The idea of free will sort of deriving from some properties of particles is interesting. I admit there's a lot to our understanding of things from a fundamental physical perspective that is lacking, so although I doubt it's the case I don't think it can be ruled out on a logical basis.

I know I'm in the minority, but I object to the idea of responsibility actually, and prefer to think of change in a kind of "neurobehavioral engineering" or transformative justice sense. That might seem pathological or even psychopathic (which is ironic because I'm anything but); I just mean that I think responsibility (like randomness maybe, at least with reference to free will) is sort of a red herring. It's one of the reasons I'm interested in free will issues, because I think the notion of responsibility (outside of a very strict causal sense, as in "this geological formation is responsible for this waterfall") is misguided, and also shifts focus away from change efforts, toward retribution. To me, punishing an individual for a crime out of retribution makes as much sense as punishing a car for breaking down; I'd prefer to see the individual "fixed" in the same way I'd prefer to see my car fixed. The primary obstacle to the former from my perspective is lack of knowledge, which will diminish rapidly with time whether we as a society want it or not. I think one of the biggest challenges we will face as a society in the next 200 years (assuming we don't disappear or devolve into a dark age) is how to integrate advances in neuroscience and psychology into our sense of justice and responsibility. E.g., if you could change a person completely for the better, is withholding that change unethical? What's the point of retributional justice then? Aren't you just shooting yourself in the foot, societally speaking?

This is all tangential to the paper, but I think issues of free will become critical when you are faced with the possibility of total change in an individual.