US ballistic missile systems have very poor cyber-security
zdnet.com
zdnet.com
I've spoken to the military trained "cyber warriors" at conferences and it was unsettling. They simply had a worse grasp than some pre-college kids I've met who dabble in security between high school classes.
There's a lot of veneer there and not a whole lot of substance. It is like they're trained to be the world's best script kiddies (e.g. they run provided tools in a given order and expect a predetermined result, they don't REALLY grasp the underlying concepts at a low level).
Now I will say the NSA has some really sharp cookies, and I'm sure some other DoD departments do too. But the people at the top seem to think "cyber" war can be mapped to normal war, and train accordingly. That's a fool's errand.
Hopefully they get it together, but in terms of DoD's own internal politics it seems like a long road with the computer illiterate grey hairs at the top.
Based on my experience working with those ex-DoD folks, I echo your sentiment. Anyone who was known to be a part of the veteran hiring initiative became a black sheep among the other rank-and-file at my company, because everyone knew that the DoD folks could hardly do anything more complex than a follow a 5-step "how to install metasploit" guide without having their hand held (and even then...). They also had very little familiarity with basic security tools like MFA, IDS, IDM softwares (which makes sense after reading the article).
The worst part still was that they were very cocky about their abilities. I heard way too many times about how "I have experience with 'real war' at the pentagon, I know what I'm talking about", when in reality they certainly did not. If the actual DoD is anything like their ex-infosec employees that I worked with, I can only imagine that this article is just the tip of the iceberg.
But who would ever argue that? It's political suicide, "how dare you hate the troops", etc. It's fun to see how toxic it can get -- I'd recommend looking at a few of the USAJobs message boards that have advice on how to get hired. Every now and then you'll see a thread about how the veteran preference is unfair, and, well, I won't spoil it. :)
It won't change until it has to change.
The conflation of two totally different categories of products decreases the credibility of the entire article.
With that said, the subject matter is tragic.. almost terrifying. Did we learn nothing from stuxnet?
STIG scans are automated and the basis for identifying a finding is sometimes a lot different from the name. You have to decode the scanners script and compare the description with the code. In this case it is likely a "medium" finding that an email service is running and may be a risk. "May" and not "is". It requires a manual evaluation to confirm.
My favorite is the vulnerability identified as [redacted] which merely identifies the operating system as Windows. It is a High severity.
At our facility we have a "check box" security department. The entity above us is so concerned about STIG findings and if they are checked of of the list, other vulnerabilities are left to the wayside.
I once got in an argument about outdated embedded versions of java in applications we use. some were up to 7 years old. I advised that we contact vendors, but being an systems admin that was up to the individual application administrators. I was told it didn't show up on scans and to shut up and color (OK they were a little nicer to me than that, same message though).
I can see how places might be lacking in security if they have the same mentality as here.
* Update: Never mind, I stand corrected. You are correct. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airborne_Launch_Control_System...
My understanding is that inside the capsule LCCs, if the ALCS sends a launch order, if they do nothing in two minutes, the missile launches. I believe any of the ten LCCs in the wing can abort the launch. Then there's some arbitration procedure where another LCC can reverse this and decide to launch after all, and then I think the wing commander's LCC can have a final override on that. The intention is that if all of the LCCs are destroyed, the missiles can still be launched, since there would be no one left to abort the launch, but under normal conditions, the ALCS would not be able to launch. The government is currently starting to build a new ALCS replacement system that is IP based, which I think has to be about the worst idea I've ever heard of.