'Dying All Tensed-Up': 30 Years Since the Troubled Secret Mission of STS-27
americaspace.com
americaspace.com
According to the prof, the shuttle as originally envisioned would have had about 1/2 the cargo volume, and less throw weight, but in return a higher orbit at engine cut-off, much better serviceability, and a simpler design. In order to get the support of the military, the cargo requirement was pushed to what was just-barely-heroically-possible engineering in order to launch the military satellites desired by the spooks.
This decision compromised the program in every way imaginable. The schedule stretched out. The launch-pad weight ballooned, forcing the solid booster design into barely-possible territory. The original goal of "recycle for weekly launches" became a pipe dream. The re-entry heat shield design became very complex. The unit cost ballooned. The cost per launch ballooned.
The right answer all along would have been to tell the spooks: "No, damn it, design satellites that fit the payload bay or take a hike." The spooks would have had many years to refine and compact ever-better satellites. We paid a high price for poor program management decisions at the top.
The lesson I take out of it: As engineers, we need to think about risk budget at all times. Pushing the envelope on something is probably necessary to beat the competition. Pushing the envelope on everything is poor risk management. As an engineering manager, be very intentional about where risk is allowed. Concentrate your management efforts on de-risking the risky, and delegate the low-risk to clear your mind for managing the unpredictable.
I will admit that I have not always done that, and have collected the scars that I deserved.
https://history.nasa.gov/SP-4221/ch8.htm
Also the performance of spy satellites is dictated by optics. In order to get sharper images you need larger lenses. That's just physics. Smaller will always be worse.
Another answer is modularity of design, like Falcon Heavy. Though granted it is much harder for a spaceplane concept and may as well be an ultimate feature creep.
One of the super secret missions they used to sell the shuttle program was capture (and theft, or tampering and replacement?) of foreign in-orbit satellites. There isn’t any solid evidence this was ever done, but it was a unique capability of something like the shuttle.
No. That is the easier-to-swallow purpose. The logistics of capturing an enemy sat, one that might defend itself by changing orbit, are ridiculous.
What shuttle could do was bring friendly sats back. Why? Well it would have to be something that you couldn't let burn up in the atmosphere but neverthless needed to come home. Shuttle could have serviced space-based nuclear weaponry, the one type of friendly sat that couldn't be destroyed in the atmosphere or sent into a disposal orbit.
A fleet of nuclear-tipped reentry vehicles in orbit would have required constant up-and-down servicing. Russia saw the US biulding a vehicle capable of servicing such a fleet. Fearing a capability gap, Russia developed Buran. But when various treaties and understandings mooted space-nuke concepts, Buran lost its purpose and was parked. Shuttle continued.
Other aspects of shuttle also came from never-flew military missions. Those giant wings were to permit a polar-orbit overflight of russia with return to the launch center, a cross-range capability. It didn't need such massive wings.
Nukes in orbit was long out of question by the treaties. The Star Wars was all the rage (SDI). It is those satellites and their components which were going to be huge and be nuclear powered and thus couldn't be just burned in the atmosphere.
(As was done before, during and after the space shuttle program.)
In this case the story says the satellite required ad hoc human intervention in order to become operational which does support the idea that the STS was needed.
However given the amount of propaganda around both the STS program itself and of course the NRO and other intelligence agencies it's difficult to know what to believe, and I pretty much agree with the opinion (yours too I believe) that the STS was a significant drag on the US space program.
(What's the chance that purpose built "satellite retrievers" might already have been constructed? The current crop of micro satellites would be seemingly easier to retrieve and return to earth using a "corona-style" mechanism (drop and collect in air via aircraft) -- something impossible with the older refrigerator- or bus-sized ones.
If you google "inspector satellite" you'll see that in current events, people are questioning whether they've been deployed.
https://www.airspacemag.com/space/spaceplane-x-37-180957777/
That would work once. After you successfully capture one satellite your adversary would add a special explosive payload to a subsequent satellite and then "leak" a salacious detail about said satellite to make you attempt to capture it. One shuttle braking up in orbit later and you'd never use it for that purpose again.
On-orbit servicing of friendly recon sats was considered pretty seriously, though: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3390/1
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shenzhou_program#Missions_laun...
They didn't managed to add engines to their copy and US launcher had reusable parts, but "Energiya" was strictly for single-time use.
And it isn't like the US program hasn't suffered from neglect either. The best thing for US space efforts, both orbital and not, has been the end of STS.
You then claim that they must have damaged a fuel line when they touched the satellite.
How do you know it hasn't? For example, it would seem to be within the capbilities of the rumored Blackstar:
> Flight controllers were convinced from the grainy images that the damage was not severe and that the crew were mistakenly seeing damage in conditions of poor lighting.
I can't help but wonder if they had to say that because there was no real way to either fix the shuttle or retrieve the astronauts.
> If the heat shield was damaged, it could spell disaster during the fiery return to Earth and Gibson’s was instructed to use RMS cameras to acquire imagery.
Why wasn't this SOP until after we lost another shuttle crew?
The point is that there's always something to try, even if it's improbable. Pilots are told to fly as far into the crash as possible, because it never helps to give up, and there might still be something you can do.
It's possible that they chose to say that because they thought there was no way to save the astronauts, but they definitely did not have to. And if that's really how it was, they definitely shouldn't have.
I have never understood NASA management. It's been responsible for both Shuttle disasters (pushing Challenger to launch despite unsuitable weather). NASA demonstrated what I think is humanity's finest engineering-your-way-out-of-a-problem with Apollo 13, which couldn't benefit from satellite imaging, robot arms or other inventions since, but they seem pretty complacent after that.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaste...
That was in the comments. That is the best part of the article. We have a long road to go about learning from things that worked ok by pure luck. But, as usual, we barely learn from mistakes...
I think that's really the crux of your statement. Humans seem to be terrible at working together in large organizations, or at least running them. Organizations seem to learn from mistakes only temporarily, or at all (as you pointed out). Consider the self-driving car group at Uber as a recent example.
As in, for example, public warnings by countless actual hackers back in the 80s and 90s about how vulnerable most US systems were. (For which, in return, they were persecuted and prosecuted. With no apologies as said warnings came to deserved fruition.)
[0] Yes, safe is relative. Are they safer than humans is one measure. But should we stop there? No. Can we truly even get there? ...
Gross. I'm glad culture, as well as technology, has evolved since the 80's.
Shuttle Commander Gibson: "So in other words, the resolution on the encrypted video was that bad that they based a conclusion on it that was in gross error. ... If I had said hey, I think this is important enough for us to break the encryption and send you guys clear video, oh, it would have been pandemonium down there at DOD. But in hindsight, oh man, that's what we should have done."
Ascent-Entry Flight Director Wayne Hale: "We were struggling in those days to try to maintain the security classification, so on and so forth... When the crew reported they saw this stuff, we had a long negotiation as I recall with the customer to say well, can we look at the TV? Because we weren't supposed to see any TV from on orbit. (They said) absolutely not. Could we look at the bottom side of the shuttle? That was the agreement, that we could, but we used this special slow-scan TV. And it was grainy."
So it looks like a case of "the rules are the rules, period."