‘I Had A Funny Feeling in My Gut’ (1999)
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He decided (correctly) not to relay anything to the higher ups. However, later he was not commended for that, because his job was to make the call and tell something like “I have an alert of five incoming Minuteman missiles — I am sure though it is a false alarm from the new system”, instead of unilaterally deciding to block the message. He was right not to escalate, but if he did, it would not have immediately ended the world.
While true, if he had claimed the missiles were real, those with authority may have pushed The Big Button.
>According to Petrov and other sources, the false alarm was eventually traced to the satellite, which picked up the sun's reflection off the tops of clouds and mistook it for a missile launch. The computer program that was supposed to filter out such information was rewritten.
Every programmer should read this as a reminder of how a software bug can have catastrophic consequences. And I know it's hard, as deadlines come closer, the time dedicated to find bugs drops accordingly.
At worst, the number of visitors will drop to 0 for a short while, or clients/internal users won't be able to do their job for said short while. This will quite possibly impact the bottom line of company that relies on that particular site/app/system, but any effect will be lost in the noise (and probably even underestimated, because that's how this happened in the first place!).
While it's sort of nice that there are real-world stakes to the worst-case scenario, it's also both comforting and depressing to contemplate how relatively meaningless these stakes really are, personally.
https://blog.ucsusa.org/david-wright/nuclear-false-alarm-950
Was that typical for testing in 1983? Or is that how systems are tested today?
So, the control center hasn't been taken out by a cruise missile and the submarine pens are untouched and the bomber airfields check in as OK... it just doesn't make sense as a sneak attack vector. Maybe every sub launched cruise missile in the fleet failed to work; unlikely.
Something not declassified yet, but probably would clear up a lot of confusion, is if the detector code was fooled by sunlight on clouds or whatever, the trajectory solver likely came up with bizarre results like the ICBM launch site was the center of Lake Michigan or downtown Chicago or the trajectory of the other missile has a best fit predicted impact point of Ohio or Mexico City.
They have plenty of practice analyzing the huge horizontal velocity vector of normal spacecraft launches. A strange sunlight reflection would tend to have zero horizontal velocity; the opfor seems to be bombing its own missile sites by tossing the ICBM exactly straight up and down? That seems a little odd unless someone's trying to set off a false flag leading to a real attack.
I would think it would be good defensive coding strategy to have different teams write and deploy the detector code vs the trajectory analysis code, such that if one messes up it really doesn't matter.
> Petrov's decision was based partly on a guess, he recalled. He had been told many times that a nuclear attack would be massive – an onslaught designed to overwhelm Soviet defenses at a single stroke. But the monitors showed only five missiles. "When people start a war, they don't start it with only five missiles," he remembered thinking at the time. "You can do little damage with just five missiles."
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