Treasury Reaps Billions as It Sells Citi Shares
dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com
dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com
In 2008, this guarantee was for $306 billion.
> And the government will get even more money from its investment in Citigroup. The Treasury said it would reap a profit of $2.25 billion by selling all its Citigroup trust preferred securities, which it received for guaranteeing $301 billion in the bank’s most troubled assets. It expects that sale to be completed on Tuesday.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100930/bs_nm/us_usa_citigroup_t...
> In a statement, the Treasury said it sold all of the trust preferred securities that it received in exchange for guaranteeing a pool of about $301 billion in Citigroup assets. The Treasury never made any payouts on the guarantee, which has been canceled.
If you reduce government borrowing by $100 billion that frees up $100 billion for use by the private sector. Quite a few people would argue that $100 billion in private investment via the free-market is a much better idea than $100 billion in dubious government projects selected via political horse trading.
We aren't talking about paying down the debt. We are talking about borrowing less money this month than we did last month because we just sold our shares in Citibank and so we've got a few billion in cool cash lying around. The total debt continues to go up, just at a slower rate.
From the credit market's point of view, the US govenment just sold a few billion less in bonds this month (as compared to last month) and so that means that the creditors have a few billion more to invest elsewhere.
Because this $100 billion is not being borrowed or spent. The borrowing has already occurred and has been spent (in this case invested). This $100 billion is a separate unaccounted for number -- one of profit. It's not inherently part of a partisan issue, like the expiring Bush tax cuts, for example.
If you reduce government borrowing by $100 billion that frees up $100 billion for use by the private sector.
No it doesn't. The private sector is free to borrow as much as it likes from banks at any time. The only impacting factor might be on interest rates and inflation, but those are reflective of other factors as well.
Obviously the size of the credit market changes over time but in the short term, public and private interests are competing for the same pool of available cash.
Agree in the long-term about the need for sustainable fiscal policy.
We don't know to what extent because there is no full audit of the Federal Reserve's activities in this department (for our benefit of course).
We do own the "Red Roof Inn" though so that's cool I guess.
Bear Stearns created a small shell company with a detailed and interesting charter. They loaned this company a large sum of money, in return for a set of bonds. The company used that money to purchase the loans from Bear Stearns. At this point Bear Stearns owns bonds whose value is approximately that of the loans. (Actually slightly more because the bonds are structured to better meet investor's needs.) They then turned around and sold the bonds to investors.
One of those investors (in theory it doesn't have to happen this way, but in practice it does) gets both the most risky piece of the investment, and a contract to run the company by rules specified in the company charter. That investor is called the servicer, and they are responsible for the day to day activities of the company. Which mostly consist of collecting loan payments, paying out the bonds, and making detailed records available to any properly qualified investor. Once the last loan is gone, the company has no assets and goes away.
Your loan is now owned by the shell company (which has no employees and exists only to shovel income from loans and send them out again as bonds), which is run by the servicer. JP Morgan Chase did not purchase any connection to this company when they bought Bear Stearns unless Bear Stearns chose to keep some of the bonds. (They did keep some from many deals, and purchased some from deals they didn't do, so they may be an investor.) Control is with the servicer. However it should be noted that the servicer's hands are tied by the charter, and there is very little flexibility in how they can choose to run things.
Also note that once the deal goes bad, the servicer's incentive is to run the deal in whatever way maximizes the servicing fees they get. This has proven to result in decisions that are counter to the interests of both investors and people who owe the loans. For instance renegotiating a lower loan that people can actually pay generates less in servicing fees than taking a loan through bankruptcy court. Therefore the servicer often prefers driving loans into bankruptcy even though that is worse for everyone else.
Now do you see why this is a mess?
However it looks like http://www.americanbanker.com/mortgage_serv/top-subprime-ser... can give you a bunch of the names and how much servicing they do. I can guarantee you that they will be a bunch of companies you've never heard of from all over the country. Except that if you have one of these loans, then you're familiar with the one who is servicing your loan.