Darpa Pushes ‘Mosaic Warfare’ Concept
nationaldefensemagazine.org
nationaldefensemagazine.org
Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Phase II Project DARPA Contract W31P4Q-08-C-0292
Given that fear is a weapon, I don't trust people on a battlefield to not use meat eating robots for psychological effect, if they happen to have them around. If it is possible for people to be fed into the meat eating robot, then they will be.
We will see the preview of the future whenever Israel decides to face their new systems in Syria. No GPS, jamming up the vazoo etc. US is already playing with Russians there to a degree. I think the quote was: "The most hostile EW environment in the world"
> Retired Navy Adm. Scott Swift, former U.S. Pacific Fleet commander, said at the conference that in future conflict, communications will be degraded. “Windows of communication will open and close rapidly in times that are not under the control of the commander,” he said. That is why the autonomy and the unmanned piece of mosaic warfare is important. Systems must be able to act independently when they are cut off from higher headquarters, he said.
Coming soon to a battlefield near you: drones equipped with AI that can distinguish friends from enemies 85% of the time, combatants from civilians 61% of the time, and capable of firing at will when the satellite link is down.
https://www.f35.com/about/economic-impact-map
Edit: this source says ~350 districts build components for the F-35. https://www.star-telegram.com/news/politics-government/artic...
That would imply a level of care that is completely incompatible with a lot of things. Take the use of low-IQ troops in Vietnam:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_J2VwFDV4-g
But the defense budget is so people can "put food on their family"? It doesn't even begin to add up.
Here's how it works. You start out with a giant estimate, for 3,000 planes. That giant estimate is mostly caused by the lifetime cost of maintaining 3k planes. As the years roll by, you start chopping production numbers off, while trying to get some cost inflation per unit somewhere. You end up spending 1/3 less, for 1/2 the planes in the end. 20 years after the first F35 flight, you've moved on to the next big thing. Conveniently justified by an inevitable, possibly dramatic, change in what the military needs.
So like microservices, but for killing people.
Also: the F22 datalinks are incompatible and can not easily interoperate with the F35 ones. That problem sound familiar too.
The thing is, the US military re-tools its organization every 10 to 20 years or so, looking ahead at the conflicts to come. In the late 80s that re-tooling began and the result was methodologies that came to fruition in Iraq and Afghanistan. We take notes from past examples (see Russian occupation of the latter), examine the fight we see coming (insurgent warfare in WWII), and rebuild doctrine to fit.
The special operations groups were part of the process. While we were creating our own future enemies in the 60s and 70s (mujahideen turned into Al-Qaeda and others) we were also getting a first hand look at guerrilla warfare and how ineffective symmetric war concepts were at facing a guerrilla opponent.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asymmetric_warfare
[edit]grammar![/edit]
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%2012-1...
I wish I could remember the book I read. It details things like how the one person you had to worry about at a security checkpoint was the person with all their papers in order... I want to say it was Western Africa, or a similar holding that the book centered around.
[edit] All that to say I agree with you. A self-sufficient force seems to be, by nature, multi-talented. [/edit]
[edit2] And the book, which is quite good, is "Small Wars" by a Colonel Callwell. https://www.amazon.com/Small-Wars-Their-Principles-Practice/... [/edit2]
Nah. The Corps has had plenty of opportunity to acquire the experience organically:
"During about 85 of the last 100 years, the Marine Corps has been engaged in small wars in different parts of the world." --Small Wars Manual (1940 Edition)
Running through the list of the Corps' most revered heroes... I can't think of a single one that didn't face an enemy that employed guerilla warfare tactics. Chesty Puller started out fighting an insurgency in Haiti and then Nicaragua. Before that SgtMaj Daly fought in the Boxer Rebellion. Smedley Butler fought Cuban insurgents in the Spanish–American War (later writing "War Is a Racket"). Archibald Henderson fought in the Seminole Wars...
The Corps has more experience with asymmetric warfare than the stereotypical military campaign. It also has a very long institutional memory where best practices are developed and passed down - I don't remember ever hearing somebody cite British colonialism during a period of instruction, we had our own colonialism to refer back to: the banana wars.
I'm just joking...sort of. It's usually the things that we didn't think of that bite us in the butt.
Given the random hodge-podge of software and firmware that modern military tech runs on, you're not going to see much success in building a magic one-size-fits-all virus that will spread across the entire system.