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Comment by drinchev | Hacker News Reader

TBH at this point everyone should do it, since it will be a nightmare flying on these, until the investigation is over. I can’t imagine how the crew feels when assigned to such a fight in these circumstances.

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The current theory of "why" is that the new system should work automatically so there's no need for retraining, but if it goes wrong the pilot can disable it; but since there's no retraining, the doomed pilots didn't know why the planes were doing what they did and how to disable it.

If I were a pilot and got assigned the same model, I would make sure to learn the procedure to disable it. And make sure the procedure really works, although how would I do that, can I ask Boeing? Since it's software, what other variables did they forget to include in their testing?

It's already been established however that if the pilots follow the original checklist then they would be disabling it as part of those steps. With the first crash it was decided that they quit following the steps and kept fighting the stick until it was too late.

The pilots are required to, by memory, know when this particular situation is happening and how to disable the system. The checklist is the runaway trim checklist, to turn the system off the pilot flips switches next to the trim-wheel, which moves with the automatic trim to visually indicate trim adjustments. This is not new to the MAX, only MCAS adjusting the trim is new to MAX.

When customers start complaining they'll ground them I think

Customers are already demanding information about the plane assigned on their flight.

If you look at Southwest's Twitter feed, it's in full spin mode.

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