Good stuff. One concern with Callisto though: What stops a serial perpetrator from reporting himself (using an alias) to be able to identify anyone else who has reported him?
Users of this product will be able to enter the identity of their perpetrator into the escrow. This data can only be decrypted by the Callisto Options Counselor (a lawyer), when another user enters the identity of the same perpetrator. If the perpetrator identities match, both users will be put in touch independently with the Options Counselor, who will connect them to each other (if appropriate) and help them determine their best path towards justice. The client relationships with the Op- tions Counselors are structured so that any client-counselor communications would be privileged.
edit: from https://www.projectcallisto.org/callisto-cryptographic-appro...
There are no legal implications from lying to a lawyer that are different than lying to a software developer or anyone else, at least not that I can think of. I suppose communication with lawyers is more likely to be in situations where lying has legal implications, such as in legal proceedings. But if you lie on the witness stand, the problem is not that you lied to the lawyer but that you lied to the court.
A perpeterator's accomplice files a report, triggering a process that leads to meeting an accuser. The accomplice then carefully unwinds and backs out the process, and leaks the accuser's identity to the perpetrator for use in other harassment or blackmail.
I think this is a great thing for YC to be doing.
Generally, an attacker would probably not want to call attention to themselves. A sufficiently well-resourced adversary (I suppose) could hire people to spam the system with false accusations (possibly targeting similar peers so it looks like "hey, everyone in crypto/databases/... is being accused") but if the process of getting an account with this system isn't trivial (invite-only, verified email, etc) it wouldn't be easy.