If GPS satellites were to cryptographically sign their signals, would that be sufficient to prevent spoofing of GPS signals (assuming the receiver of the signals treated the signing appropriately)?

Like, I can imagine maybe there could be an attack where one could record gps signals at some nearby place, and then play them back in slightly different orders/rates to try to fool a receiving device into thinking it is somewhere else (nearby).

But I don't know how much of a time delay would be needed in order to do that. Could a timestamping service do timestamping quickly enough to prevent this attack for internet connected devices?

I tried looking at how the signals for GPS work (like, how frequently it sends time information and how detailed it is for civilians) but it seemed complicated and I got confused and/or didn't try hard enough, so I didn't arrive at an answer for how long it would take to spoof positions if one could only delay real signals that one received.

Edit: the purpose of making the gps coords unspoofable would be to make it so that even if the screen-in-front-of-camera attack was done, it would have to be done at the same location and time as it would be claimed to have happened.