Self-reference and Logic (2005) [pdf]
imm.dtu.dk
imm.dtu.dk
"This sentence has five words."
This is a true statement. And we know that the conjunction of two true statements should also be true.
"This sentence has five words and this sentence has five words."
With eleven words each part of this statement is obviously false and here we can't rely on the "and", which we are used to from the simpler logics, anymore.
The two "this"s could refer to two different things. However, the second this would normally become that to indicate comparison but grammatically the original is still sound [with notes]:
This sentence [indicates a sentence with five words in it] has five words and this sentence [indicates another sentence, also with five words in it] has five words.
Natural language normally isn't a fully self-contained representation.
"This sentence has five words" AND "this sentence has five words" seems to be logically consistent. Doesn't trying to construct the logical proposition in natural english violate some sort of rule?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indexicality#In_linguistic_pra...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deixis
For example, if I say "it's sunny out now" or "today is a warm day" or "Berkeley is east of here" I also run into problems related to the prospect that references may not have the same referent in different contexts. (For example, two speakers can respectively affirm and deny each of these propositions even though they may both agree in all of their beliefs!)
The example that you give can also be interpreted as a deictic problem because the referent of "this sentence" can change from sentence to sentence, even though we normally don't expect the referents of noun phrases to change this way.
I'm surprised that he did not mention Jim Propp's self=referential aptitude test. It starts with:
> 1. The first question whose answer is B is question > (A) 1 > (B) 2 > (C) 3 > (D) 4 > (E) 5
And, of course, Bolander's paper ends with an utterly delightful final sentence!
If P then Q
being true does not mean Q has to be true. I don’t think you can conclude Santa Claus exists based on your argument.
P = !P v Q
Q |= _|_
P = !P v _|_
P = !P
2. Premise: ((P -> Q) -> P) -> P
3. (P -> Q) -> P, from 1
4. P, from 2 and 3
5. Q, from 1 and 4
Your Q was generic and could have been any statement. In particular one that has been provably shown to be false. If your arguments are correct then you have the ability to prove any false statement is true.
Do you really think you have found a way to demonstrate that the standard two-valued logic used in mathematics leads to a contradiction?
Curry’s Paradox shows the limits if naive set theory. Thus mathematically we have to be OK with the idea that not all naive set constructions produce valid sets.
In informal setttings we can argue that
If this sentence is true then Santa Claus exists
can’t be false. But then one usually assumes it must then be true. I would argue this isn’t the case. There are sentences that have no truth value. For instance,
This sentence is false.