot, Top Gun instructor, and Forward Air Controller). Maybe you will like it too...

http://jockopodcast.com/2017/04/05/69-the-real-top-gun-battl...

Listening right now, thanks for the share.

Thank you for coming into this thread and dropping knowledge bombs. There are way too many BRRRRT-heads online that think they're experts in military aviation because they watched a youtube clip one time.

> What the "troops" want is not a good variable in understanding what the best method of providing CAS is.

That reminds of a talk I heard by a historian who pointed out that the Sherman tank was actually a better tank than its reputation suggests. While a bigger gun and more armor could have helped, the tank commands actually turned down bigger guns (because they hadn't yet seen tanks that needed them) and providing sufficient armor to actually stop the weapon fire being trained on them may not have been possible with the logistical constraints of the US Army.

Probably this one by the chieftain "Myths of American Armor"?

https://youtu.be/bNjp_4jY8pY

Same guy, although I don't think that was the precise talk in question.

> the F-35, despite it's many setbacks and runaway budget might actually do the CAS mission quite well

If you're defining CAS as dropping overkill PGMs from 30,000ft in clear skies.

But that form of CAS is unique to the 'last war'. How will the F-35 fare in Central Europe where 90% of days are overcast and media coverage means you can't just throw a 500lber into a block of flats to suppress a sniper.

> So I told you what this soldier wants, and what the Airforce is doing.

The soldier wants the target suppressed ASAP, in any weather and with minimal risk to friendly force. The Air Force is following its usual tactic of appearing to do just enough to fulfil the soldier's needs so that it can keep the Army away from armed fixed-wing.

>But that form of CAS is unique to the 'last war'.

Unique like how the A-10 has been operating in such uncontested airspace of the 'last war'? An SU-25 was downed by a MANPADS last year in Syria. The A-10 is tough and highly survivable, but the case of not being hit in the first place has some merit.

That form of CAS it not at all unique to the "last war", it's the next evolution of CAS from lessons learned. CAS doesn't need to mean slow, fat, and scary. It needs to be effective and fast.

Even on an overcast day you could still throw a munition through a window of a building, I don't know why you think that cloud coverage diminishes our capability.

> So I told you what this soldier wants, and what the Airforce is doing. Hopefully that's good enough.

In your opinion, does this article accurately reflect the current limitations of the A-10, and list useful enhancements of what a "Warthog 2.0" should have? For example:

> Because CAS missions often take place at very low altitudes and low airspeeds — anywhere from 150 knots to 300 knots — the aircraft must be able to perform a two-G sustained turn at a rate of five degrees per second with a turn radius of no more than 2,000 feet.

> The instantaneous turn rate — that is, how quickly a plane can wheel around in the first few seconds of a maneuver — would have to be better than 20 degrees per second while pulling six Gs. The aircraft must also be able to remain less than one mile from a target between attacks while pulling no more than two Gs — except for the roll-in to the attack and the time it’s leaving the area.

[...]

> The A-10 cannot take off at its maximum weight in places like Afghanistan and must either off-load weapons or fuel. The next-generation aircraft must be able climb out of a runway at maximum gross weight at a rate of the 4,000 feet per minute at a density altitude of 20,000 feet. Further, it must be able to operate out of a 3,000-foot runway at sea-level with a full fuel load and an internal gun. Ideally, it should be able to operate out of austere 1,500-foot runways.

> A cruise speed of at least 360 knots is desirable, the pilots said. Initially, the group believed that it would be best for a next-gen aircraft to cruise at 480 knots with a dash speed of 540 knots. However, with Sprey’s input, the team came to the conclusion that such a requirement would be aerodynamically incompatible with a tight turn radius at low airspeed.

[...]

> The prospective next-generation Warthog replacement needs to have a minimum combat radius of 150 nautical miles with at least four hours on station time with internal fuel, the pilot explains.

* https://warisboring.com/what-will-the-next-a-10-warthog-look...

* https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/mcsallys-case-let...

This is why the Marines specifically wanted a STOVL variant. Horizontal speed can be arbitrarily slow for a STOVL jet, even zero, and STOVL jets can take off from small, hastily constructed airfields. Likewise, most close air support these days is actually from helicopters.

The A-10 is a flying anti-tank machine gun from the 1970's.

STOVL aircraft including the F-35B never hover during normal operations except for the last few seconds before landing. It burns too much fuel, and depending on how much weight the aircraft is carrying (fuel plus ordnance) there may not even be enough thrust available.

The point of the person you responded to was that STOVL aircraft can fulfill the requirement of a close air support (CAS) platform of being able to take off from hastily constructed airstrips, rather than being limited to carriers and large bases, often far removed from the area of operations.

Well that was the theory but it's never really worked out in practice due to security, maintenance, and logistics obstacles. Aircraft in forward bases are too vulnerable to mortar attacks. And all the fuel, parts, and ordnance has to be brought in by truck convoys or helicopter. It's just totally impractical.

It’s impractical in a setting like Iraq or Afghanistan, sure. On the other hand, if the Marines were to land on one of the Spratly Islands or on the coast of Norway, they could construct an airfield and have the Navy supply it from the sea, freeing one of the carriers or amphibious carriers to be redeployed elsewhere (or perhaps just adding to the local airfield capacity). Being able to base and operate STOVL aircraft days or weeks before heavier aircraft can be deployed there provides a significant advantage.

As programmers we are well trained to find the source of a problem, not treating the symptoms. The source problem is a lack of fire support for troops. This does not require an airborne weapon platform, fire support can be delivered by cannon and rocket artillery. And coincidentally this area is lacking in the US armed forces.

The Paladin is based on a chassi from like the early 1960s and can only do three rounds per minute or one round per minute sustained up to 22km. In comparison the Panzerhaubitze 2000 that can fire 10-13 rounds a minute continuously up to 30km. The 2016 Russian 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV can do 16 rounds per minute up to 40km, even the older 2S19 "Msta-S" manages 6-8 rounds per minute up to 24km. Not to mention the modern wheeled based systems like the Archer or the CAESAR which would be ideal for rapid redeployment against threats in a low intensity conflict.

And then we have rocket artillery systems, here the USA actually have a modern piece that is good in low intensity warfare, the M142 HIMARS. But compared to the Russians the US basically doesn't have any long range rocket artillery systems available for fire support.

But if you insist on having a CAS platform then forget about the A-10. Ask the Russians if you can buy some SU-25 Frogfoots. It's the best CAS in the world.

Is rate of fire really a blocker for US artillery? Can't they just bring more guns?

1 rpm sustained fire is extremely low. That's like a magnitude worse than the other modern alternatives. All others also fire atleast twice as fast and for almost 150% of the distance. Also sense the gun is that bad it creates a self reinforcing effect, why would you want more of it if it's bad?

>Ask the Russians if you can buy some SU-25 Frogfoots. It's the best CAS in the world.

\laughs in CIA supplied MANPADS\

Haha! It's a good joke. Don't know why you are being downvoted. Now the other guy could could afford to get some of those downvotes instead.

Sustained rate of fire isn't as important as you've implied. First off, you'll either burn out your barrel, or run out of ammo. Two, most fire missions in high intensity combat will be shoot and scoot, where each system fires 2-3 rounds then moves to a secondary fire position to avoid counterbattery fires. In low intensity combat situations where relocation isn't a requirement (Iraq/Afghan), firing rate is completely unimportant.

And you're also ignoring ATACMS. HIMARS is nice for the Marines, but ATACMS is great for high intensity warfare.

And the SU-25? Junk. It wouldn't survive 30 minutes against anyone with a decent AD (though neither would the A-10). Everyone underestimates how lethal modern combat will be against any and all aircraft.

It’s cause A10’s are cheap and F-35’s are expensive. Same reason why the SR-71 was killed (10 planes to own the sky and any adversary vs an order for hundreds).

The SR-71 was a recon platform, not a fighter or bomber. It was made obsolete largely by advances in satellite technology.

Also: "On Sept. 3, 2012 an article written by Rakesh Krishman Simha for Indrus.in explains how the Foxhound was able to stop Blackbirds spy missions over Soviet Union on Jun. 3, 1986.

That day, no less than six MiG-31s “intercepted” an SR-71 over the Barents Sea by performing a coordinated interception that subjected the Blackbird to a possible all angle air-to-air missiles attack.

Apparently, after this interception, no SR-71 flew a reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union and few years later the Blackbird was retired to be replaced with the satellites."

https://theaviationist.com/2013/12/11/sr-71-vs-mig-31/

The Aurora project and TR3-B were successful. There's no chance we don't have a few of them in Dreamland or off the intercontinental self where we simply use them for reconnaissance. Just look at the old F-16 pilot footage from 2007, it was a controlled leak to see how the government would react to such technology, just like the disclosure of Area 51 (Bob Lazar) after satellite imagery was beginning to become popular.

IDK, part of me feels like there's too high of a chance of Aurora being confused for a ICBM reentry. And similarly, the same interceptor missiles used for hypersonic payloads like that would be effective against it. And the countries that don't have nukes and anti-nuke infrastructure, we just fly drones over with relative impunity. So I legitimately don't see the niche where they make more sense than something else that's public.

That being said, the Space Shuttle didn't really make sense on it's face either and we built it, so I could def be wrong.

I agree with you on all points, but they are already disclosing the late 80s technology to the general public with the SR-72. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_Martin_SR-72) Allegedly, Ben Rich of Skunk Works after he retired in 1991 gave a presentation at UCLA chronicling his career and hinted at the Aurora and that "we now have the technology to send ET home" so we probably have some new type of propulsion system that makes planes interstellar. This is all speculation though.

What's really fascinating is the x-37b https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_X-37 we have an autonomous space craft in orbit for years, yet I never head anything about it. It's part DARPA project so, it's probably some sort reconnaissance experiment.

I could go on and on, I just find this all fascinating.

That makes planes interstellar.

I’m sorry, what?

As in can fly to proxima centuri?

It was capable of bombing and A-to-A combat, but was never used for either, according to the Skunk Works book by Ben Rich.

Good to know! I'll have to pick up a copy of Skunk Works, I've heard many good things about it.

Making new A-10s wouldn't be cheap. The newest ones are 35 years old.

The company that built them shuttered 16 years ago.

The 'replacement specs' supposedly exist in an unofficial capacity:

* https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/17236/a-10-replacement...

An older article talking about the current Warthog limitations and what a "Warthog 2.0" should have:

* https://warisboring.com/what-will-the-next-a-10-warthog-look... * https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/mcsallys-case-let...

The A10 has lots of redundancy, including a second engine, and even some armor. Super Tucanos lack all that. For a country like the USA, with expensive pilots and a huge aversion to getting pilots killed, something like the A10 makes far more sense. Other countries have a different situation obviously, making the Super Tucano a better choice for them.

The sane choice for the USA would be a new A10, redone mostly to avoid components that are getting difficult to source. Minor other changes are fine (geared turbofans, modernized armor, no bleed air...) but one shouldn't let Second System Syndrome make a monster.

Reply on news.ycombinator.com