Oklahoma Department of Securities Leaked Millions of Files
upguard.com
upguard.com
- i use fastmail, and use the alias@myemail.mydomain.com to alias everything.
- tennessee has a way to let you remind to renew your plates, so i used licenceplate@myemail.mydomain.com - i got a phishing email licenceplate@myemail.mydomain.com
- i contacted them, and the investigator said they allow third parties access, so basically it was too hard to track it down.
I really don't know what to do, maybe send it to a newspaper?
I chose to stay quiet.
I guess I'm not the only one to have faced this dilemma.
Here it was a citys (pop 2mil+) water system. I didn't need a name or password to it once I got into the server itself.
I screenshotted the login, the exploit, their water system (it reminded me of MS Paint, which a lot of those system seem to look like), then created a fresh e-mail using Tor, sent a few e-mails to several e-mail addresses I could find for contacting them, and within a few days it was no longer accessible.
For a longer time than I should have, I felt bad for doing it, but at the same time, I doubt they would have done much if I just e-mailed them without showing proof.
I never received anything, threats or thanks, in that e-mail account. So hopefully someone appreciated it.
I have a custom domain, so i set my email to firstname@mydomain.com. They allow you to use alias@firstname.mydomain.com to alias to firstname@mydomain.com and you can use as many aliases as you want. That is at no additonal charge. To me, that alone is worth it to use fastmail.
Like the parent, I have name@example.com as the official account email for a single user account. All aliases are alias@example.com.
source: I work for fastmail.
https://web.archive.org/web/20080415231058/http://thedailywt...
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2019/01/16/massi...
https://www.upguard.com/breaches/rsync-oklahoma-securities-c...
If upguard's behavior were responsible, why would they have downloaded any more data than necessary to determine that it was sensitive stuff? They would have noticed it, reported it (without downloading) and perhaps helped fix it. I doubt very much that the OK Dept of Securities would have subsequently given them access to the files so as to do some kind of audit on sensitivity, in a non-NDA manner.
This post reads more like an ad for upguard than a responsible disclosure.
This was a very very serious leak and I don't see how the severity could be communicated otherwise.
> This post reads more like an ad for upguard than a responsible disclosure.
As long as there is quality information in return I have no problem with this type of stuff appearing HN. And this was a very interesting post.
That said, they located the open rsync server via shodan, which is not exactly the elite tactics of the security world. Lots of people, both benevolent and malicious, watch shodan queries for things like this and triage new findings. So it might be more appropriate to say "if an IP address falls in a forest that a lot of people are watching", but that rather tangles the metaphor. In my experience rsync probing is significantly rarer than SMB and NFS probing, so I'd hazard a guess that there are also fewer people watching Shodan for rsync than more commonly exposed file share protocols, but I'd wager that it's still more people than just this one research outfit.
The big impact of Shodan, as the best known large-scale internet scan and the only one I know of that exposes so much data to the public, is that things like a lone exposed service on a random IP can't comfortably be assumed to be obscure any more. Once Shodan sees it, anyone can know about it with trivial effort.