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I was referring to WebGL and Canvas fingerprinting there, which the document seems to be in favor of, although they return a single value instead of a randomized value--presumably so all TOR browsers will look the same and muddy the data.

At any rate, a randomized canvas or WebGL fingerprint shouldn't be very useful for tracking a particular browser.

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Read the "Strategies for Defense: Randomization versus Uniformity" part.

Most of their drawbacks to randomization apply to uniformity too, other than sites changing behavior due to your randomization. Uniformity has the big drawback of making it apparent that you're using the Tor browser, which is a red flag in some cases. At the very least it invites extra scrutiny. It's a strange design decision in my opinion to announce to loudly that a visitor is using the Tor browser when they presumably want to attract as little attention as possible.

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