For Decades, Southern States Saw Thanksgiving as an Act of Northern Aggression
atlasobscura.com
atlasobscura.com
It's easy to see why the "Southern States Saw Thanksgiving as an Act of Nothern Aggression" from Lincoln's action. He extended the meaning of the celebration to include victory of the North over the South, and asked the South to observe it, according to wikipedia.
>Population has steadily increased, notwithstanding the waste that has been made in the camp, the siege and the battle-field; and the country, rejoicing in the consciousness of augmented strength and vigor, is permitted to expect continuance of years with large increase of freedom.
Freedom only decreased if you saw black slaves as non-human. They were a majority of the population in many southern states.
"Southern states saw" in the headline is probably ignoring the black population, but I'm not sure. It was only many years later that there were large migrations, after the reconstruction promises passed them over, "vagrancy" was heavily outlawed, and they effectively lost the vote.
That's a really careful glossing over of the coordinated white supremacist terror campaigns that drove newly emancipated black Americans from their homes in the South. Olivia Hooker, the last eyewitness to the only bombs dropped on continental America, passed just last Wednesday at the age of 103.
Her story is an incredible reminder of the sheer capacity for hate that remains unaccounted for in America still today:
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/opinion/olivia-hooker-tul...
We are seeing another such issue crop up where the federal govt is declaring weed illegal and the states are saying it is legal.
Funny how the DEA can still bust people in legal weed states isnt it ?
Yes, the Civil War was about states' rights. Yes, the South was fighting for independence from what it saw as Northern political bias and Federal overreach. But all of those ancillary issues were about defending slavery as an economic and cultural institution.
And that's my perspective as someone who grew up with "war about slavery" as the default interpretation, only learning about contemporary states' rights arguments in later history classes at my (public Virginia) high school. (And then only learning from HN/reddit that "Northern aggression" / "states' rights" propaganda was even still a thing.)
I expect someone raised on that propaganda would be even more confused, likely enough to conclude that the speaker is lying or misinformed.
Similarly, in the Confederate constitution, there were some provisions added that specifically restricted the ability of the states to handle slavery in their jurisdiction - e.g. the "right of transit and sojourn" (which essentially meant that free states were forced to respect the "property right" of any slave-owning citizen of another state who comes to reside there) - this, of course, was in response to Dred Scott.
I actually think that preserving the Union is, in some sense, a more technically correct answer, since the South did not start the war [2]. The South declared its independence. The North started the war to prevent the South from gaining its independence [3].
As an aside. Independent of my actual interperatation of history, I think it would be highly unreasonable to deny citizenship to someone for holding a controversial belief that is shared by a significant portion of the country. Like it or not "states rights" is an American interpretation of the Civil war, even if it is one that is not historically accurate. And we really do not want the government to be in a position of dictating the "correct" history.
[0] You could argue about how trustworthy the North was. I would argue the main cause of the Civil war was that the South lost confidence that the North was (or would continue) to compromise on this issue.
[1] At least for a while. With hindsight, I am sure that slavery would have eventually been abolished in the South as well, and it probably would have been the North that was the primary political force behind it.
[2] Fine, they did open the attack of Fort Sumter when the Union refused to withdraw. You could therefor argue that the South did technically start the war, but I find that to be a bit of a stretch.
[3] As I mentioned above, this was the primary motivation of the North. The North, at the start, did not continue this sentence with "...so that they could abolish slavery".
More accurately, “states rights” was, at the time of the Civil War, a code word for protecting slavery that was revived during the Jim Crow era as a broader code for protecting segregation and systematic discrimination, and the faction which uses it that way has always been strong enough to play a major role in shaping the national mythology.
Further, Texas V. White was not a unamious decision. In the dissenting, Justice Grier wrote [1]:
>is Texas one of these United States? Or was she such at the time this bill was filed, or since?
>This is to be decided as a political fact, not as a legal fiction. This court is bound to know and notice the public history of the nation.
...
> I do not consider myself bound to express any opinion judicially as to the constitutional right of Texas to exercise the rights and privileges of a State of this Union
...
> I am not disposed to join in any essay to prove Texas to be a State of the Union when Congress have decided that she is not. It is a question of fact, I repeat, and of fact only. Politically, Texas is not a State in this Union. Whether rightfully out of it or not is a question not before the court.
This is reflective of a general political fact that sovereignty is not a legal question. Had the South won the war, we would not be having this arguement. It would be an undisputed fact that the Confederacy was a sovereign nation not subject to US law. It takes 2 sides to wage a war, and the North started the war because it found the South's political decision unacceptable [3]
Further, if we look at the post-war history, it was northern republicans who argued that secession was possible, as this is what allowed them to treat the former confederate states as conquered territory and therefore subject to direct congressional rule.
The southern Democrats (along with more moderate republicans) argued that secession was illegal, and therefore they were still full states in the Union, which would make laws such as the Reconstruction Acts [2] unconstitutional
[0] Not that it would have made any practical difference.
[1] https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/74/700#writing...
[2] As an unrelated matter, the North did repeal the Habeas Corpus Act 1867 in order to prevent the courts from ruling on the constitutionality of such reconstruction measures. Given the precedent set in Texas V. White, the southern states were likely correct that much of reconstruction was unconstitutional.
[3] That is not to say that the North was not justified in starting the war.
It's insane how often this is disputed when the Confederate states explicitly asserted this in their various declarations of secession. Mississippi's, for example, begins[1]:
> In the momentous step, which our State has taken of dissolving its connection with the government of which we so long formed a part, it is but just that we should declare the prominent reasons which have induced our course.
> Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery - the greatest material interest of the world. Its labor supplies the product, which constitutes by far the largest and most important portions of commerce of the earth. These products are peculiar to the climate verging on the tropical regions, and by an imperious law of nature, none but the black race can bear exposure to the tropical sun. These products have become necessities of the world, and a blow at slavery is a blow at commerce and civilization.
[1] http://www.civil-war.net/pages/mississippi_declaration.asp
Moreover, the US was way behind Euope on this issue and I suspect they wouldn't have lasted long until sanctions were imposed on slave-produced goods, especially tobacco and cotton.
Many people don't realize that both the Confederacy and Union had slavery, or the the Emancipation Proclamation specifically exempted the Union's slaves (as it had to).
This triggers a lack of balanced historical perspective and understanding. E.g. many of the naive arguments for razing Confederate history can be applied to US history, European colonist history, Native American history, etc. Without nuance, the conversation becomes a one-sided "we are good and our history is good vs they are bad and their history is bad".
I went to school in the North as well, and in my opinion, they simply didn't dwell on the Civil War for as long as my Southern school did (a whole semester vs. a couple of weeks). It makes sense...the Civil War doesn't have much locality in Seattle while it has a lot of locality in Vicksburg.
Absolutely. Succession (being part of issue of "states' rights") was a huge part of the Civil War.
> The president couldn't free slaves within the USA by executive order
Indeed; I pointed that fact out myself. There's no question that the man Abraham Lincoln was anti-slavery but could not himself end it. There's also no question that the man Robert E. Lee opposed Virginia's succession but not himself stop it.
The fact remains that as a whole the Union still had slaves, and that didn't change for the entirety of the Civil War. In fact, assuming you believe the Union's authority was legitimate, slavery was outlaws in the South years before it was in the North.
My point is there's obviously things going on here other than just a war to end slavery, and it's important not to downplay that either.
---
FWIW, I'd call Seattle "the West".
If you believe in rule of law, this makes complete sense. They had no way to outlaw slavery without an amendment.
> My point is there's obviously things going on here other than just a war to end slavery, and it's important not to downplay that either.
It is true that the USA would have held onto slavery a little longer without succession. But the South read the writing on the wall, it was going to be outlawed sooner or later, so they decided to rebel.
The South wouldn't have succeeded if slavery wasn't in danger of going away, the Union wouldn't have fought the South if the South hadn't succeeded. But yes, slavery was the cause of all of this, even if indirect.
> FWIW, I'd call Seattle "the West".
My white Vicksburg classmates called me a yankee even though I was born out west, it didn't matter if Washington wasn't even a state at the time. As long as I had that standard midwestern accent (the one that the west and midwest basically have), the west not being the north wasn't relevant. (Ironically enough, my friends from Boston were even more racist than my southern white friends, but that is a story for another time)
Not true. States could outlaw slavery. Regardless, neither state laws nor federal constitutional amendment happened.
> But the South read the writing on the wall, it was going to be outlawed sooner or later
Not only slavery, but agriculture-hostile tariffs, state sovereignty, Southern political representation in general.
Given the events following the Civil War, it does seem they were on target.
> My white Vicksburg classmates called me a yankee...As long as I had that standard midwestern accent
Okay...I'm not sure what I'm supposed to take from this. I'm talking about biases in education according to Civil War geography.
As you said, the fervently believed myth was that the confederacy was about states rights - growing up I only met one person in twenty years who even went so far as making a rasict joke, and I knew plenty who flew a Confederate flag and absolutely believed that all men were created equal.
I think maybe the myth ended up being a useful way of letting people keep their old flag and old team allegiance, while completely changing the what they actually believed.
That said, the Fourth of July and Thanksgiving were always celebrated.
The run on US flags after 9/11 was something else. I remember when my mom begrudgingly bought a flag magnet 2 weeks after it all. Apparently the neighbors were giving her side-eye for having the only flagless pickup truck on the street.
Now I wonder what process led to these 100 questions, and their valid answers. (I just took the test a few weeks ago, and becoming a U.S. citizen on Monday.)
The full list of questions and valid answers is here: https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Office%20of%...
I can see several folks in this very discussion who might be surprised by this bit of history.
Edit: so far two different people think I am mischaracterizing what Southern states said at the time about their state's rights. I wasn't talking about that at all. I was talking about how I (and many modern historians) think about Southern states' reaction to Dred Scott and how Northern states ignored it. Please respond to what I said, instead of something I did not say.
I believe the "Civil War was about states' rights" line began in the 19th century [1], around the same time as "the number of Confederate memorial installations peaking around 1910 — 50 years after the end of the Civil War and at the height of Jim Crow" [2].
In reality, "Confederate states did claim the right to secede, but no state claimed to be seceding for that right. In fact, Confederates opposed states’ rights — that is, the right of Northern states not to support slavery" in "Northern states [failing] to 'fulfill their constitutional obligations' by interfering with the return of fugitive slaves to bondage" [3].
[1] https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2011/04/12/13535...
[2] https://www.businessinsider.com/confederate-statues-meaning-...
[3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/five-myths-about-why-...
This is correct. Sorry.
Granted, I doubt this is what the South has in mind when citing State's rights as a justification.
Source?
--Abraham Lincoln
https://www.nytimes.com/1862/08/24/archives/a-letter-from-pr...
For me, that's a whole lot of subjunctive "ifs" that refer to alternate realities, not actual negotiating positions or offers. When Lincoln says, "What I do about Slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union" he is referring to his conviction that the Union cannot possibly be saved without an end to slavery.
Prior to the civil war, there were numerous compromises between the North and South whereing the South got to keep slaves. In March of 1861, Congress passed the the Corwin Amendment (requiring a 2/3 majority of the House and Senate; which is even more impressive given that 7 states had already seceded and therefore did not vote) t, which was endorsed by both presidents Buchanan and Lincoln.
I don't know if the Corwin amendement would have been ratified by enough states, if not for the Civil war, but given the timing, it is impressive it managed to amass even the 5 ratifications it did.
For what it is worth, I agree with the South's assesment that compromise was not going to be tenable long term, but the North certainly was trying.
As the certainty of a military victory became clear, along with the costs of the war, the opinion of the North began to change to a much less compromising abolishanist stance; which should not be suprising.
So, this would be an example of the South using the power of federal government to impose its will on the North. It was only after it looked like they had lost the power to do that anymore, that they started a war.
If they hadn't been so eager to have their way nationally, it's possible the Civil War could have been avoided.
[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Walker_(filibuster)
OTOH, the test is of ability to parrot the mythology of the dominant political groups in the country.
You'd be better off saying it was about geography! There is a band of soil running along today's black belt that is unusually good for growing certain labor-intensive crops, particularly cotton. That lead to a non-industrial economy. Meanwhile, water power to operate machinery was widely available in New England.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Belt_(U.S._region)
So right off, you have a huge conflict over things like tariffs, and you'd have that even without adding the issue of slaves. The north preferred to have tariffs on manufactured goods, and the south preferred to have them on raw materials. The "state's right" in question was actually the nullification of a tariff.
BTW, the usual story about slavery in the USA also leaves out the awkwardness of stuff like this slave owner:
For instance, Mississippi [1]. The first two sentences of the Mississippi secession document read:
"In the momentous step which our State has taken of dissolving its connection with the government of which we so long formed a part, it is but just that we should declare the prominent reasons which have induced our course. Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery-- the greatest material interest of the world."
During the Civil War there was "Cotton diplomacy" [1] where the South tried to pull Britain and France onto its side, under the presumption that their need for cotton would win out. Despite the cotton famine [2] they managed to stay neutral.
Anyway...economics (then and now) are king.
Which isn't to say that it doesn't change the economic equation if you take it away. But it's more tenable to say that the reason people were willing to go to war over it was more about the economics of power than about economics in general.
Vacationed in Charleston a few months ago. Dropped into the Old Slave Mart Museum [1]. I learned something, there, that for the first time made the Civil War make sense (from the Southern perspective).
Imagine a Southern plantation owner's balance sheet. What do you think would be the most valuable asset? I used to think it would be land, buildings and equipment. But it wasn't. It was enslaved people. Something like 90% of the wealth of Southern land owners was in their human capital.
Most of those enslaved people weren't owned outright–they were leveraged. Most bills of sale I saw said 1/3 cash down with the rest to be paid in installments. Much of the down payment, it turns out, was also borrowed. (Enslaved people being mobile, fungible assets meant creditors valued them as collateral.)
So, in summary, you had the wealthiest people in these states being leveraged to the point of ruin on their enslaved populations. That meant their banking system depended on the continuing value of the South's enslaved people. (New York, too, though to a lesser degree, but I digress.) So the calculus wasn't "we keep slaves and stay very rich, or give them up and become less rich." It was "slaves or bust." This is why the Gettysburg address hit like a thermobaric blast front--it amounted to a rebooting of the South's elite ranks.
I mean, sure, it's clear why the elites wanted the war. But for the average white southern laborer, slavery did nothing but push down wages; It's hard to ask for a raise if the boss can just buy someone to do what you do.
The explanations I've heard were nonsensical (that the average white southern man fought because it was in the interests of the elite southern man) or assume the southerner was just... evil (the average white southern man fought so that there would at least be something below him.)
I find both of those explanations really unsatisfactory, because they assume that non-elite white southerners are either stupid or evil to the point where they will start an extremely brutal war who's explicit aims are to preserve the wealth of the elite at the cost of everyone else. This seems... unlikely.
> Socialism never took root in America because the poor see themselves not as an exploited proletariat, but as temporarily embarrassed millionaires.
The frontier Slavery No socialism
Wars were always fought by average people for the benefit of the elites.
I can't find the exact quote but there is one that pretty much says when a peasant goes to war the best he can hope for is to come back to the same life whereas for the king it's a huge win.
The thing is, 'peasant armies' are largely a modern thing; Throughout history, arming your pesants without raising their station was... a little like giving slaves guns.[1] Most armies for most of history were composed of people who were higher class than peasants; for that matter, for much of history, your position in society was largely dependent on your ability to project force. (and that itself had a lot to do with wealth; a decent suit of armor was incredibly expensive for most of history. And fighting is something that it takes time to get good at like anything else; if you are a substanance farmer, even if you are equally armed, (which you won't be, a decent suit of armor was incredibly expensive) and equally big and strong (which you also won't be; having enough food matters a lot when strength training) you are gonna have a hell of a time fighting a guy who grew up wealthy who spent his time training.)
My understanding was that nearly all ancient and medieval societies had mechanisms for successful warriors to rise up the socioeconomic ladder; be that tournaments (some societies had rules where if you were able to overcome a better armed/armored opponent in the mele, you'd be able to keep some of his arms/armor) or in war (really, until the modern era, if you participated in the sack of a city, you got to keep some of the stuff your side stole. Certainly, in the medieval era, if you captured a rich dude in war, not only could you keep the stuff he had on him, you got to ransom him back to his family) - and of course, there are direct promotions; do well enough, and your leader is gonna make you a knight or something.
The idea is that if a society treated it's warriors poorly enough, they'd find, ah, 'Klingon promotions' on their hands; If they didn't align power with violence, they'd find themselves with new leaders.
(In a way, this is an amazing thing about modern democracies. The army, in many cases, remains subservient to the civilian state, even when it sure looks like it has a decisive choice in the matter... But, historically, this is the exception, not the rule.)
All that said, if you were poor, if you were sent to war, if you were used in battle, you probably wouldn't be armed/armored enough to be particularly effective, in part because your leaders would be just as afraid of you as of the enemy, in part because you were unlikely to be particularly effective against properly trained/armed/armored people, and in part just 'cause in the pre-industrial era, arms and armor were ridiculously expensive. (I mean, I guess you might compare a mounted knight to a modern MBT... the difference being that you were expected to go to war with your own stuff, not the government's stuff. Imagine a world where the only people who could be tankers were dudes who could afford to buy said tank... and a world where those guys expected said tank to pay for itself in booty.)
My understanding is that as a medieval peasant, wars happened to you. You didn't really go to war except in the most desperate actions. You were seen, really, as part of the land; almost property that turned fallow fields into productive farmland.
You could argue that the end of this system was Napoleon; I mean, it had been in decline for a while; more and more of the equipment used by armies was government property rather than private property, even to the point of the muskets being owned by the government rather than the soldiers, but... Napoleon decisively trounced the old system. You could argue this was a big part of why Napoleon conquered so much of the world; at a time when the rest of the world had an extremely class-based military leadership system, and where the men under arms were strictly limited, in part due to trust, Napoleon had an army (in part thanks to the preceding revolution) pretty much full of regular dudes, lead by officers largely promoted on merit. (Oh yeah, and because of this trust, Napoleon had a massive army)
You could look at the 'levee en mass' which gave France it's numerical superiority as enabled by the fact that the French trusted their poor in ways that the rest of the world didn't;
[1]which did happen; I mean, there are ancient sources suggesting that several bronze-age societies had elite units composed of slaves, even... but clearly these weren't your regular slaves; the status of being an elite soldier meant a lot more then than it does now. And throughout history, most of your army was a class above your laborers- It's hard to use force to make things shitty for the people who are applying said force for you.
In retrospect, it's kind of obvious why the clergy and warrior classes would gain power: clergy, by dint of education and spiritual authority, and warriors, by dint of being well-armed and good at killing people, both have a natural degree of power over others.
Another important point is that this tended to occur only in settled civilizations (which, admittedly, was most of the world by the 18th century or so.) Settled civilizations prior to the Industrial Revolution needed an educated clerical class and also large numbers of farm workers (because agriculture was labor-intensive) meaning only a few people could devote themselves to being really good at fighting, or alternatively wearing ridiculous clothes, throwing lavish parties, and marrying their cousins for political reasons, as the case may be. In contrast, hunter-gatherer societies tended to have the entire male population not only more physically fit than even most knights and nobles, but far more practiced at hunting and warfare, with enough overlap in the relevant techniques (e.g. horsemanship, use of weapons, etc.). Many settled civilizations were dominated by nearby hunter-gatherers--the Greek city-states by Alexander's Macedonian Greeks, the Chinese by the Mongols--because there's really no way for a pre-industrial civilization to hold their own against hunter-gatherers. Hell, even as late as the 1870's, large amounts of the United States and Mexico were effectively off-limits to white settlers because of the power of the Comanche, who only fell because (a) like many fallen American Indian peoples, they had plenty of enemies who were more than willing to help the whites defeat them and (b) the United States at that point was just barely no longer a pre-industrial civilization. Oh, yeah--and, as of the American Civil War (to bring this full circle!), it was now possible to enlist large numbers of common people and send them to war instead of risking a smaller ruling class of nobles.
For Europe. For China, this was the rule. It did lead to some military disasters -- I understand that the Qing conquest of China relied on northern Chinese generals betraying their country -- but soldiers and the military were held in very low esteem and got not much in the way of power or authority. New dynasties were established by force and in that context generals became emperors, but that happened about every 200 years, and it didn't lead to an improvement in the prestige allocated to the military (except under the Mongols, who didn't really buy in to the Chinese system).
You have a very idealistic view of human nature if you don't think this banal evil is more common historically than not.
Even today there's no popular campaign today to go to war against Iran or North Korea, but it sure is popular in some conservative think tanks and with our current NSA, John Bolton, it's been his obsession for the last 20 years it feels like.
Yeah, I keep hearing this, and I just... saying things happen because people are too dumb to see their own self interest is... it's just really unsatisfying. It fits the data, but it also tastes like the other times in my life where I've been wrong because I'm arrogant.
It's also unsatisfying because it's not particularly predictive; it doesn't tell me which elites the masses will follow and why.
There's also the trope of the bonding that takes place within smaller military units that makes them committed not to the cause but to each other.
In addition the other side of people too dumb to see their self interest, I am not saying these people are dumb but we see that today if we turn on the news to see for one example - farmers rationalizing themselves being hurt by retaliatory tariffs on American farm stuffs - they seem cognizant of the problem, aware of the higher order consequences for themselves, and willing to accept them to try what seems to be on some terms a way to attempt for fair trade with China, and still support the President. It may be rationalizing but it's not done out of ignorance or stupidity.
What you are asking for in the end sound like some equivalent to Psychohistory in Asimov's Foundation, which would be a neat idea.
John Brown was one of many anti-slavery militants who was involved in Bleeding Kansas, and far from being the extremist he's portrayed as today, he was widely considered a hero in the North, with songs being sung in his honor by Union troops during the war, (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Brown%27s_Body). Others defied federal law in attempts to free slaves and secret them north towards Canada.
The resolve and radicalism of the abolitionist and free-stater movements shouldn't be underestimated. Many Americans in the antebellum years perceived slavery as an unconscionable evil just as we do today. A few undertook great personal risks to resist it, while many, many more worked through the political system to resist slavery.
Many of our contemporary perceptions of antebellum America are somewhat biased by the historical revisionism of neo-Confederates.
As far as as why the poor would die for the elites, well that’s also existed from the beginning of time. Pretty much every war is like that.
The War Of The Roses was a family feud that lasted 32 years, and cost lives of somewhere between 35,000 and 50,000, all to decide which inbred guy gets to sit on a chair and boss everyone else around. Almost no one that died in that war, had anything to gain, or lose.
Do you really think anyone on the street really had anything to gain or lose from World War I, a war that cost between 8 and 21 million lives, all because of some piece of paper after some idiot born into a “special” family took a wrong turn and couldn’t escape perhaps the most incompetent assination squad in history[0]?
People go off an die determine which religious bureaucracy will collect a monetary tax from a group. There’s no benefit or harm to any individual about this.
There are a lot of ways of looking at world war 1. There are those that view it as largely a war of German aggression; that Franz Ferdinand was merely a convenient excuse.[1] - I dunno, if I was a French person and the Germans were marching on my home in Paris, I might think I had something to gain or lose.
At any rate, I think that the schlieffen plan (i.e. We're going to war with Russia, so let us roll over France preemptively) evinces a kind of extreme arrogance that is... well, it certainly says something that isn't good.
As an aside, I find it super interesting how the Germans took a very similar tack in world war two, with an army that was by all accounts, vastly inferior as far as training and equipment went, (I mean, adjusted to their enemies/the technology of the day) but with superior tactics. And while the attack was... similar, in the first war, the attack succeeded against Russia[2] and bogged down in France - and in the second the war, they succeeded against France,[3] and bogged down in Russia. - there is an argument to be made there that the victories were as much about politics and organization and motivation as anything else. Of course, there's also a strong argument that it's just technology. Taking ground with world war one era technology was really hard, as the attack moved forward at the speed of a walking man, while the defender moved men around at the speed of train. armored and motorized units in world war 2 allowed attackers to exploit breakthroughs again, breaking that huge advantage that the defense had.
I mean, in favor of your point, it might not have been completely clear that had Germany won, that the citizens of the conquered nations would be treated so roughly as it was in the second round of that conflict. But still, I think that the civil war was very different, because the union war aims were pretty clear, and those aims would not have been served by treating the southerners as a conquered people.
(One can make the argument, in fact, that we'd all be better off, especially the southerners, if we had treated the south as conquered land, and if reconstruction continued; if the north put together a marshal-plan style rebuilding effort that reconstructed the south as a functional society. But it didn't continue, in part because treating the southerners as a conquered people went against both the war aims and the ongoing goals of the north.)
[1] Certainly July 5 showed that Germany was not willing to put any effort at all into preventing the war from escalating; At a pen stroke, Wilhelm 2 could have had a pretty good chance of making world war one a localized conflict, preventing world war two and the cold war in one stroke. Instead, he said "we'll back you up no matter how far you take it" I personally think history treats the man much more lightly than he deserves.
[2](in part due to their support of Lenin... you could argue it wasn't really a military victory, that Germany succeeded against Russia in the first world war by funding Lenin until he took down the Russian government and sapped their will to fight. I mean, there were a lot of factors here; even in the second world war, Germany seemed to do really well against Russia... until they hit lenningrad and stalingrad, and things bogged down. - It's possible that a Kerensky or even Kornilov lead Russia[2a] would have pulled off something similar and fought the Germans to a standstill. The technology of the day favored the defense, after all. of course, you could also put this in part on Wilson for not propping up kerensky the same way the other allies were propped up with food and ammo. A well-timed and full throated "we will not let you starve" from America and some machine guns from the UK would probably have saved Russia from the Bolsheviks. I mean, some of it is on Kerensky; he wasn't aggressive enough against Lenin when he had the chance, and he had given up control of most of the armed forces (and unwisely armed some of the wrong people) by the time it was really clear that Lenin was a German-supported traitor.) but... Germany certainly wasn't doing badly militarily, you could argue that they would have won against a Kerensky government that didn't have a whole lot of allied support.)
[2a](as an aside, I see the conflict between Kerensky and Kornilov as one of the great tragedies of history. If the two would have worked together, we would probably have had a mostly-democratic Russia... in 1917. Kerensky was understandably super suspicious of Kornilov, but all evidence later was that the man would have been a soldier loyal to the Russian government, even one lead by Kerensky.)
[3]and why? France had more and superior tanks and a much larger army. It was in part tactics, certainly. Ohler argues that it was methanphetamene; He thinks the drug allowed the germans to plow through the ardennes and roll over France while sleeping something like 1/3rd as much as people without the drugs, thus ending the battle before the French had time to formulate a response. Of course, one could also attribute it to an airpower advantage on the German side; while the French had a larger army, more and better tanks, the Germans had an airpower advantage that may have been decisive. There's also the theory that war weariness from the first war just had a hugely different effect in Germany and France, and that was the root of the French defeat the second time around. My favorite book on the subject is, of course, Bloch - but while it is an incredible book, it doesn't really come to a real conclusion as to why France lost against an enemy that was by all accounts inferior.
The only specific claim I'll stand behind about german vs. allied equipment in ww2 is that at the outset of the battle of France, the Germans had worse tanks than the French, and that the French had a larger army. the Char, for example, was more than a match for anything the Germans had. (In skilled hands, a fair number of anything the Germans had.) It was way more expensive, (as one would expect for a heavier, better-protected tank with a bigger gun) and harder to support and keep in the field (sort of the opposite of the later situation with the Panzer4 and the Sherman, much later in the same war, where you needed several Shermans to take on one Panzer.) but it was very well protected, and had a very large gun for it's day. It was cast, rather than made from wielded plates, further increasing it's cost and it's protection (and further complicating repair)
I mean, "Better tank" is a funny thing to say; the allies later won the war with tanks that were inferior even to the panzer of the time, if we are using that standard. It was totally fine you needed several Shermans to reliably take out one panther, because the allies had such an advantage in material and logistics that they could reliably get numerical advantage after D-day.
But one on one, the Char, as I understand it, could be expected to beat the Panzer of it's day with ease. It was built for those one on one fights, and excelled at them... when it had the chance. My understanding is that the Char was an 'infantry tank' - it was built to sit and slug it out, essentially. It seemed that the idea of a heavy 'infantry tank' went out of style pretty fast after world war two started up; it looked like lighter tanks for exploiting breakthroughs (and simply being on the battlefield in quantity) which were called 'calvary tanks' at the beginning of the war seemed to be the tank design that proved most useful. I mean, turns out, these "medium tanks" were simply more useful than either giant or tiny tanks, and this wasn't known at the outset of world war two, as there weren't a lot of large scale tank battles in the Polish campaign or in the spanish civil war to learn from.
Look up Pierre Billotte in the Battle of Stonne for one particularly dramatic example of the Char in skilled hands in action against Panzers. (and if you find a good book about him in English, report back)
But, my point here is that France did not lose through inferiority of numbers nor through inferiority of equipment.[4] It was something else. Perhaps they just weren't prepared for the German army sending their tanks out faster than their supply lines in ways that the French were utterly unprepared for? But really, I think it might just be Tactics. The French were fighting world war one, perhaps fighting it acceptably well. Germany had been through a number of smaller wars meanwhile, and could see how the new technologies upended the old rules of war, and those technologies made decisive the time it took France to figure out that the rules had changed. (There's a view, in fact, that the same thing happened in the first world war; The French started out in bright red trousers and white gloves, that they were dramatically less prepared for the sort of war that the new technology created than the German aggressors were. But the technology of the first world war meant that they were not overrun before they figured out the new rules, and in the end, a willingness to fight, short supply lines, and a large population carried the day.)
(as another aside, I consider the idea that the French are somehow less willing to fight under unpleasant conditions or more likely to surrender than other countries, that "the last brave frenchman died during Napoleon's retreat from Russia" to be... ahistoric. )
May's "Strange Victory" isn't as good as Bloch's "Strange Defeat" - but as I recall (it has been some time) May seemed to suggest that much of this seemed like chance on the German side, too. That you had ridiculously overconfident people in charge, that a lot of the Germans who should have been listened to thought the plan to invade France was way too risky, way too likely to fail. but that somehow, perhaps because the technology of the day allowed for fast and deep breakthroughs and the French leaders were still thinking in world war one terms, that confidence worked out better than could have been reasonably expected. Or maybe it was a low probability event; a fluke. Low-probablility events do occasionally happen.
[4] Unless that inferiority was in airpower; The Germans had decisive air superiority on the continent at that time. And it could have been what made the difference; You could easily argue that air superiority made the decisive difference. - I mean, having arial surveillance could have gone a long way towards mitigating the French confusion at the command level, if nothing else. But air superiority alone doesn't seem like it was decisive in other theatres, so you have to come up with some reason why it made the difference here and not, say, against Russia.
(also I want to point out that while I am of the opinion that the Germans can be considered the aggressors in world war one, and you can reasonably make that case, it's not a universally accepted opinion as their culpability for world war two is.)
We take for granted our 20/20 view of 1861 and we are biased in our present knowledge of how things turn out. Descendants of slaves, poor white southerners, and northerners all turned out better off, and the U.S. would grow stronger as a whole.
But to look at world and U.S. history from the lens of 1861, that's what the participants of the civil war had to do. Some of it was identity politics. Some of it was loyalty to home turf. Some men DID fight for states rights as much as that is derided as an empty excuse. There has always been concern of the Federal government gaining "too much power" since the Constitutional Convention and Anti-federalism is a well-documented movement of early American politics. For many, the Civil War was viewed as an extension of that cause. (If you want an excellent view on the war by a relatively impartial contemporary, view Lord Acton's account from 1866: https://mises.org/library/american-federalism-and-civil-war)
And sure, rich slave owners had their own motives. And they certainly would leverage the motives driving poor southerners to garner support for the war. That story is as old as time.
There's no question that poor southern whites and yeomen farmers both saw their wages depressed by slavery and recognized it as the direct cause of their woes. In the antebellum South--particularly during the two decades leading up to the Civil War--there was a significant class conflict that that represented a clear internal conflict to the planter/master class. Not only was the number of slaves increasing, they were also starting to be used in non-agricultural industries. And even when they weren't, slaves were a constant threat to poor white workers' efforts to try and push for wage increases as slave-strikebreakers.[4] Northern abolitionists repeatedly highlighted this conflict and hoped to use it to create division in the South; in 1838, Charles Olcott of Ohio famously observed "[a]ll of the evils of slavery are great evils; but one of the greatest is, that it injures the free as well as the enslaved."
In the years leading up to secession, the master class embarked on a major propaganda campaign to get poor whites to overlook the class conflict and see themselves as beneficiaries of slavery, and later, secession. They argued that abolitionists and "Black Republicans" would force freed slaves to be viewed as the equal of whites, to the latter's everlasting detriment. The common points were that black emancipation would flood the labor market and depress wages for poor whites to starvation levels, the ensuing class conflict/race war would kill thousands of those whites who didn't starve to death first, and of course, there was the constant specter of miscegenation. James Furman, a South Carolina Baptist preacher, predicted that "[a]bolition preachers will be at hand to consummate the marriage of your daughters to black husbands...submit to have our wives and daughters choose between death and gratifying the hellish lust of the negro!!...Better ten thousand deaths than submission to Black Republicanism" (McPherson).
None of these attitudes were new. Fear of a slave rebellion had been a constant in slave states, and it touched slaveowner and yeoman alike; non-slaveowning whites figured they'd be at risk just the same as slaveowners. Then John Brown attacked Harpers Ferry in 1859, and the worry about hypothetical slave revolts turned into an orgy of fear and paranoia; the master class saw an imminent threat, with non-slaveholders in cahoots with Northern abolitionists even as non-slaveholders felt the same fear. John Brown was tried, and as the North started to lionize the man as a martyr and saint, the South went nuts in anger. McPherson likened the Southern panic in 1860 to France's Great Fear in 1789.[5] These arguments clearly had a profound impact on Southern society, and were embedded so thoroughly that they'd be lodged in the collective Southern psyche for the next century. But alone, they weren't enough to push through secession.
For the master class, secession was seen as both a means of protecting the peculiar institution and eliminating the internal threat posed by poor whites. The propaganda and constant fear helped lay the groundwork, but they succeeded mainly by managing to push through before internal opposition could solidify and organize. They were also helped by poor whites being apathetic voters, as they knew they lacked the power of the master class. In the end, secessionists pulled out all the stops to ensure nothing could stop the movement:
> The ultimate choice of disunion, therefore, was a choice made by the master class. By the early 1860s, the Deep South’s slaveholding interests were using every possible method to force people with no ties to slavery to support the institution. Politics became dominated, as Shugg wrote, by “farce and fraud; the knife, the sling-shot, the brass knuckles determining ... who shall occupy and administer the [public] offices.” Poor whites, along with many other non-slave owners, made it completely clear that they opposed disunion. The state conventions, of course, were all dominated by the master class, who deliberately chose to ignore public will. While proving the efficacy of manipulative violence, slave owners simultaneously invoked more concern from Northerners. To Americans residing in free states, it seemed as if a small but powerful band of slaveholders were the only Southerners desiring disunion. Poor whites certainly did not want war. They had no desire to fight and die to protect an institution that had long injured their own prosperity and well-being. Despite all of the weight scholars have afforded white supremacy, it was simply not enough to unite the white South over slavery and disunion (Merritt, 303).
Once everyone accepted that war was inevitable, both sides tried to downplay slavery as the immediate cause. For the North, it was to avoid antagonizing the border states. For the south, it was because they needed a more palatable rationale for non-slaveholders to accept. The Confederacy also expected King Cotton to persuade European governments to quickly support them, but they figured avoiding mentioning slavery would give foreign governments a useful figleaf to hide behind on slavery. It was a complete fiction, but a useful one for each side. And in 1861, everyone believed it would be a short war. Southerners believed that their martial superiority would carry the day, and one Southern soldier could whip a dozen or two Yankees.
Some fought because of cultural beliefs about courage and the glories of war or the fear of the shame of cowardice (or the physical threat of hanging deserters). Others because the immediate enemy--Northerners--was a more tangible threat than the political power of the planter class. But at first, that wasn't a huge issue. In 1861, "almost half of all the South’s enlistees 'either lived with slaveholders or were slave owners themselves'" (307). That changed later on with conscription, the "Twenty Negro Law" (in part, tied to the fear of slave rebellion), and the hiring of substitutes who were mostly poor. And throughout the war, desertion was a constant challenge for southern armies. Eventually, the Confederacy would try to limit some of the class tensions that were hampering the war effort, but even after, they were always a factor. Finally:
> The master class’s fear mongering surely helped convince a number of them that maintaining slavery would keep their families safe and their wages stable. By playing to their basest, most irrational anxieties, masters suc- cessfully used racism to push reluctant poor whites into an unsustainable war. Moreover, many of these men, who oftentimes lived hand to mouth during slavery, actually looked forward to the prospect of making a steady wage in the Confederate military [...] Other poor whites were seemingly coerced into enlisting due to the fact that they depended upon certain slaveholders for employment, land rental, or loans. Some simply concluded that allying with the powerful master class was in their best interest. Yet another often-overlooked incentive for antebellum era men to join the armed forces was the historic precedent of the government granting land to veterans [...] Finally, cravings for honor and respect undoubtedly led some poor white men to try to prove their own self-worth and masculinity through combat. And once the war actually began, slaveholders could shift their campaign of racial hysteria into a campaign about honor and patriotism. Once the fighting commenced, the region’s politicians could stop talking about miscegenation and race wars and begin talking about heroism and virility. And poor white men, who had spent most of their lives without a sense of honor, finally found a way to feel valued by their society. By protecting their homes, families, and communities, poor whites were able to elevate their social status. Furthermore, as David Potter found, most Southerners had more loyalty to the war and the troops than to the Confederacy itself, largely due to their emotional attachments to “home" (318-320).
Apologies for the length, my reply got away from me.
0. https://www.amazon.com/Roots-Southern-Populism-Transformatio...
1. https://www.amazon.com/Masterless-Men-Antebellum-Cambridge-A...
2. https://www.uncpress.org/book/9780807848845/the-counterrevol...
3. https://www.amazon.com/dp/B002NXOQLQ
4. https://www.lawcha.org/2017/07/17/poor-whites-labor-crisis-s...
I just bought 'masterless men' and I'll read it on my flight tomorrow. I'll evaluate the rest of the books you cite later.
But.. there needs to be something better than an upvote. Like an upvote you can give once a year or something. This was a really good, and really helpful comment.
Also, there's a natural human reaction to seeing invading armies occupying your home town, regardless of the rationale behind that action or one's previous or preexisting attitude towards their present ruling class. I mean, there's a spectrum of reactions, but a large chunk of that spectrum includes hostility.
This gets down to Arendt's idea of the banality of evil: people who do bad things (usually) aren't mustache-twirling masterminds, they're otherwise "normal" people for whom the morally wrong course of action is either easier or more compelling (including for reasons of racial superiority). My opinion: we shouldn't privilege the word "evil" by associating it with some kind of deep instrospection leading to immoral action -- lots, if not most, of the evil in the world stems from mundane small-mindedness.
When you consider that the average white sharecropper in the antebellum South inherited both social and political structures that granted him legitimacy in contrast to black slaves, it makes sense that such a status suffices for supporting war -- it's a matter of identity.
(Arendt's book is on my list; haven't gotten there yet.)
I guess I use a definition of evil that is more utilitarian than I am. Evil, I think, is when someone does something that harms another person far out of proportion to the benefit the perpetrator receives. It's different from something that is merely wrong in that it diminishes utility for all parties involved rather than increasing utility for one party and decreasing it for the other.
I mean, a stupid/extreme example would be that a starving person stealing bread from a wealthy person isn't very evil, maybe isn't evil at all, while a well-fed person stealing bread from the starving would be very evil.
(Note here the diminishing marginal value of wealth; your first loaf of bread is worth rather more than your second million dollars.)
As part of this definition, I am mostly only acknowledging material benefit; I would see it as much more evil to kill someone for fun, say, than to kill the same person for access to food, shelter or other material necessities, even if you are receiving quite a lot of utility in terms of emotional pleasure or what have you from the former act, and even if I feel the second act is wrong. The second act is still a lot more understandable.
So, especially if you are already living with what I'd call desperate poverty, in a situation where both your access to food and shelter was insecure, giving up material wealth (including access to food) in exchange for a kind of social status that seems disgusting to me, seems to me like irrationally harming another person in a way that harms yourself, too- thus, stupid and evil. But maybe I undervalue social status? But more likely, I am missing part of the story
What were the dissenting poor supposed to do? Refuse a paying army job? Travel to the North to read up on the other side’s views? Before the modern era, most wars were fought for personal reasons involving the elite. Commoners enlisted because the army paid and offered opportunities to rise in social status.
The South was run like a feudal society:
“Among the many scholars who have worked on this question, V.O. Key is a distinguished political economist from the Southern University of Texas who devoted his life to offering a factual and definitive answer. He is a founder of American political economic studies -- he used scientific factual surveys and data rather than ideology and speculation. So this issue of how rich ‘plantation’ oligarchs repeatedly got poor white farmers to vote against their own interests in local elections is really no longer a mystery. For centuries, the oligarchs limited public education, and tightly controlled the media in the South. Travel was restricted in the South before the Civil War. Southern newspapers consistently lied to the voters. The sermons, school-books, political tracts, and newspapers repeatedly ran ‘stories’ intended to keep the population angry and afraid of Slave ‘rebellions’ and foreign influences. Achievements of the Slaves, or any brilliant black person, were systematically suppressed.
Professor Key factually documents the repeated behavior of the rich plantation owners in taking and maintaining political power. Very few of these feudal lords did much for their own communities and they did not build a middle class. The rulers blamed Negroes, and Yankees and foreigners, for the poverty and lack of infrastructure in the South. Southern politics in State and Nation by V. O. Key
More recent scholarship -- influenced by V.O. Key's scientific and mathematical methodology in ‘political economics’ -- continues to document the fact that at the time of the Civil War, the South was one of the wealthiest regions of the world. The oligarchs had a global lock on raw cotton production and could easily have won the Civil War by paying for an army three times bigger than anything the North could have produced.
In addition, the South was heavily-armed and each State funded a "State militia". The "militia" was conscripted from almost all able-bodied poor white Southern males. They were conscripted into press gangs to hunt down runaway slaves. The North had no equivalent ‘state militias’.“
https://www.quora.com/If-the-majority-of-southerners-werent-...
The South went to war not because the slaves were going to be freed, but because Lincoln did not agree with Slavery as a moral good.
As per the Cooper Union address: http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/cooper.... where he said 'what will convince them? This, and this only: cease to call slavery wrong, and join them in calling it right. And this must be done thoroughly - done in acts as well as in words. Silence will not be tolerated - we must place ourselves avowedly with them.'
Note well: This does not make Utah Mormons less patriotic... just a bit historically schizophrenic.
I think we live in a world that nobody gives a fuck about reasons and true meanings behind things. Fuck history I wanna party!
This is not an endorsement of Islam as a theology. But culturally, I'm down.
I'm curious about Native Americans though. A lot of their culture and resistance has been lost today, but back around the birth of the holiday I can imagine them finding it offensive and being vocal about it, if not due to politics and tradition, due to the hypocrisy of it.
Everyone's history matters: The Wampanoag Indian Thanksgiving story deserves to be known
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/blogs/national-museum-america...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dakota_Access_Pipeline_protest...
Still a lost cause
The traditional menu is one that happened to be served one year at Harvard. For some reason lost to history, it became the de facto traditional menu.
Thanksgiving is commonly known as a celebration of a good harvest, but the reason why the harvest was good is seldom remembered.
Plymouth Colony was originally communal. Marx was far from the first to think that "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" might be a good idea. Such thinking dates back to Plato at least, and in 1620 the colony actually tried it. Nobody wanted to do the work, though everybody had needs. After 2.5 years, with half the colony dead, Plymouth governor William Bradford decided to prioritize survival over the ideals of socialism. The resulting harvest was plentiful, giving reason to celebrate Thanksgiving.
https://www.forbes.com/2008/11/27/thanksgiving-economy-histo...
It's a lesson people are starting to forget. We'll probably try again, and maybe somehow things won't turn out the same as every previous time.
...the socialist natives took pity on the starving Europeans and helped their fellow humans. Good luck with the rest of your rewrite of history.