Australian Police and spies gain powers to access encrypted messages
smh.com.au
smh.com.au
>In one of the most significant compromises, the bill will define what constitutes a "systemic weakness".
I'm eagerly awaiting the explanation of how they intend to break encryption without introducing systemic weakness.
"Spy agencies and police have said that the Christmas and New Year period poses a heightened risk of terrorist attacks."
It'd be comical if there weren't serious risks of them damaging internet security in the process.
Also note that Telegram and WhatsApp are insecure and horrible. I would use Signal, OTR and maybe iMessage if you trust the Apple bean-counter-turned-CEO.
From the conclusion:
> This report’s analysis of law enforcement demands for exceptional access to private communications and data shows that such access will open doors through which criminals and malicious nation-states can attack the very individuals law enforcement seeks to defend. The costs would be substantial, the damage to innovation severe, and the consequences to economic growth difficult to predict. The costs to developed countries’ soft power and to our moral authority would also be considerable.
<snip>
> If law enforcement wishes to prioritize exceptional access, we suggest that they need to provide evidence to document their requirements and then develop genuine, detailed specifications for what they expect exceptional access mechanisms to do. As computer scientists and security experts, we are committed to remaining engaged in the dialogue with all parts of our governments, to help discern the best path through these complex questions.
This is a paper by experts in the field. The Australian government would do well to listen to them and not fantasize that they can legislate away reality.