Unpublished and Untenured, a Philosopher Inspired a Cult Following | Hacker News Reader

Unpublished and Untenured, a Philosopher Inspired a Cult Following

nytimes.com

87 pointsdiodorus45 comments

What I've seen of kimhi's drafts has been pretty dense, harder to read than Kripke(!), but important. In particular (IMHO) he ties a common thread from hermeneutics, continental deconstruction[+] and, for me, modern computational semantics, without the rigid and, IMHO, artificial platonism of American analytical philosophy.

Why do I think it's important? When your cars have hand-built planners you can't really call them (except metaphorically) "self-driving" no matter how many CNNs you put in their vision system and to do so fakes you out to the point where you end up running over women pushing bikes because nobody thought to put in a handler for that case.

[+] I mean the point of early Derrida, not the fatuousnes of most deconstructionist writing.

Links to drafts?

"IMHO, artificial platonism of American analytical philosophy"

Platonism has a meaning (or maybe more than one), and none of them describe any shared assumptions of 20th century/contemporary American philosophy. Please find a different term of abuse.

"It is raining, but I don't believe it is raining" is certainly valid if I propose it as one possible thing happening in the world, and yet if I make that statement with the added context of "[I am asserting that right now] it is raining..." then it is clearly contradictory. Stripping away context makes the statement naturally ambiguous, and yet some decision is being made about what kind of context is "correct" or "logical"? Am I missing something here?

Even with the added context of "[I am asserting that right now] it is raining, but I don't believe it is raining" doesn't seem necessarily contradictory to me. The two parts could be being evaluated in different (possible) worlds. [While this may seem unlikely, here's one context: I'm hallucinating and am experiencing rain, but rationally I deduce that it can't actually be raining.]

(Likewise "Santa Claus lives at the North Pole, but I don't believe in Santa Claus". - The first is evaluated within the world of Santa Claus mythology; the second in a world consistent with my beliefs.)

In both cases, the language you are using does not describe what you really mean. In the first instance: "I am experiencing a hallucination of rain, but it is not raining". In the second "The fictional character Santa Claus is said to live at the north pole. I do not believe Santa Claus is real".

In both instances, precision prevents you from conflating two classes of belief.

From your own perspective, it is quite impossible to state "I believe it is raining. It is not raining." This all seems to hinge on the issue of perspective. Very interesting stuff. Grateful to the "Herodotus38" for explaining it; I couldn't grok it from the article.

I wonder if someone could extend this to put mathematical proofs in applied maths on a better footing.

> In both cases, the language you are using does not describe what you really mean. In the first instance: "I am experiencing a hallucination of rain, but it is not raining". In the second "The fictional character Santa Claus is said to live at the north pole. I do not believe Santa Claus is real".

That's not the case. Your sentences are not my intended readings.

My original is perfectly expressible in (intensional) predicate logic:

(Rain(w,t) ∧ ¬Rain(w',t))

(where w,w' are worlds, t is a time)

The conflation of psychology and logic makes no sense to me.

But what the philosopher is stating, I think, is that no-one can state: (Rain(w,t) ∧ ¬Rain(w',t)) because no-one has the standing or perspective to be able to verify Rain(w,t) and ¬Rain(w',t) simultaneously.

Essentially:

w -> ¬w'

Is this attempting to strip objectivity from philosophy?

> w -> ¬w'

That doesn't work, because I can say something like "John dreamt he found a unicorn" which involves two different worlds (say, w & w'). Or, to make it more parallel, "John dreamt he wasn't dreaming". Which are both perfectly reasonable sentences and have perfectly reasonable predicate logic translations.

In the original, we are not proposing separate worlds though, not in that sense.

1. I assert that it is not raining. 2. It is not raining.

This chap saying that 1 and 2 exist in the same world, and are therefore contradictory. Equivalence of statement and assertion.

It makes no sense to me to conflate logical statements and (human) speaker-anchored assertions. When semanticists work on natural language meaning, this requires use of the formal languages. It makes no sense to me to hard-wire human-speakers into a system of abstract logic (which we need when we reason about human speakers).

In "John dreamt he wasn't dreaming" the two observations either have different observers or happen at different times. At no point is John both aware that he is dreaming and also thinking that he is not dreaming.

It seems from the comments that people are trying to find an easy way out from the dilemma - like supposing 2 different 'I's or the same 'I' that partakes in 2 different worlds/realities. The reading that I like better is this: given the same frame of reference (same 'I', same reality) to both parts of the sentence, does it represent a logical fallacy?

I had trouble with that too and I think I understand what the writer means (but I could still be wrong). I will give it my best shot:

At first I could imagine saying and truly meaning "It is raining, but I don't believe it is raining". But then I realized that statement would only be true if I was referring to a past tense version of me (say I was in a car so didn't see the rain), and meant it as "It was raining, but I didn't believe it was raining (but now I know)". Or maybe with that statement I'm taking a step back and really commenting on my own perception "It is raining, but I (not the true I who knows "It is raining", but the sloppier version that perceived things wrong at first) don't believe it's raining. It's like the statement only makes sense with the implicit assumption that the "I" in the second part is referring not to the "True" I that knows it is raining, but the fallible one.

The very act of saying "It is raining" really means "I believe it is raining", so you can't truly say "I believe it is raining, but I don't believe it is raining."

Maybe someone smarter will chime in, this hurts my head. Thank you poster for the link. I'm going to sleep.

You’re taking the example too literal. It’s not raining, you only think it is.

A better example would be climate change.

Climate is changing, but I don’t believe it is. In this the point that psychology and logic don’t integrate so well is clearer, because the issue is so politicized while also a logical fact.

It’s the difference between saying, I think it’s raining and asserting that it is. The point isn’t to say that it’s not raining, it’s to say that you should consider that the way you experience the world might not be as logically as you know.

I think, this is really an everyday phenomenon. There are a number of scenarios where this may apply:

Suspension of disbelief: I'm collaboratively participating in a narrative and asserting certain truths is a premise to this collaboration, which is the very act of making meaning. At the same time, I do not believe in the reality of what is actually my psychological reality. This is a certainly a matter of context switching, which is not reserved to art, but may also be observed in real life.

In certain cases, the narrative which is the description of the real world, which we wholeheartedly assert, becomes complex to an extent, where, while we still acknowledge the correctness of this description, we find it increasingly difficult to believe in, even on the basis of a working model, while still working in and with it. Compare quantum physics, certain aspects of cosmology, etc.

Parallel acknowledgement of contesting messages regarding the state of the world or facts therein, especially in politics or systems of belief. I do know that the regime I was asserting did this and this, but still I do not believe that the leaders would have done so. (Compare German citizens guided through concentration camps after WW II; I see it, I do know it to be true, but I do not believe it.) Or, by the example of current SCOTUS hearings, I may believe a certain witness (i.e., assert the content to be true), but still do not believe that the other person would have committed the incriminated act, still, I assert the testament of the witness as truth, which implies that the act has been committed by this person, etc. (All kind of distortions arise from this, some are even part of what we regard as objective history.)

It’s not reality and it’s a logical contradiction. The question is to reason about how to reason things you do not have a direct experience with.

No proposition -- with the notable exception of a priori statements, which are about constitutive elements of our internal reality -- is about reality, but about our notion of reality – compare Kant. Reasoning is about synthetic propositions, which are necessarily only as conceived and represented in our internal reality. Logic is about what may be generalized in this, i.e., about forming synthetic judgements based on a posteriori data. Regarding this data, there is no chance to relate directly to reality, since nothing in our experience relates directly to reality, but is formed by our inner and outer senses. The same is true for any shared experience, commonly related to as 'reality' or 'truth'.

Since the truth of a proposition relates to a state of the world (reality), the notion of a contradiction relates to this as well. Hence, we have to shift our attention to the very nature of this world/reality and its representation, when facing a contradiction. A contradiction just refers to an ambiguous state, expressed as a non-exclusive duality of logical values. Now, we may ask, is it the world, which is ambiguous, (we may never know), or is it our representation, or, is there possibly more than a single representation/context at once?

A (very simple) example: If we subscribe to the notion of color as a property of an object, a solid colored object _is_ of a color, meaning, it may be either blue or red, but not both at once. But, if our description of the world includes the notion of a spectrum and mixed colors, it may be both blue and red at once, commonly related to as a shade of violet or purple. The very context may include the spectral description or not, it may be even ambiguous about this.

Well this is effectively meaningless. I can see why everyone went over to analytical philosophy. Color is the absence of light and all that. Anything you propose willl have some categorical membership grounded in something measured and observed. The only thing you get in the interpretive weirdness are rules that may or may not be consistent. Not to mention the more serious issue of incompleteness and undecideability. I think that’s the whole issue.

However, a proposition, like, "A says she knows it is raining, but A says at the same time that she does not believe that it is raining", is about a state of mind and a question regarding its logic is about what may be generalized. I can't see where analytical philosophy may be of help here, as the proposition would be just meaningless. (Let's say, Wittgenstein I wouldn't be of help, Wittgenstein II maybe. But I wouldn't consider the latter as analytical in the strict sense.)

> "It is raining, but I don't believe it is raining"

"but I don't believe it is raining" is a personal belief that can be defined as personally assigning >50% probability that it is not raining.

"It is raining" is a fact. A fact can be defined in this context as something that I believe that a great majority of my collaborators believe is true. Or even something that my group I identify with decided is true. Therefore I act within the group as if it is raining in order to be constructive member of the group and collaborate efficiently. When an opportunity arises I might argue with the group to advocate and confront my belief. Sometimes though it is more efficient to just take an umbrella like everybody else than argue. Especially if a cost of taking umbrella is small relative to a potential loss if it really is raining.

Therefore "it is raining" become a shortcut to "I believe I should act as if it is raining" which doesn't contradict "I don't believe it is raining".

There is an analogues Sam Harris' example that can be rephrased as: "Gun is loaded, but I don't believe gun is loaded". Same can be said about the God.

Then you're implying that it 'might' be raining... adding hidden context to your statement, rather than taking it as face value.

The issue is related to the distinction between the meaning of statements, and what one can say about an individual who utters them.

There is no logical contradiction in "it's raining but I don't believe it". That describes a genuine state the world can be in. There's clearly something going wrong if someone says that, but it somehow depends on who's speaking. In the third person, it's fine, in the first person, it's a problem. In contrast, "it's raining and it isn't", or "Justin believes that it's raining and he doesn't" are just contradictions, no matter who says them. The challenge is to characterize what is wrong with the Moorean absurdity.

At least, that's the core of the traditional story, which Kimhi wants to reject.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore%27s_paradox https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemic-paradoxes/#MooP...

P.S. Your point about floating a possibility is addressed in the SEP article I linked. In general, contemporary philosophers will talk about a sentence like "It's raining" as an assertion, and include explicit clarification when it's not an assertion ("it might be raining", "it's raining?", "if it's raining and I don't believe it, then I'm wrong").

I'm intrigued. I'll have to read the book. For me, the distinction between it's raining and whether I believe it is raining rests on the distinction between experience and concepts. (This doesn't appear to be the Kimhi's thesis, if I understood the NYT article.) I first read about this studying Buddhism.

I know it is raining when I experience the sensation of rain. The truth of my experience can't be disputed. My experience may even be illusory, but it's still my experience. "I heard the sound of rain in my dream."

On the other hand, a belief ("it is raining", "there are no black swans") depends on conceptual thinking, which is instantly invalidated by a counterexample or discovery of a logical error. Beliefs are useful, but must be held lightly, subject to experience.

Assuming the article is correctly summarising his argument, this is the same critique that Hegel put forward of the distinction of Force and Expression:

> It is often said that the nature of Force itself is unknown and only its manifestation apprehended. But, in the first place, it may be replied, every article in the import of Force is the same as what is specified in the Expression: and the explanation of a phenomenon by a Force is a mere tautology. What is supposed to remain unknown, therefore, is really nothing but the empty form of reflection-into-self, by which alone the Force is distinguished from the Expression — and that form too is something familiar. It is a form that does not make the slightest addition to the content and to the law, which have to be discovered from the phenomenon alone. Another assurance always given is that to speak of forces implies no theory as to their nature: and that being so, it is impossible to see why the form of Force has been introduced into the sciences at all. In the second place the nature of Force is undoubtedly unknown: we are still without any necessity binding and connecting its content together in itself, as we are without necessity in the content, in so far as it is expressly limited and hence has its character by means of another thing outside it.

- G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, § 136

I haven't heard of Kimhi before this article, so my knowledge is only based on my reading of it, but I don't understand why we would want to collapse logic and psychology.

Logic involves formal systems. Whether or not these formal systems provide a sound basis for thinking about actual causation in the world or even for thinking about our own thinking about causation is a separate issue.

When is a formal system a logic and when is it not?

Formal Systems can have non-logical axioms, which would make it non-logical?

But a lot of this dealing with assertions that may or may not be true in logic has been dealt with in a more rigorous way already as far back as the 1960s: Fuzzy Logic https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzzy_logic.

A belief like "I think it is raining" can be encoded as a 75% chance of it raining.

Fuzzy logic is just theory of vagueness. It's just one example of many-valued logic and reasoning involving predicates that are vague in nature.

Kimhi's ideas seem to be deeper than that.

I see your point, but the phrasing is confusing: fuzzy logic is not the same as probability. "A 75% chance of it raining" typically means that it either rains or not.

In a fuzzy setting, "I think it is raining" would be encoded as "the current weather is partially included in the Raining set, with membership greater than 0 but smaller than 1".

This probably becomes Shrodeniger-esque. The observed and to act upon.

That's not quite right. Your tactic might handle the Moorean absurdity ("it's raining but I don't believe that it's raining"), but there's a variant: "it's raining, and I'm certain that it's not raining" that it doesn't handle.

Amusingly, the works of Epictetus we have are because one of his students, Arrian, recorded his teachings.

Kinda wondering why the geniuses who surround him haven’t just made endless tapes of interesting discussions and then had him ghost-written up

The article states he's perfectionist. He probably wouldn't be OK with that.

Socrates/Plato as well.

More contemporarily, George Herbert Mead's influence is based mainly on his transcribed lectures contained in Man, Self and Society. Mead wrote a good deal during his lifetime, but always relatively short pieces that he never bothered to compile together into books or programmatic statements of his philosophical position.

(as alluded to in the article.)

Same for Saussure, whose most-read work was a compilation of his notes by his students and colleagues after his death.

Stoicism and many other Greek philosophies were much deeper than just thinking different ideas and concept in abstract and writing them down.

Stoic philosopher was someone who was living his life according to stoic philosophy. To learn philosophy and to become a philosopher was to enter training program where you live with the teacher and internalize the philosophy as way of life.

Why would anyone read books about philosophy of bodybuilding and how to lift weights for years if they are not going go to go to gym and actually train? In a same way, you can't really become a Stoic philosopher by reading the books.

My leg is being pissed on, therefore it must be raining.

I've been saying this for a decade. A statement contains an implicit statement of knowledge. But it's funny that this chap is lauded for it. I always get downvoted hard for it. Maybe because of who I'm saying it to in what context.

haha

Dang, this guy would understand my argument for what IS tested in science versus what people WANT to test with science. There is a huge gap especially in medical PRACTICE and drug DEVELOPMENT. I.e. What IS practiced versus what could be practiced if we (the participants) were safe and capable of developing. I.e. Often we try to prove something is correct and overlook proving something is incorrect.

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