The irony there is that there's probably no person on the court more predisposed to ruling against Trump than Gorsuch is.
Of course, everyone will likely feel justified in hating him when the Trump v Hawaii decision is released, unless it's 8-1 or something in favor of Trump.
And it was a gamble, as most of the Republican leadership in congress fully expected Trump to lose, in which case Hillary might have nominated someone considered even more liberal than Merrick Garland.
If that had happened, and that person confirmed, would they be sitting on a stolen seat too?
And people did decide... In 2012 when they voted for Obama by like 51%. Lame duck presidents have gotten SCOTUS seats before. Reagan nominated and had a confirmation in his final year by a supermajority.
Regan's last nomination was an interesting one. With his first nomination for the seat coming nearly a year and a half before the next election. Then going through another potential nominee, with Kennedy not being confirmed until early 1988.
Regardless, all I'm saying is I understand the reasoning for not wanting to let Obama appoint a SCOTUS justice in his last months. They could have gone the other way and let it come to a vote. Republicans would certainly have had the numbers to block it (and the yays needed 60 then). And then Obama would have appointed someone else, and so on until the election was decided and the next president in office.
Though I have no doubt the Republican leadership would have acted differently if a seat was open during the last days of a Republican administration.
Either way, Gorush's seat is no more stolen than a Hillary appointee would be.
There was no reasonable excuse in 2016 either lmao.
The method they chose instead was illegitimate, and that's why it is a stolen seat.
That's understandable.
> months before a presidential election
I don't think you understand the definition of "lame duck". It refers to the period between election and inauguration. It is completely unreasonable to treat the entire final year that way.
I'm mobile, so I'll try to make this brief, but in _Sessions_, for example, he expressed concerns on how vague or poorly written laws afford the government too much power. In _Gutierrez_, he (unusually) wrote the majority opinion, and then also a concurring opinion that I assume he couldn't get other justices to sign on to, which effectively bashed Chevron deference.
_Chevron_ was a case largely believed to have set the stage for much of what people see as abuses of federal authority holding (basically) that an ambiguously crafted statute that does not expressly give a government agency over an authority over an area, but which could maybe sort of be interpreted that way, then you should find in favor of the government, because they're the experts.
Gorsuch believes that giving the government powers that Congress did not expressly intend is an abdication of judicial duty, and that we shouldn't interpret ambiguity as a blank check. He thinks that if Congress intends to give <agency x> authority over a specific domain, then they should say that explicitly.
TLDR, the deference that Chevron establishes as precedent in government cases most largely benefits agencies operating under the executive branch. Trump runs the executive branch, so that cuts in his favor. Gorsuch believes (more than the other justices) that they do not deserve that deference, and that laws should be interpreted to mean what they say.