I'm a dual citizen: in my other country, every five years I can vote on two ballots (to choose a party list for national government and one for regional government) and the following year again two ballots (to choose a party list and an individual representative for local government). In the US, I can vote for n state judges, state governor, state lieutenant governor, state treasurer, state secretary of state, state representative, state senator, presidential primary, president, federal senate primary, two senators, federal representative primary, representative, mayor, n members of the school district board, n local referenda, n state referenda. Some of these offices have terms as short as two years (e.g. representatives), or non-aligned terms (e.g., in a six year cycle there are two separate elections for federal senators). While in the other country there are two election days in every five year cycle, in the US I vote once or twice a year, and there are half a dozen to a dozen ballots on each occasion.

It could be done by hand, but the scale is very different to a more typical democracy.

Another benefit of electronic voting systems that mark and/or verify voter-verified paper ballots with the voter is allowing the blind and illiterate to vote alone and retain their privacy. Sighted literate voters take for granted that they don't have to reveal their vote to anyone else.

This doesn't get any discussion or support in the article (quite the contrary, there's some language about how such machines are second-best to voters marking their own ballots). The paragraph discounting "BMDs" (ballot-marking devices) contains no pointer to evidence to back the assertion that voters don't check their machine-marked voter-verifiable paper ballot. This is solved with voter education -- tell voters to verify their ballots no matter how they're marked. By the logic of this claim, it's worth pointing out that humans make mistakes writing on paper too. So better to have the voter verify their own ballot. There's also no evidence given of "the dispute-resolution mechanism" for a malicious or errant machine mismarking a ballot. This excuse seems particularly reaching to me as all roads lead to the same outcome -- the voter should spoil the ballot and get a new ballot. No proof is needed to justify spoiling the ballot because in the end they're not committing fraud. Even if the voter spoils multiple ballots, that's not a big deal. I'll need evidence to see that this is a serious concern but the article presents none.