The status quo of a semi-adversarial relationship between the NSA and tech companies for offensive cyber capabilities seems better to me for both parties. Of course it would be good if they were collaborating on defensive cyber security.
The status quo of a semi-adversarial relationship between the NSA and tech companies for offensive cyber capabilities seems better to me for both parties. Of course it would be good if they were collaborating on defensive cyber security.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSAKEY.
I thought everybody already knew that US corporations serve as an extension to the surveillance apparatus. Remember all the corporations fighting against the government's mandate at an artificially crippled maximum keysize of 40 bits, in order to allow continued surveillance in the 90s? Yeah, neither do I.
Interpreting _NSAKEY as an NSA backdoor is similarly naive. First, it's named _NSAKEY. Surely they could name it something else. Second, its purpose was reverse-engineered, and it's capable of signing cryptography modules, same as the existing Microsoft key named _KEY. Anything that could be done through _NSAKEY could also be done through _KEY, so it would be easy for the NSA to just ask for a copy of _KEY such that nobody would notice. The conspiracy theory makes no sense - it's like saying "$politician is trying to take away our freedoms by pouring mind-control agents into the water" when $politician is just straight-up signing bills to take away your freedoms.
Your comparison is out of line because of ridiculous characterizations like this. Microsoft said that it was a backup key, which either means that they have the most poorly implemented scheme for backing up cryptographic materials ever devised, or they don't mean what most people think when they hear the word "backup". Microsoft then claimed that the backup was necessary for passing the export control review, which is a bold lie to tell since the Export Administration Regulations are available for review to everybody. One thing not included in the EAR that might influence Microsoft's conduct in trying to get permission from the USG to reach global customers: executive orders. The government had a hard limit at 56-bits and was proposing that anybody wanting to export crypto beyond that needed to participate in their push for private-key escrow, which they were calling "key-recovery". Recovery... sounds kind of like a backup plan...
I provided links in my response to the parent comment.
At the very least, retract your claim about how people who don't want fluoride in the water are "loons," and then maybe we can have a good-faith conversation. But if you want to dismiss people with actual science backing their views as loons, I'll dismiss you as a loon, too.
I'll tell you what it looks like to me:
After the debug symbol is found, Microsoft gives a seemingly very stupid explanation for it[1]: "It is a backup key. Yeah, uhhhh... during the export control review - the NSA said that we had to have a backup key, so we named it after them..." After being challenged on the plausibility of their backup scheme they refuse to provide any further explanation.
Here is the funny part: Microsoft might be technically telling the truth about it being a "backup". Consider what else was going on around this period: ridiculous export controls on key-length, the clipper chip... and finally: government managed private-key escrow[2]. At that time the export regulations did not specify a backup requirement, and yet Microsoft claims otherwise. You know who else was talking a lot about backups? The Whitehouse, in its proposal for allowing the export of key-lengths above 56-bits - so long as applicants implement "key-recovery".[3] Somehow I don't think that we share the same definition of the word "backup".
Also, ECI Sentry Raven[4], have fun with that.
[0] https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/784280/sigint-ena...
[1] https://cryptome.org/nsakey-ms-dc.htm
[2] https://web.archive.org/web/20000818204903/https://csrc.nist...
[3] https://epic.org/crypto/key_escrow/key_recovery.html
[4] https://archive.org/details/nsa-sentry-eagle-the-intercept-1...
Evidence of X does not include "X would have been done by Y, and Y did Z, and X and Z are both bad, so why wouldn't Y do X too." That is basically the definition of an ad hominem argument. Whatever else the NSA may have done, and however much it's reason to believe the NSA might have wanted to do this specific thing, it's not evidence of them doing this specific thing (and again I'm not sure what this specific thing is even supposed to be). And if anything, the lack of mention of NSAKEY in the leaks is a reason to believe that there wasn't anything there.
Evidence of X also does not include "Y refused to talk about X." That might be evidence that Y is suspicious and untrustworthy (or evidence that the person asking was a conspiracy theorist who wouldn't be satisfied by any explanation), but it's not evidence that Y actually did X.
So, that's my definition of evidence. I'll turn this around: what would evidence that NSAKEY was not a backdoor look like to you? Would anything convince you, or is your claim unfalsifiable?
It would only work one way with an API relying on a PKI with a single CA, zero transparency, and trusted keys named after spy agencies suddenly appearing out of nowhere. I'm gonna bail here, because I'm now not sure if you honestly don't know what the CAPI was in relation to the NSAKEY - or if you're trying to waste my time by getting me to explain the most basic principles of public key infrastructure.
How would the signed payload to activate this backdoor be delivered? Where’s the code that receives it? Where’s the code that then processes that signed payload?
It’s not like this stuff is terribly hard to reverse, you’ll almost certainly be able to easily find all the symbols and probably even leaked source on various NT-related forums.
You are wrong on the facts that there is a "single CA" - there is _KEY in addition to _NSAKEY.
So, this brings me back to the point I mentioned at the top of the thread: why didn't the NSA just demand a copy of the private key for _KEY instead of a separate key? A separate key always carried a risk, and also required a rebuild - handing over _KEY could have happened immediately. If _NSAKEY has special permissions, can you point me to where in disassembled CAPI code / leaked source these special permissions are implemented, and what they are?
Your conspiracy theory is "The NSA is evil and also stupid." This is a more complex and less likely, and less worrisome conspiracy theory than "The NSA is evil." If the only thing we have to worry about from the NSA is things bungled as badly as this alleged _NSAKEY backdoor and the actual Dual_EC_DRBG backdoor (which was noticed by cryptographers basically instantly), we have nothing to worry about. That doesn't seem like the rhetorical position you want to take.
The fact that foreign governments aren't more skeptical of Microsoft really baffles me. The American government isn't dumb enough to buy security products from Kapersky after all, or devices from Huawei.
Windows is still closed source. Therefore there is a lot of speculation around the phone home capabilities.
To pull of what they did, they knew multiple zero-day vulernabilities in Windows. To any reasonable security-minded person, knowing that many vulnerabilities and having the ability to capitalize on them is likely only achievable a few different ways, one of those ways being having an arrangement with the company whose vulnerabilities you were exploiting.
I would. However, I'm in no position to deny that I need Microsoft's products. Assuming I'm Iran, I'm not going to convert my entire digital infrastructure away from the status quo. I literally won't be able too anyway.
Now if I'm America and we're talking about Huawei undermining my customers.... Yeah I don't have to put up with that and Huawei will lose. I don't care, I've got Samsung and Apple. So I see your point, but you're misrepresenting the scale.