Why does voting take 6 minutes? I think I used a voting machine maybe once in my life (in the Netherlands and apparently young enough to not have used those more often). Casting a vote on paper is usually checking a box with a red pencil, takes maybe a minute of dealing with the huge sheet of paper with all the candidates.
Just curious.
Here's an example from this year.
https://www.kingcounty.gov/~/media/depts/elections/how-to-vo...
Send them from an arbitrary public mailbox at a busy place, like a train station or a mall.
This should make tracking impractical, unless you expect "them" to scan for fingerprints.
It gets validated, then passed along for counting.
Second, if you want, you may drop your ballot into any drop box, or hand deliver it to elections, who will validate it and put it into the counting queue.
Uh, you're only supposed to vote once.
Now the ballots show up, you can fill them out for all family members, even if recently deceased, and vote for everybody. That spouse doesn't need to vote. The high-school senior is too busy to do their own voting. The truly ambitious can even grab ballots out of mailboxes, adding them to their pile.
It may take some time to fill out a ballot paper. But the act of voting itself is inserting the ballot paper into the locked and monitored ballot box, which takes a second or two.
My polling place is filled with tables and chairs and cardboard privacy dividers, but has just one ballot box, with a scanner-tabulator on top of it.
The electronic voting machines that take the place of the paper ballot are the problem. You need dozens per polling place, and each one is expected by design to be alone with a voter, with physical access and privacy, for tens of minutes. I presume by default that any jurisdiction using them is actively promoting the hacking of their own elections, and such presumption must be rebutted only by exposure of the facts of the process that would mistrust the communications coming from those boxes as compromised and potentially malicious. I cannot fathom how it would even be possible to secure such devices. At least the scanner-tabulators attached to ballot boxes can be watched continuously.
They are broken by design, and utterly unfixable. The specifics of the known exploits are therefore somewhat irrelevant, because there will always be some means of compromising them. So the only way forward would be to treat every last one of them as permanently untrusted hardware.
While there may be some way to make them useful in an election, for now, until that PhD cryptography paper comes out that solves the problem, the only reasonable thing to do is toss them all in the trash, and go back to inked paper.