Hehe. Have a link?
The contemporary AIM-4 Falcon missile had a much more sophisticated seeker but had to be cooled before firing and was useless once the coolant ran out, for example if the pilot took too long to get a lock.
Modern IR-guided missiles use imaging IR sensors and actually recognise target shapes.
This boggles the mind. The US military have had trouble facing asymmetrical opponents close to continually since the Vietnam war. It's not like they haven't had time to see it coming.
I think the embarrassment that was the Millennium Challenge war game[0] showed just how out of touch the top brass is.
* F-4 - older multirole fighter, SEAD/STRIKE/CAS
* F/A-18 (A/B/C/D aka legacy hornet) - replacement multirole
* F-14 - interceptor
* A-4 - strike, SEAD etc
* A-7 - strike, SEAD etc
* A-6 - strike, CAS
* EA-6 (significantly different from the A-6) - ELINT/EWAR
* E-2 - AWACS
* C-2 - COD
* S-3 - Anti submarine, Tanker
These were pretty much all replaced in the mid 90s leaving the following:
* F/A-18 (E/F, basically a different airframe) - multirole fighter, SEAD/STRIKE/CAS and Tanker
* EA-18G (basically the same airframe as the E/F) - EWAR/SEAD while retaining marginal A2A capability
* E-2 - AWACS
* C-2 - COD
That's a pretty drastic reduction in airframes to manage so it's understandable why those managing them want to try to maintain consolidation to an extent. Now whether this is the best way of going about it is an open question. The F-18 platform has shown that it's possible but it's also much more mature, having had many decades to work out the bugs. There's also the question of how they managed to talk the navy into a single engine platform but that's a rant for another day...
Note: the first list was never all deployed at the same time on the same carrier AFAIK. They travel as squadrons between carriers depending on the carriers mission. The second gets deployed together regularly as they comprise the bare minimum for an operational air wing.
It's the same disease that McNamara caught, resulting in the F-111. The F-111 was supposed to be the super plane for the Navy and the air superiority platform for the Air Force. Synergistic with this is that idea that there would be no more dogfighting and it would all be done with missiles.
Tactical data sharing, complex systems like missiles, and the infrastructure which supports them all involve a lot of planning. No plan survives contact with the enemy.
The issue with the F-35 isn't that it is intended to perform both air superiority and ground attack missions. The basic objection to the F-35 is designing a single airframe with several variants capable of conventional takeoff and landing (F35-A), short takeoff and vertical landing (F35-B), and catapult assisted takeoff and arrested recovery (F35-C). These are completely different ways of taking off and landing, with different design constraints, and it is difficult to create an airframe that can be modified to perform any of them. That's the primary philosophical objection to the F35, at least. There's another whole debate about whether we need aircraft dedicated for the close air support role (like the A-10), and the rest of the complaints are specific to F35 design choices.
It's not clear that this is the case. While the Eurofighter is better in a turning fight, it may not matter against the f35. The f35's stealth helps it choose the engagement parameters but the f35 has another advantage in a dogfight. Apparently it has the bizarre ability to point its nose very quickly allowing it to casually snap off kill shots with a minimum of fuss.
All the earlier reports of f35 dog fighting abilities involved very early f35 models which were operating under pretty severe software restrictions. In addition, no one really understood the f35's flight characteristics so they were trying to fly them like f16's and f15's, which is a big problem. Every fighter aircraft must flown differently based on its flight characteristics.
See this 10m clip https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXQ2lO3ieBA
It's "ordnance", not "ordinance". Different words.