30 spies dead after Iran cracked CIA comms network

https://www.amazon.com/Legacy-Ashes-History-Tim-Weiner/dp/03...

Those described in the above comment were US nationals in Russia operating under diplomatic cover, and are not subject to Russian law. They would be deported. Russian nationals working for the CIA would not be found by that search.

The agents in the story were Chinese/Iranian/etc. nationals working for the CIA. They had no diplomatic protection, which is why they were killed.

Here's something interesting that Milo Medin wrote about dual homed sites like NSA and NASA, that were on both the ARPANET and MILNET:

    To: fair@ucbarpa.berkeley.edu (Erik E. Fair)
    Cc: Hackers_Guild@ucbvax.berkeley.edu, ucdavis!ccohesh@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
    Subject: Re: a question of definition
    Date: Thu, 29 Jan 87 15:33:35 PST
    From: Milo S. Medin (NASA ARC Code ED) <medin@orion.arpa>

    Right, the core has many gateways on it now, maybe 20-30.  All the LSI's will
    be stubbed off the core however, and only buttergates will be left after
    the mailbridges and EGP peers are all converted.  Actually, I think DARPA is
    paying for it all...

    Ames is *not* getting a mailbridge.  You are right of course, that we could
    use 2 gateways, not just 1 (actually, there will be a prime and backup anyways),
    and then push routing info appropriately.  But that's anything but simple.
    Firstly, the hosts have to know which gateway to send a packet to a given
    network, and thus have to pick between the 2.  That's a bad idea.
    It also means that I have to pass all EGP learned info around on the
    local cable, and if I do that, then I can't have routing info from
    the local cable pass out via EGP.  At least not without violating
    the current EGP spec.   Think about it.  It'd be really simple to
    create a loop that way.  Thus, in order to maximize the use of both
    PSN's, you really need one gateway wired to both PSN's, and just
    have it advertise a default route inside.  Or use a reasonble IGP,
    of which RIP (aka /etc/routed stuff) is not.  I'm hoping to get
    an RFC out of BBN at this IETF meeting which may go a long way in
    reducing the use of RIP as an IGP.

    BTW, NSA is an example of a site on both MILNET and ARPANET but without
    a mailbridge...

    There is no restriction that a network can only be on ARPANET or MILNET.
    That goes against the Internet model of doing things.  Our local
    NASA gatewayed nets will be advertised on both sides.  The restriction
    on BARRNet is that the constituent elements of BARRNet do not all
    have access to MILNET.  NSF has an understanding with DARPA and
    DCA that NSFnet'd sites can use ARPANET.  That does not extend to
    the MILNET.  Thus, Davis can use UCB's or Stanford's, our even NASA's
    ARPANET gateways, with the approval of the site of course, but
    not MILNET, even though NASA has MILNET coverage.  Thus we are required
    to restrict BARRNet routing through our MILNET PSN.  If we were willing
    to sponsor UCB's MILNET access, for some requirement which NASA
    had to implement, then we would turn that on.  But BARRNet itself will
    but cutoff to MILNET (and probably ARPANET too) at Ames, but not
    cut off to other NASA centers or sites that NASA connects.  There is
    no technical reason that prevents this, in fact, we have to take
    special measures to prevent it.  But those are the rules.  Anyways,
    mailbridge performance should improve after the conversion, so
    UCB should be in better shape.  And you'll certainly be able to
    talk to us via BARRNnet...  I have noticed recently that MILNET<->
    ARPANET performance has been particularly poor...  Sigh.

    The DCA folks feel that in case of an emergency they may be
    forced to use an unsecure network to pass certain info around.  The
    DDN brochure mentions SIOP related data for example.  Who knows,
    if the balloon goes up, the launch order might pass through Evans
    Hall on its way out to SAC...  :-)


                        Milo

(Milo Medin knows this stuff first hand: https://innovation.defense.gov/Media/Biographies/Bio-Display... )

    To: fair@ucbarpa.berkeley.edu (Erik E. Fair)
    Cc: ucdavis!ccohesh@ucbvax.berkeley.edu, Hackers_Guild@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
    Subject: Re: a question of definition
    Date: Thu, 29 Jan 87 12:29:36 PST
    From: Milo S. Medin (NASA ARC Code ED) <medin@orion.arpa>

    Actually its:

    SCINET -- Secret Compartmented Information Net  (if you don't know what
    compartmented means, you don't need to ask)
    DODIIS -- DoD Intelligence Information Net

    The other stuff I think is right, at least without me looking things
    up.  I probably shouldn't have brought this subject of the secure part
    of the DDN up.  People like being low key about such things...

    Erik, all the BBN gateways on MILNET and ARPANET currently comprise
    the core, not just mailbridges.  Some are used as site gateways, others
    as EGP neighbors, etc...  And just because you are dual homed doesn't mean
    you get a mailbridge.  And the IETF doesn't deal with low level stuff
    like that; DCA does all that.  In fact, the reason we are getting an
    ARPANET PSN is because when DCA came out to do a site survey, they
    liked our site so much they asked if they could put one here!  It's
    amazing how many sites have tried to get ARPANET PSN's the right
    way and have had to wait much longer than us...  BTW, since we are
    dual homed (probably a gateway with 2 1822 interfaces in it), we
    are taking steps to be sure that people on ARPANET or MILNET can't
    use our gateway to bypass the mailbridges.  The code will be hacked
    to drop all packets that aren't going to a locally reachable network.
    BARRNet, even though its locally reachable, will be excluded
    from this however, since the current procedural limitations call for
    not allowing any BARRNet traffic to flow out of BARRNet to MILNET
    and the reverse.  NASA traffic of course can traffic through BARRNet,
    and even use ARPANET that way (though that's not a big deal when
    we get our own ARPANET PSN).  That's because only NASA is authorized
    to directly connect to MILNET, not UCB or Stanford, etc...

    DCA must have the ability to partition the ARPANET and MILNET in
    case of an "emergency", and having non-DCA controlled paths between
    the nets prevents that.  There was talk some time ago about putting
    explosive bolts in the mailbridges that would be triggered by
    destruct packets...  That idea didn't get far though...

    The DDN only includes MILNET,ARPANET,SCINET,etc...  Not the attached
    networks.  If it did, you'd need to file a TSR to add a PC to your
    local cable.  A TSR is a monstrous piece of paperwork that needs to
    be done anytime anything is changed on the DDN...  Rick knows all
    about them don't you Rick?

    The whole network game is filled with acronyms!  I gave up trying
    to write documents with full explainations in terms long ago...
    I have yet to see a short and concise (and correct) way of describing
    DDN X.25 Standard Service for example...  That's probably one of the
    harder things about getting into networking these days.  We won't
    even talk about Etherbunnies and Martians and other Millspeak...

                        Milo '1822' Medin

Who would answer the Milnet NOC's 24-hour phone was hit or miss: Some were more helpful and knowledgeable than others, others were quite uptight.

Once I told the guy who answered, "Hi, this is the University of Maryland. Our connection to the NSA IMP seems to be down." He barked back: "You can't say that on the telephone! Are you calling on a blue phone?" (I can't remember the exact color, except that it wasn't red: that I would have remembered). I said, "You can't say NSA??! This is a green phone, but there's a black phone in the other room that I could call you back on, but then I couldn't see the hardware." And he said "No, I mean a voice secure line!" I replied, "You do know that this is a university, don't you? We only have black and green phones."

    Date: Thu, 11 Sep 86 13:53:45 EDT
    From: Steve D. Miller <steve@brillig.umd.edu>
    To: staff@mimsy.umd.edu
    Subject: Talking to the Milnet NOC

       This message is intended to be a brief tutorial/compendium of
    information you probably want to know if you need to see about
    getting the LH/DH thingy (and us) talking to the world.

       First, you need the following numbers:
        (1)  Our IMP number (57),
        (2)  Mimsy's milnet host address (26.2.0.57),
        (3)  The circuit number for our link to the NSA
            (DSEP07500-057)
        (4)  The NOC number itself (692-5726).

       Second, you need to know something about the hardware.  There
    are three pieces of hardware that make up our side of the link:
    the LH/DH itself, the ECU, and the modem.  The LH/DH and the
    ECU are the things in the vax lab by brillig; the ECU is the
    thing on top (with the switches), and the LH/DH is the thing
    on the bottom.  The normal state is to have the four red LEDs
    on the ECU on and the Host Master Ready, HRY, Imp Master Ready,
    and IRY lights on at the LH/DH.  If these lights are not on,
    something is wrong.  If mimsy is down, then we'll only have some
    of the lights on, but that should fix itself when mimsy comes up.
    Some interesting buttons or switches on the ECU are:
        reset - resets something or another
        stop - stops something or another
        start - restarts something or another
        local loopback -- two switches and two leds; you may need
            to throw one or the other of these if the NOC asks
            you to.  These loopback switches should be distinguished
            from those on the modem itself.
        remote loopback -- like local loopback, but does something else.

       The modem is in the phone room beside the terminal room (rm.
    4322, if memory serves).  It can be opened with the chase key from
    the key box...but if someone official and outside of staff asks
    you that, you probably shouldn't admit to it.  It has a switch on
    it, too; it seems that switch normally rests in the middle, and
    there's a "LL" setting to the left which I assume puts the modem in
    local loopback mode.

       Now that you have some idea of where things are, call the NOC.
    Identify yourself as from the University of Maryland, and say that
    we're not talking to the outside world.  They will probably ask for
    our Milnet address or the number of the IMP we're connected to,
    and will then poke about and see what's happening.  They will ask
    you to do various things; ask if you're not sure what they mean,
    but the background info above should help in puzzling it out.

       Hopefully, this will make it easier to find people to fix
    our net problems in the future; it's still hard to do 'cause
    we have so little info (no hardware manual, for example),
    but this should give us a fighting chance.

        -Steve

The CIA would send a 35-year-old spy out with a cover job that only accepted applicants up to the age of 28, and then send a polite letter to the Russians informing them of his arrival. Meanwhile there was a giant search for the mole at CIA HQ, because there had to be one, how else would the Russians unmask so many agents so quickly?

Poor contingent hires couldn't even get basic auth, eh

This breach would not have happened without that convienence.

UX could have made it easier to remember to robots file. So could process, or review or other security practices. But no UX is gonna solve fact that internet is insecure due to its convienence.

The internet can never be secure. At best you can get lower levels of insecurity.

>A defense contractor for the CIA named John Reidy claims he warned the agency that it was using insecure communications systems in 2008, and again in 2010 when he started to suspect the channels had been cracked. A year later he was fired by the agency, a move he claims was retaliation for not shutting up.

>“It was a recipe for disaster,” Reidy said. “We had a catastrophic failure on our hands that would ensnare a great many of our sources.”

The person who could actually save the day and prevent the catastrophe gets ignored, marginalized, and/or fired. The people who were involved in the original disastrous decision keep moving up in the organization and usually keep their jobs after the catastrophe. So it's not like these organizations are lacking smart people: their institutional and bureaucratic incompetence just prevents those people from doing their job properly.

Well,... the saying is "Allen Dulles was much of a clown first, politician second, and serviceman the third."

Regarding US foreign intel service: when something the size and budget of CIA does recon, something useful will come out of it regardless of how lame is their tradecraft.

Like this, France in 1700 wasn't powerful because it's king and ministers were geniuses, it's military competent. It was powerful because it's agriculture could support 20 million peasants.