The only valid safety model is airgapped computers, stripped of any networking equipment, fed data only using dedicated thumbdrives coming from another computer running a different OS
VM are a problem waiting to happen.
VM are a problem waiting to happen.
> VM are a problem waiting to happen.
Something something security threat model and personal risk tolerance...
They can contain malicious code just as well as a thumbdrive. The concern with USB is the firmware, and the thumbdrive pretending to be a HID device or having an extra partition with malicious code.
Purchasing many similar drives of a well known brand in a random supermarket is a reasonable alternative.
Just keep them for 1 year before using them, in case an exploit becomes popular - but this is extremely paranoid.
Of course.
> The concern with USB is the firmware, and the thumbdrive pretending to be a HID device or having an extra partition with malicious code.
Right, that's the concern I was alluding to above. You'd still be better off burning optical media (and disabling any autoplay crap on the target system). You can still store severl GB of data on optical media.
> Just keep them for 1 year before using them, in case an exploit becomes popular - but this is extremely paranoid.
This may work if you only stick with very popular makes/models, since they would have a higher chance of being 'noticed' for doing something wrong.
Security is in the spotlight, not in the shadows
Prefer tools that everyone else uses, unless you have a very compelling reason not to (windows: too many 0 days, complexity, and surface of attack ; wifi: too easy to start a rogue network)
Because when these popular tools get hacked, you will know it. I keep an eye on rogue firmware. I have not seen a real world threat yet, but I do expect spear fishing attacks for people involved in crypto (fortunately, not for us just writing software)
For a project idea I've been considering how to attach a sensitive (but powerful) machine to the network with the smallest possible interface (in terms of code exposure). RS232 is probably the simplest yet still functional without getting into niche hardware standards.
On balance I think USB might be worse than Ethernet[2] or even Ethernet+TCP/IP just because typical network stacks have probably seen more scrutiny than USB stacks. But at the end of the day I know I'm going to want to use something like seL4 to protect the application from the transport stack(s). And even then you still have to worry about the hardware. There's a real dilemma in choosing the simplest hardware that is still viable in terms of performance, support (including ease of porting or writing drivers), and long-term availability.
[1] Assuming a simple ethernet controller with all the fancy features disabled or, ideally, not even present.
https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2015/01/pokemon-plays-twitch-...
The problem with stuxnet was that non dedicated thumbdrive brought in the worm. Also their equipment was networked. Bad idea. If data must be exchanged, use unidirectional links. Good old serial ports, with only TX or RX wired (Edit: I do not think centrifuges need a full ethernet stack. Depending on high level abstractions like TCP/IP for simple operations comes at a cost)
My model is not perfect safety, but if it take something the scale of stuxnet to attack, I feel safe enough.
I laughed when the recent spectre and meltdown exploits were revealed, because the good old airgap model meant I did not have to care.
Afterall there "could" be a wireless chip within the ME hardware.
(I know there isn't, I'm just playing overly paranoid)