India has an intricate history with nuclear technology. Both the Soviet Union and the US courted India in the 1950s, but in the end it was Canada who donated a design for the first Indian reactor that came online in the 1960s. The US assisted with building another. Indian testing of nuclear weapons in the 1970s drew a sharp rebuke from several countries and the US and Canada withdrew their assistance. This also resulted in the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an export control regime to prevent nuclear proliferation. Cut off from exporters of nuclear technology, they slowly continued with domestic designs and new research. But their tremendous size and influence made them an attractive partner in geopolitical power plays.

In 1988 the Soviet Union and India announced they would build two new reactors, and the US fiercely protested at the time. The Soviet Union fell apart, and the Russians didn't resume the project for another 10 years, but construction eventually began in 2002. In 2006 the US and India reached an agreement to cooperate and the US lobbied for an exemption for India from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which was granted. It quickly became obvious that everyone wanted a slice of the Indian nuclear energy market.

Disregarding climate change for a moment, it's clear that the energy demand in India is increasing, and despite a rapid rise in the deployment of renewables, utility-scale generation is still 75% coal. This contributes greatly to pollution. Local coal lower quality than elsewhere, requiring more per unit of power. Nuclear will be an important complement to renewables as the energy mix slowly migrates off of coal. Unlike the US, which is awash in cheap natural gas that's readily stored and piped where needed, helping to even out the mismatch between solar generation and demand, India has very little natural gas, so it can't afford to pursue a strategy that deemphasizes nuclear energy.