But leaving the facts aside, this is something you can logic through. Instead of speculating about what problems Google might have faced, look to its actual conduct to see what problems it tried to avoid. If "industry lobbying power" was the problem, you'd expect Google would try to deploy fiber somewhere it had the leg-up lobbying-wise, like Seattle or San Francisco or Mountain View. It never did that. Under your theory, you have to assume that Comcast (based in Philadelphia) has more lobbying muscle in Google's own back yard than Google.
What did Google do instead? It went to medium-sized cities in Red states with overhead utility lines. Atlanta, Austin, Provo, Kansas City, etc. Why? Because those cities waived regulatory requirements they applied to incumbents, including the crucial one of build-out requirements (the requirement to build out to the whole city). Google went places like Kansas City, which fast tracked permitting, gave free leases of public land for fiber huts, and waived the obligation to cover low income neighborhoods. Indeed, the willingness to waive build out requirements (which are routine in the industry), is one thing these disparate Fiber cities have in common.
All of this tells you that the basic problem with Fiber was profitability (not just making a profit, but enough profit compared to what else Google could be doing with that money). Build-out requirements kill profitability, because you’re forced to spend a lot of money building to neighborhoods where you can expect few customers. (The major cost of a fiber build is wiring the neighborhood, not hooking up each house.) That’s why a cornerstone of Fiber was the idea of “fiberhoods”—neighborhoods with demonstrated demand for fiber. (Of course, remember, the initial fiberhood selection exluded most low income neighborhoods in KC, as you’d expect. Google was forced to back peddle and add a bunch of low income neighborhoods in. But that misstep tells you a lot about the money math that was driving Fiber.)