> but is surely not intentional; I would call it a design flaw.
In fact, it is intentional! Meaning that the system has a performance specification that permits failure-to-recognize-lanes-correctly in some cases. This element of the design relies on the human operator to resolve. Once the human recognizes the problem, either they disengage the autopilot or engage the brakes/overpower the steering.
Now, you could argue that the design should be improved and I would agree. But we should perhaps step back and consider some meta-problems here. As others have stated, the functionality cannot deviate significantly from previous expectations without at a bare minimum an operator alert, training pamphlet or disclaimer form. Tesla's design verification likely should be augmented to more comprehensively test real-world scenarios like this.
But the real core issue is that the design approaches this uncanny valley of performing so terribly close to parity with human drivers that human drivers let their guard down. IMO it's the same problem as the fatality in Phoenix w/an Uber safety driver (human driver). When GOOG's self driving program first monitored their safety drivers they found that they didn't pay attention, or slept in the car. IIRC they added a second safety driver to try to mitigate that problem.