The Influence of Railways on Military Operations in the Russo-German War 1941–45
hgwdavie.com
hgwdavie.com
So once they were forced into some kind of escalation, they had to escalate all the way. Other countries did not realize that (obviously) so they kept putting pressure on Germany with escalations on their end.
If you subscribe to the belief that the grand strategy of war should be left to the politicians and not the military, then the timetable excuse is gross dereliction of duty on the part of the military: the military is failing to provide plans for perfectly reasonable options that the government could wish to enact (i.e., limited war instead of total war).
That's not even remotely what happened. What actually happened was the Tsar ordered a full mobilization while lying to the world that their mobilization was only partial, to possibly delay the mobilization of other powers. From the start, not a single thing was done differently from a full mobilization.
The Soviet decision of precisely what to scorch was made by railroad logistics experts. They tore up some tracks here and there, but paid especial attention to wrecking all locomotive depots before retreating, and taking all operational locomotives back with the retreating forces, leaving no equipment for the enemy.
The German military engineers spent their efforts on repairing and regauging the tracks, but didn't pay as much attention to the condition of the depots, failing to realize that without a fully operational depot per every 80 km of track, the line's overall capacity was severely degraded. This left front units starved of supplies as soon as the length of captured and "repaired" railroad lines got long enough.
I am failing to realize this too. To be fair I'm not a logistician or train guy.
Why are the depots necessary, and why at 80km intervals?
Refueling, refilling water, turning around, and performing needed regular maintenance to keep the locomotive in running order was very difficult without a specially prepared site - the depot. Without depots, you could get a train 80 km down the line, but then you were stuck without the ability to immediately hand the train off to the next locomotive.
The Russian network was techically primitive but had higher traffic capacity (e.g. because manual signalling and slow trains meant collisions were unlikely
Russian central logistics planning meant that there was less non-essential traffic.
The Russian net was run according to rules developed by railway specialists. In contrast, the Wehrmacht had multiple competing managers, including some military officers who made decisions (e.g. commandeering trains) that degraded overall network efficiency
It was easier for the Russians to repair their own damaged railways than for the Germans to bring captured networks to their own higher standards
The German military in WWII did not distinguish itself with good command of logistics.
Poland continued to modify the remaining tracks slowly after it regained independence in 1918 till 1939.
Compare to Germany's traditional G2 gauge: only 3.15 meters wide by 4.65 meters high, and that height is with a sloping roof profile. (And the German gauge is quite generous compared to some other Western European countries; for much of the British network, the loading gauge is much smaller.)
Then things get simplified for English-speaking audience titles ...
First, fix problem with down-votes — down-votes are used here to hide alternative views on a problem, from politics to quantum theory.
Second, fix problem with off-topics — create possibility to separate off-topic branches from main branch, so users can discuss their problems without disturbing others.
Third, text contains no emotions or political battles. It's just text. Minor correction of text between two historians can be major insult to you.
Also, please edit swipes like "probably deliberately" out of your comments here. With that you broke at least two guidelines: the one against flamebait and the one that asks you to assume good faith.
Just look at the summary and maps here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Front_(World_War_II) and tell me again that I am the one nationalism baiting by pushing back against the term "Russo-German war".
But you are correct that I cant assume bad faith by the original authors. There might be other reasons.
> This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES Volume 30 Issue 2 on 27th April 2017
—where one can expect that the choice of language is careful and significant, and it's called "The Influence of Railways on Military Operations in the Russo-German War 1941–1945", not what the current headline says it's called (Influence of Railways on Military Operations in the Soviet-German War 1941-45).
(With that said, let me be the first top-level thread to comment on something other than the title. I haven't read the article yet, but it's a fascinating topic and I look forward to doing so!)
About your suggestion: I’d associate the Asian theatre with that...
So academia has had to come up with new rather obscure neutral terminology like the German-Soviet Conflict or Russo-German War.
In WWI it makes sense to use the Eastern front when talking about the German/Austro-Hungarian - Russian front, but in WWII that's quite euro-centric.
https://www.amazon.com/Russo-German-War-1941-45/dp/089141491...