A country that's going to mandate backdoors/access to such communications, are going to outlaw communication methods they can't backdoor.
Say Apple makes a federated end-to-end encrypted messenger app, the government will still go to Apple and say "let us read all the messages, otherwise you can't sell your devices". THAT is the problem, and it can't be solved by more technology and shouting "BLOCKCHAIN!"
If a largish group of users could create end-to-end encryption not with a single company but with "readily available materials", then stopping it could be harder.
So it's a combination of state dictate and the practical ability of users to defy that. This isn't saying I'm optimistic, I'm rather pessimistic on any ability of a wide home-grown encrypted-messaging milieu to appear - if few are aiming for this, those few can easily be picked-off. But I don't think we should just give up on any part of this.
You're forgetting that the average user doesn't care enough to sacrifice ease of use for greater political benefit.
At least in the US, if a US citizen is part of a potentially incriminating conversation, the government's going to have a hard time forcing a court to force the citizen to decrypt the conversation.
Lawyers, correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems like a conversation wouldn't be subject to the vagaries of "combination to a safe"-production loopholes.
Well, then clearly it would quickly become ubiquitous. I mean, if a war on encryption that was just like the war on drugs were to be launched, why my local stream bed might "place burned passwords here" on the tin-can that currently reads "used needles here." (put there by the other homeless people).
It's too late for that, every machine, every browser, every user is using encryption software all the time.
"It's too late to criminalize possession of drugs. Half the country takes pharmaceuticals!"
It's trivial when you can pass arbitrary legislation.
Back in the 90s we had to deal with US gov restrictions on encryption export. Software companies and organisations fell into line. It was a big deal when 128-bit keyed Netscape became available globally in 1997, per State Dept approval, but even then the full-strength server-side SSL was still restricted to 'approved' entities.
And even 56-bit server SSL was only exportable with us.gov key escrow.
I used to use Apache with the 40-bit SSL option. Pathetic strength but no-one was going to risk jail-time by breaking laws.
I did at that time, it was just another law to ignore.
This isn't meatspace, the dynamics are quite different.
Or, ofc, get people to adopt insecure protocols. That we know (or have good suspicion) they've tried.
They most certainly do not have cause to demand access to swaths of comms no matter whose comms they're after and most assuredly when that access actually entails enabling access to all of the comms.
I posit there is no authority that should be able to demand this as a matter of the right to human existence. Law, order, society and government should not have ultimate authority on private communications no matter what the tech is capable of. We, as humans in a modern world, can speak and if desired do so in private. This is our right as individuals and if encryption helps us accomplish and enforce that right then so be it.
If they have probable cause then they need to beat feet or beat heads but either way they need to get to work. And by work I do not mean trying to impose a different reality than the one that we currently have - where math is fact, compute is cheap and source is open.
What's it going to be? 100 go free or six lines from everyone?