Boeing uses force feedback so the two pilots are aware that something is counter-acting their input.
I really don’t think the Airbus strategy is defensible - certainly not when the two inputs are far apart!
Boeing uses force feedback so the two pilots are aware that something is counter-acting their input.
I really don’t think the Airbus strategy is defensible - certainly not when the two inputs are far apart!
Boeing is responsible in the article too: adding such new feature without properly communicating with the pilots??
Maybe the pilots did not receive proper sim time on a 737MAX, which I believe has different enough instrumentation and automation systems to require a separate sim from the standard 737. But they almost certainly knew which systems were on the plane, and how to operate them under normal conditions.
Isn't part of Boeing's marketing strategy that the 737MAX actually DOESN'T require additional training? The entire point of MCAS is to make the larger 737MAX react to control inputs just like a smaller 737, so flight crew can just fly them all "like a 737".
Airbus statement on sidesticks. [1]
Boeing position on sidesticks.[2]
This is a long-standing controversy. The F-16 fighter was the first aircraft produced with a sidestick. But that was so the pilot could control it during high-G maneuvers. Airbus's use of it has been controversial for years. For a good overview of the Airbus control system, read "Fly by Wire", by William Langewiesche.
But that wasn't the problem with Lion Air.
Airspeed. Attitude. Vertical speed. Altitude. If the pilot is operating on wrong information for any of those, they may lose control of the aircraft. All large aircraft have more than one of each of those. But when they disagree, or fail in a common mode, big trouble.
Whether some other data source like GPS or inertial should be used to back up those is an open question. GPS can and is jammed. Inertial systems drift. Both are complicated. The classic instruments are so simple. But they rely on tubes to holes in the aircraft skin, which might become plugged for a number of reasons - ice, maintenance covers, insects, or dirt.
[1] https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/app/themes/mh_newsdesk/docume...
If you read the whole transcript and report it really does show just how wrong the pilot pulling back got it. And it speaks to the training and understanding that pilot had of how to fly the electronics vs how to fundamentally fly an aircraft.
He quite literally kicked down the door to the cockpit and asked "What the hell are you doing?"
Moments later, the co-pilot at fault said "but I've had that stick down the whole time!"
I don't know easily panicked mentality can be tested for. Training is one thing, but training is typically designed to instill automatic response to predetermined stimuli. Sometimes what you want is a reset back to first principles and activation of conscious reasoning. Which is exactly what you don't get in shock or panic, and is the reason for training automatic response.
Captain: What the hell are you doing?
Benin: We've lost control of the plane!
Robert: We've totally lost control of the plane. We don't understand at all... We've tried everything
Now, instead of a team working jointly on a problem, we have two juniors feeling that they have to justify and defend themselves to their captain. It’s a really poor psychological position to be in with a time-critical problem to be solved.
It’s a human response, obviously, but I’m betting it’s the opposite of what his training would have recommended.
IMO, in that moment, the Captain either needed to get his crew problem-solving, or take control himself. unfortunately he did neither.
But I think at this point the plane was plummeting belly down (not nose down) to the ocean and they only had like 90 seconds to live.
By that point I think they all knew they were dead, even though their words don't indicate it. They were in pitch black conditions :(
There was time, if only someone had said the word ‘stall’ out loud.