The Time Everyone “Corrected” the World’s Smartest Woman (2015)
priceonomics.com
priceonomics.com
edit: the more I think about it, the more I suspect that the actual optimization was not randomizing both the door choice and the location of the car, which then allowed simplifying the win logic. If door 0 is always considered the door with the car, then the whole loop body can be collapsed down to:
if (rand() / (RAND_MAX / 3) == 0) noswitch_wins++;
No threat of a paradox as I was thinking before, but a fairly clear statement that the odds of winning by not switching are 1 in 3.I'm wondering if gambling would be a good way to go about it. Start with $10 each, and alternate who plays the "host" of Monty Hall. One person is only allowed to switch, and another is only allowed to stay. For each correct answer, take $1 from the other person.
Hmm, maybe to sweeten the deal, the person who switches gets $2 for a win, but the person who stays gets $3. That way, it would show that even with 50% better payout, it doesn't overcome the 2x difference in odds.
Another problem which is best explained by simulation is the random distribution of wealth [1]. (I played a bit with this one, introducing further parameters like liminal damage, debt, asymmetric amounts depending on investors trust, etc, to see how basic economic assumptions would reshape the model. Answer: only to the worse.)
[1] http://www.decisionsciencenews.com/2017/06/19/counterintuiti...
Do you think that agent-based computational simulations (say of micro-economics bubbling into creating emergent macro-economics) are ever used in debates?
That made me realize: code is a better way to describe problems than human text.
After many years, I finally understood where I made the mistake. It's not stated explicitly in the wording of the problem, but if you point this out explicitly, nearly everybody changes their mind:
When Monty Hall opens the door, he has to pick one of them, and he has knowledge of what's behind it.
The way the problem was described, I didn't appreciate that.
It wasn't until one of the groups that wrote in to support Vos Savant explicitly said "since some of the students in the class were skeptical, we wrote a simulation of the problem, which output the probabilities you would expect if Vos Savant was right." I inspect the source code, and viola- instantly understood my false assumption about the problem description.
It's an open problem whether the Monty Hall problem should explicitly state the implication of which door Monty opens. To me, I think the whole point is that it leaves one of the consequences unstated, and the reader is expected to make that indirect inference.
This is why, rather than reading text, I think people should describe these problems with code. Unambiguous code. With test cases. Then everybody can inspect the unambiguous code rather than having to parse human text.
Indeed you should switch if you think there's any chance at all that Monty always opens doors with goats. (Unless of course you think that there's also a chance that Monty always reveals cars whenever he can, but that wouldn't make for very good TV.)
Additionally, to open the door with the prize would terminate the game, so to open the door with the goat is the only action that makes sense given what we know.
Or you know, somebody could just write a computer program that described the rules unambiguously so everybody could inspect them and not have to make reasonable interpretations.
I think the world would be a much better place if we all dropped our egos and approached these sorts of disagreements with kindness and benefit of the doubt. Even if we're confident that we know better than the other person, we should approach it as a genuine attempt to understand and clear up the misconception as a way of improving the other person (and be willing to admit that the "misconception" may end up being true after all, as in a case like this). As far as I can think of, condescension is just some obnoxious human habit and doesn't actually provide any value.
I have 10 cups, and under one is a prize. I get a victim - ahem - volunteer to select two, and place markers on them.
I then say clearly that I will remove 6 of the other cups and, to retain the mystery, will not reveal the prize. There are now four cups, the prize is under one, and two of them are the volunteer's original choice.
And now the offer: They may retain their original two, or they may surrender their two and select only one of the other, currently unselected two.
So:
* What would you do, and why?
* What interesting further variant can you think of?
This should be straightforward to anyone who actually understands the Monty Hall problem.
Now that Monty is closing off 9998 doors, it makes the leap of logic much less difficult. Clearly the one door he didn't close off is special.
My variant was not intended to assist explaining the original, it's a variant intended to make people think again. It often exposes non-understanding in those who will blindly and automatically say "Switch".
Here's another variant. 12 doors, I let you choose 3. I then open 4, leaving your chosen 3 and 5 others.
I let you keep your original choice, or give them up to choose only one of the others. Should you switch now?
P(3/12) = 25%
The remaining doors have 75% probability and choosing 1/5 only gives you 15% chance of winning.
Explaining that to muggles, though, is non-trivial.
Do you say 'I will now remove 6 empty cups?', or is it believed that you removed 6 unmarked cups at random?
> I then say clearly that I will remove 6 of the other cups. And, to retain the mystery, I will not reveal the prize.
It wasn't a criticism.
I just wanted to draw attention to the point that in the random game (I.e. player marks two, you reveal 6 random unmarked, if no prize is revealed, player decides to switch to one or to keep two) it is the better strategy to never switch.
Do you think it would be an interesting variant to play the game like that?
You say you don’t reveal the prize, but one can remove six cups at random without revealing their contents.
“Removing cups” is not the same as “removing empty cups.”
If the rules of the game permit you to remove the cup with the prize, it is significant. I think the math and optimal strategy changes.
One can, but one cannot guarantee it.
Actually, one can. One can choose 6 at random from the ones that are neither selected, nor hide the prize.
My point is that my phrasing is, I believe, sufficient to allow the listener to determine that I will turn six cups without revealing the prize. In particular I say that I will remove 6 of the other cups and ... will not reveal the prize.
I honestly don't see how that can be interpreted in any way other than to say that I will deliberately not turn a cup that reveals the prize.
12 doors, I let you choose 3. I then open 4, leaving your selected 3, and 5 others.
I let you keep your original choice, or give them all up to choose only one of the other five. Should you switch now?
Let me check with the actual calculations. If I stick I have a 3/12 chance of winning. If I switch and I originally did pick the winning cup then I always lose, and if I didn't then I win with probability 1/5. So my overall probability of winning if I switch is 3/12×0 + 9/12×1/5. So sticking gets me 1/4 and switching gets me 3/20. Sticking is better, but by a smaller margin than I expected.
I find it weird that that resets the odds back to 50:50
Edit: Thanks for pointing out the typesetting issue!
1/2 * 1/3 + 1/2 * 2/3
= 1/6 + 2/6
= 3/6
= 1/2I said it was weird, not that I didn't understand it.
I suspect this thought process is why numerate people get thrown by this puzzle.
And sure you can find it weird, lots of people do, but the reply by DoctorOetker was trying to point out reasoning which, when properly internalised, can make it feel less weird. Some people - possibly you included - never lose the sense of weirdness. I have.
But in truth, sometimes we never really understand things, we just get used to them. For me, maybe this is one of them.
As for understanding; the stack exchange question on whether it's coincidence that the value of G is approximately pi squared is one of these things I bear in mind whenever I think I understand something. : )
Edit: and if I'm not mistaken, you once spent far more time than I would have the patience for explaining how this worked to a rather offensive young person. I admired your patience there. It was more than I had and had better results.
One reason why g is close to pi^2 is related to the original idea to define the metre as being the pendulum length required to give a 1 second half-tick. If that's your definition of the metre then g is exactly pi^2. So in some sense it's not entirely coincidence. I should go and find the stack exchange discussion, but I don't have time just now.
And thank you for the compliment about my patience - I appreciate it.
Does Monty know where the car is? (The original article says he does, but this often gets lost in the version people read.)
Suggest Monty doesn't, and he opens door #3 to reveal a goat only because it wasn't the door you picked (and it was merely luck the car wasn't there). In that case, it is genuinely a 50/50 shot between the remaining two.
Now if Monty did know where the car was, and he wouldn't have opened door #3 if the car had been there, then the 2/3 percentage to switch is intact.
To many this seems like a minor (or incorrect) distinction but it's little assumptions (Monty knows) that underpin these gotcha questions. That's one reason why Google-style interview questions irritate me so much. In many of them, there's an implicit assumption that is necessary but never stated.
Many of the responses Marilyn got seemed to come from this form of irritation, even if some of the people writing in couldn't express a logical or justifiable basis for their irritation.
It's an interesting puzzle, but it's too easily rephrased like a con.
Go back to the 100 door version. You start out by opening 1 door, so it's 99/100 that the car is behind another door. If monty just happens to open 98 of those doors and reveal all goats, then that 99% probability that you should switch to one of them combines with new knowledge of which to switch to. Its exceedingly rare, but if it happened, then you should still switch.
The above logic is wrong. I simulated and you're correct:
n = 10000000
n_doors = 3
first_guess = np.random.randint(n_doors, size=n)
car_behind = np.random.randint(n_doors, size=n)
should_stay = first_guess == car_behind
print('p(should stay)',
np.mean(should_stay))
# 0.3333381
monty_opens_all_but = (first_guess + 1 + np.random.randint(n_doors-1, size=n)) % n_doors
print('bad setup?: ',
np.any(monty_opens_all_but == first_guess))
# False
monty_shows_only_goats = np.logical_or(monty_opens_all_but == car_behind,
first_guess == car_behind)
print('p(monty shows only goats)',
np.mean(monty_shows_only_goats))
# 0.6667607
print('p(should stay| monty shows only goats)',
np.mean(should_stay[monty_shows_only_goats]))
# 0.499936633938
I'm kinda astounded. I do stats for a living, yet without writing out the math, my intuition misled me. I thought I had a framing of the problem that allowed me to use a quick shortcut in my thinking, and that framing was wrong. Two takeaways:1) Probability is really hard to get the right intuition about. Reasoning by analogy/shortcut problem framing is dangerous. You have to write out the math.
2) The "100 doors" explanation for the usual monty hall problem is correct for subtler reasons than are immediately obvious. You could probably set up a counter monty hall problem to trick people where there are 100 doors and he just happens to show 98 goats.
You are playing a game with a street peddler. There are 3 cards, two are duds and one is the prize. He lets you pick one card. When you picked a card he flips one of the other two revealing it as a dud, and gives you the option to switch. Do you switch?
A person who have heard the naive explanation to the Monty Hall problem would say yes. A smart person would say no. Why? Because it is not in the street peddlers interest to let you win, he has mouths to feed and need the money! So the only reason he reveals another card and asks you to switch is because you picked the right one from the beginning, so staying in this case means 100% chance of winning, and switching is 100% chance of losing.
For the naive Monty Hall interpretation to be correct we need two things to be true: Monty Hall always opens a door and the thing behind the door is always a goat. If any of those two are not true then the popular explanation is wrong, and if you look around most explanations of the problem leaves those facts out.
For example, in this article they forgot to say that the game host always opens a door and when he opens it it is always a goat. This shows that the author of the article (and almost everyone here at HN) doesn't understand Monty Hall. Instead they talk like non mathematicians like "Why would the game not open a door sometimes?" or "Why would he open a door with not a goat? It said he opened a door with a goat this one time!" etc. The problem with those things is that the explanation only says what happened this one time, so you can't possible write down the event tree without making a lot of extra assumptions about the game.
And that just doesn't change, even if Monty Hall opens a door.
So not only is there a two-in-three chance you guessed wrong on the first try. Monty is helpfully offering you a chance to switch to the correct/winning choice in the second round.
Monty's free will (an unknown) underpins this entire argument- what choices does he have, and why does he even make me choose a door instead of giving me the car (and the goats) outright?
Maybe from a statistical point of view it's better to have Monty pull this shtick, but something that's helpful 2/3 of the time and harmful 1/3 of the time doesn't make the cutoff for helpful.
This is just a hard question that is hard to get right and there is no shame in getting it wrong if you have to come up with the answer from scratch, never having heard such a puzzle before. There is no shame in not 'getting' it either. There is shame in allowing not 'getting' it to determine your conclusions.
Your initital guess (which was 1/3 probability) would have had to have been right, to make it not correct (or not the right choice) to move over to the other door. So moving to the other side (essentially you are just moving over to the 2/3 "probability block"; you were originally on the 1/3 "probability block"), inherently moves your odds over to 2/3. Staying only makes sense if you think you guessed correctly initially, and what are those odds, well those odds are 33%! And what are the odds of anything other than that initial guess (eg moving over) ? Well those odds would be 2/3!
This is the only way that I was able to wrap my brain around it. We actually did it by just doing an A B C guess three times in a row. My wife picked a letter. Then I picked a letter. It worked three times in a row, because I never initially picked the letter she did. So three times in a row, me moving over to the remaining letter (after the letter that neither of us picked had been eliminated; obviously we kind of got lucky in me not picking her letter in three tries), ended up of course as being the letter she had picked. Moving over doesn't work only when you actually choose correctly initially, which would only be 1/3 of the time. So again, moving over makes your odds 2/3.
It's brillantly simple really, yet extremely difficult to get to a method of actually understanding it, and this is the best way I've found.
But look at the real story here: thousands of men going out of their way to write letters- not quick 5 minute emails, but paper letters with envelopes and stamps- to tell a woman she was wrong. If it had been a man writing the article, would it have gotten the same reaction? I doubt it.
In my view, this is the crux of the gender problems we see in tech today. Certainly not as strong (one hopes) but certainly the same weird psychological problem that so many of us seem to have to some degree requiring men to tell women when they're wrong, but not care when men are. 'GamerGate' and the various witch hunts around that topic is a great example. It's fine if a man sucks at his job, but if a woman does and it's a role that society has labeled 'for men', suddenly it's an emotion-driven attack that must be defended vigorously.
We need to see this and watch for it if we're ever going to end it.
My experience with the internet is that people just can't help themselves to point out when somebody is wrong - man or woman. Sometimes going as far to write what could be considered full essays complete with citations. Its just another anecdote but I don't think its at all obvious its because of gender. People just like feeling smart.
> Maybe women look at math problems differently than men.
> You are the goat!
I'm sure there were many others.
I believe the OP is right, but providing uncontroversial evidence of that is hard. You need a thorough classification of the feedback in a number of sufficiently comparable cases, involving both men and women, to provide hard evidence. And even with hard evidence in hand the conclusions could be ignored; cf. climate change.
This isn't a debate that can be settled by rational evidence.
It's just how the world works. We can all pretend like we don't have uncontroversial evidence and that we'll never know if her identity as a female really affected the response. That's pretty much the status quo. Or we can not be blind and see what's happening right in front of us.
You can actually use this to your advantage. There are plenty of knowledgeable people who would rarely or never respond usefully to a request for assistance who are quite happy to spend time pointing out your errors (and flaws) if you post something incorrect.
I'm honestly not sure if this is a dark pattern. Is it wrong to take advantage of the negative behaviors of poorly socialized people?
As always, there's a relevant XKCD cartoon:
https://xkcd.com/386/ ("Duty Calls")
Ascribing this all to gender seems like too broad of a brush, and with very little evidence to back it up either.
There were likely a multitude of motivations for people to write in and correct her, but isn't it natural for us to want to take someone down a peg when they are advertised as "all that" (in this case - smartest person alive), and they seem obviously wrong about something?
This is a statistics problem that many people who have had statistics training have been wrong about.
Seems like the setup for a perfect storm.
That exists in any field, sadly. Top draft picks are scrutinized every year in sports. Every presidential gaffe gets its own 'mightier than thou' correction article. Anecdotally, I knew a mechanic who couldn't wait to read ClickNClack to find any little mistake and claim superiority.
Based on what? I hear this only brought up in the media reaction of "men try and prove smart woman wrong!"
Secondly, what is the implied norm that the author wants - you can’t disagree with someone of a different gender who has a higher IQ than you?
But it's not just about gender. Consider the racism faced by so many Black mathematicians and scientists. And Indians, such as Jagadish Chandra Bose. Even Srinivasa Ramanujan, before his genius was recognized in the UK.
But recall that Black men got human rights in the US before women did. And that corporations also got them before women did. So it's arguable that sexism runs deeper than racism.
On the other hand, I cringe at "smartest woman". What does that really mean? It's like describing some hugely multidimensional thing with a few numbers. All we know is that she did extremely well at whatever tests were used. And we also know that many such tests are culturally biased.
"It was nothing to do with her being a woman!" they will cry, ignoring the unconscious bias that led them to such an angrily disproportionate response in the first place.
Also, more people probably would have second-guessed their intuition, at least for a moment, and perhaps there would have been a few less letters.
In fact, I'd say the zeitgeist of casting everything in an identity politics narrative is in the same exact vein. It's a nice, simple, and wrong answer, but it does sort out who has committed to the group (ie religion).
I'm certainly willing to posit that women are quite often on the receiving end due to many men immediately writing them off as lower status (likely in an attempt to keep from sliding further down the scale themselves), but I'm not signing up to drink divisive kool-aid that ultimately obscures the problem.
The "Gamers are Dead" articles were authored by many different journalists, not just women. Perpetuating the narrative that it was an attack on women is exactly they type of behavior that keeps Gamergate alive.
The circling the wagons of journalists defending this poor reporting and actually attacking gamers is what Gamergate was about.
It was nothing to do with ethics anyway, that was just the excuse. How ethical is it to participate in a sustained campaign of harassment?
Your 'fake news' protestation is not supported by the evidence.
But clearly, the responses show sexism at its finest, or worst. Partly, though, many of the men refusing the argument probably honestly disagree with the counter intuitive answer, but they seem to rationalize it with their negative beliefs.
> In fact, her central theme is that non-Euclidean geometry, and indeed any mathematics related to non-Euclidean geometry, is nonsense.
I don't think the situations are similar...
Also, her problem and solution are concise to verify, I have yet to see a mechanized version of Wiles' proof. (I am willing to believe it when I see that, but until then I too have a hard time accepting the proof... but of course if an oracle put a gun to my temple and I had to guess, I'd be with Wiles...)
But you have been given information about the door he didn't open, because he didn't open it. That's why it's possible for the odds on that door of holding the prize can change.
And yes, we do now have a choice between two doors, one with a goat and one without. The error is in believing that these are equal choices.
I roll a die, and you can choose "1" or "not 1". You have two choices, but they have unequal chances of being correct. Similarly with the doors. Just because there are two choices, they may have different odds.
In the Monty Hall problem, they do.
When or where are any odds changing?
Then the host opens one. The probability of the door opened holding the prize goes to 0. But the probability on the set of two is still 2/3, and so the probability of the door that is both unchosen and unopened goes to 2/3.
But the Monty Hall Problem as stated is about the probabilities, not on the psychology. Computing the probabilities is simple math, once you understand the situation. My explanation was to help the reader understand why the two choices given don't have equal probability.
If I chose a door before, then something happens that leads to only two doors being left, both those doors have the same probability so I could just choose the same door again.
aw3c2> If I chose a door before, then something happens that leads to only two doors being left, both those doors have the same probability so I could just choose the same door again.
The original said this:
CW> The information you have gained is not about the door you've chosen. It doesn't matter what door you choose, the host can always open a door to reveal a goat. So there is no information given about the door you've chosen, so the chances of that door containing the prize remain at 1/3.
CW> But you have been given information about the door he didn't open, because he didn't open it. That's why it's possible for the odds on that door of holding the prize can change.
So let's recap what's going on. There are three doors. For the sake of concreteness let's call them A, B, and C. You choose one of them. For the sake of concreteness let's suppose you choose A.
So now there are two doors, B and C, remaining unchosen by you. Currently those two doors, B and C, each have probability 1/3 of having the prize. The door you chose, door A, has probability 1/3 of holding the prize.
Now the host opens a door, taking care to open a door that does not hold the prize. So the pair {B,C} still has total probability of holding the prize, but you are being shown that one of them certainly does not. This doesn't affect the probability that your chosen door, door A, holds the prize -- the probability that the prize is behind door A is still 1/3.
The pair {B,C} still has total probability 2/3 of holding the prize. You're now given the choice of staying with A, or switching.
Quoting you again, you said:
aw3c2> something happens that leads to only two doors being left, both those doors have the same probability ...
That turns out not to be the case. Just because there are two doors they don't have to have equal probability of holding the prize, and in this case they don't. The probability that your door holds the prize has not changed and is still 1/3. The probability that the door neither chosen by you nor opened by the host holds the prize is now 2/3.
Does that help?
Let's change the number of doors !
First, I'll rephrase the original problem ================================================
You have 3 doors, 1 hides a car, all others hide goats.
You pick one door, then __ALL doors you have NOT selected AND that hide goats are revealed, except one__
Here it's only one door because we have a total of 3. But it's one door that is indeed, ALL except one, for this particular situation.
Do the same, but with 100 doors ====================================================
You have 100 doors, 1 has a car, all others have goats.
You pick one, then __ALL doors you have NOT selected AND hide goats are revealed, except one__
Now you get:
- 1 selected, 99 not selected => the car is most probably among the 99 ones.
- Monty reveals 98 goats
- 1 selected, 98 goats, 1 not selected => the car is most probably in the later one.
The problem itself can be rephrased in an even simpler manner where Monty doesn't open any doors at all. Once you've picked a door, he then gives you the option of either staying with that door or changing to both of the other doors (where you get to keep the best prize behind them). Given that formulation, almost everybody would switch.
If you always switch to the door you didn't initially choose your odds of winning rise to 2/3.
It's interesting that kids in elementary schools were getting this right in many schools. Probably because they worked it trough and did experiments to verify it. Something that was beyond people with many PhD's.
It's the lesson for being intellectually humble.
So then we're in very serious trouble?
So the Deputy Director of the Center for Defense Information failed to estimate a concise problem in an ideal setting, but somehow the world is supposed to believe in Mutually "Assured" Destruction in a messy high complexity real world setting?
1st explanation:
You have a 33% chance to pick car right away, if you switch then you lose.
In other words, you have a 33% chance to lose if you always switch.
2nd explanation:
You have a 66% chance to pick goat, game master will eliminate the other goat, if you switch you win