Bedford and the Normalization of Deviance

And blaming the rules for the behavior of those people is not the correct position.

(see also: why the only thing many HN users know about G.K. Chesterton is the fence thing)

In the context of flying, where a careless error can result in death, this tedious checking has a very logical explanation, one that I assume most pilots are aware of.

More broadly, I suspect that a lot of rules exist specifically because what seems obvious and natural in a situation gets you in trouble. But by that token, such rules can't help but appear "stupid" but also can't and shouldn't be avoided.

and understanding that even over just 2 layers of bureaucracy its really easy to lose an understanding of the why behind a process

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Part of that is that its quicker to just rely on the institutional power

"I'm your boss, do it this way because I tell you to"

"My boss told me it needs to be this way, and I'm your boss, and the bs flows downstream, so do it this way"

uses fewer institutional resources, but that comes at the cost of no one actually knowing why things are being done the way they're being done,

and no one understands the costs of deviance from the processes being implimented

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and in lots of instances, the benefits to deviance tend to be higher than 'we get to take off a little faster'

lots of times what we measure people on tends to be in conflict with the processes we want people to follow, so we even incentivize people inventing little shortcuts around the processes we want people to follow

This means the engines that deliver the thrust in the air, are also doing the same work on the ground. The traction is delivered to the air, and the rolling is all relative to to the thrust.

The manner of control for the power of the thrust isn't based on throttle alone. There are a handful of factors that tie together, to generate force.

Just like stepping on the gas, when a car is in neutral, you can spin up the turbines or propellers, without directing the air in such a way that moves the aircraft. The pitch of the blades matters. Also, with multiple engines, thrust must be synchronized, or the effect is a turn, and one engine could push the plane in circles, if controlled improperly.

So, it's not like leaving the emergency brake engaged in a car. There are other variables at work.

I think it's also a factor, that often enough, with complex machines created to solve for a complex problem domain, leaving configurable items as independent as possible prevents more footgun scenarios than it creates. When quick thinking is needed in an emergency, to deal with real world forces in play, systems are best designed so that in a proverbial sense, you can quickly throw yourself at a problem, when stopping and thinking about a strategy might take too long.

This is not to say that stopping and thinking carefully about strategy should be skipped, but that when trouble finds you, despite best efforts, and seconds count, having the ability to skip checklists and improvise in the heat of the moment does represent a desireable pathway for saving throws.