The worst offender I have seen in the wild is treasurydirect.gov. The password must be click in on an online keyboard, and they do not allow password managers to enter the passwords.
Screenshot here: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/TreasuryDirect
Screenshot here: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/TreasuryDirect
It uses some kind of JS trick to replace usernames and passwords with asterisks, and you end up with all kinds of invalid information stored in your password manager.
Have they ever heard of input type="password"?
This is a weird way to describe keyloggers if that is actually what they are talking about.
The random order I don't understand either unless the "keylogger" is also recording mouse positions.
Otherwise, if this is actually talking about over shoulder lookers it probably has the exact opposite effect because of the increased time require to enter a password.
I would bet that that is exactly what they are worried about. This seems to me to be a really hacky way to solve that problem. If you actually need to address the possibility of keyloggers then some sort of 2FA setup would be simpler, more standard, would address a wider variety of potential security problems, and would create less friction for the user.
Anything more bespoke than that is probably much rarer.
Unless it's common for keyloggers to monitor the clipboard?
In which case, for the system they've developed to seemingly work as intended, you'll have to either have a memorizable password (likely relatively insecure), or have your password written down at hand.
I'm skeptical that this nonstandard, hostile UX was designed with any sort of valid threat analysis rather some kind of Rube Goldberg-esque security-through-obscurity scheme that "sounded good" during some meeting.
1. "Does your account number begin with a *letter*" <- click link
2. Paste Account Number
3. One-time passcode emailed to you
4. Copy OTP from email
5. Paste OTP into site
6. Use onscreen virtual keyboard to enter password (readonly field; no pasting allowed)
And just in case it's not a joke, storing hashes of every subset is laughably easy to crack so that's plaintext-equivalent.
this technique is actually good if implemented correctly -- with secure display where the host OS cannot read the image data. some predecessor to SGX whose name I don't recall had this feature. the idea is to enter a PIN though, not a friggin password.
treasurydirect seems to have only taken away the trivial aspect of it without understanding the underlying reasons and details. you know, like what most companies do with Agile.
"Does your account number begin with a [letter]?",
Where letter is a link. It's like a riddle.