How a WWII Jet Fighter Was Designed in 150 days & shipped in six months
37signals.com
37signals.com
The difference is that back then, we were indifferent to failure that cost lives.
And not just in development/testing. Once planes were deployed, if a plane didn’t come back from a mission it was “lost in action” independent if the wing just broke off in flight over some stretch of water. Read this excerpt from <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_P-80_Shooting_Star#Des...:
<blockquote>The P-80 testing program proved very dangerous. Burcham was killed on 20 October 1944 while flying the third YP-80A produced, 44-83025. The “Gray Ghost” was lost on a test flight on 20 March 1945, although pilot Tony LeVier escaped. Newly promoted to chief engineering test pilot to replace Burcham, LeVier bailed out when one of the engine’s turbine blades broke, causing structural failure in the airplane’s tail. LeVier landed hard and broke his back, but returned to the test program after six months of recovery. Noted ace Major Richard Bong was also killed on an acceptance flight of a production P-80 in the United States on 6 August 1945. Both Burcham and Bong crashed as a result of main fuel pump failure. Burcham’s death was the result of a failure to brief him on a newly installed emergency fuel pump backup system, but the investigation of Bong’s crash found he had apparently forgotten to switch on the emergency fuel pump that could have prevented the accident. He bailed out when the aircraft rolled inverted but was too close to the ground for his parachute to deploy.</blockquote>
So this “no bureaucracy” craze makes no sense for modern aviation design but makes a lot of sense where lives are not at risk (as is the case with a lot of software development, but not all).
That’s my $0.02.
That said, that doesn't explain why the aircraft of WW2 and the early Cold War took just a few years to go from drawing board to combat, in the days before advanced computer modelling, yet it took 20 years to build the Eurofighter. I suspect the lack of accountability of military contractors coupled with government collusion (jobs programs over national security) has more than a bit to do with it.
So I think that a lot of this 20 years are needed for a this regulatory stuff.
I am a fighter jet fanatic, but let's be honest: What the hell is a Eurofighter, Raptor, or Lightening going to do that can't also be done by an Eagle, Falcon or Hornet to more or less the same degree?
Let's be clear: The US and NATO established air dominance over the skies in Gulf War I in days, the Balkans in hours, and Afghanistan and Iraq in minutes with aircraft designed in the 70's. There is really no credible threat to western air forces that makes a new generation of fighter jet a priority.
Or at least, there wasn't. Now that Russia and possibly China are building realistic opponents that will challenge the dominance of F-15s/F-16s and F-18s, there is pressure to upgrade.
The Chinese still aren't big players in this space, and they mostly take their lead from the Russians.
The Russian's haven't exactly been twiddling their thumbs, but while they make great aircraft, their radar and weapon systems are just now starting to eclipse western fourth generation standards, and the Raptor is still posting 20-1 kill ratios in simulated combat.
That will probably change as the PAK-FA and J-XX come online (the Sukkoi being the greater threat, realistically, since nobody really knows what the J-XX actually is).
Russia had equal opponents to mentioned 4th gen fighters since late 70s.
Let's just say HN isn't the place to get factual information about weapons systems - when I need that I go to Key Publishing forum and such.
The kill ratios of the F-15 and F-16 speak for themselves.
There are plenty of programmers that have never held a soldering iron either.
I'm not even sure if that's 'good' or 'bad', it seems there are advantages to knowing what goes on under the hood but at the same time that knowledge comes in to play less and less every day.
To use your example of software... I've encountered one too many people who are billed as an Enterprise software "architects" who have never coded a single line production software in their life <cringe>. Needless to say, these projects almost always end up a disaster.
But those might not be designing hardware either...
I'm not sure what I think about engineers who can only CAD up a part but couldn't make it.
In the corporate world, however, that MechE will likely never do anything but CAD up parts. They will have a machinist on staff to make his creations. Just like how corporate programmers don't need to build their own computers or run the company's IT.
A better analogy might be a story of a friend of mine from graduate school, Chuck. He, and another grad student we'll call Mike, got their first year of graduate funding through a professor with very little grant money. It was very important that Mike had machine shop skills and could build some of their research equipment for the lab. Mike made a name for himself -- he wasn't a very good machinist compared to the guys on staff -- but he was building the needed equipment, even if it was very time consuming.
Using this humble lab, Chuck and Mike worked hard for their professor and eventually got lots of funding. It got to the point where the funding was so much, that time was more a concern. Chuck could then overnight parts from electronics catalogs and conduct research faster/better than Mike, who despite having this funding, continued the frugal habit of machining all his own parts. Mike eventually got disciplined (for not moving fast enough in his research) and frustrated (he fixated on the fact that his skills helped them get the funding in the first place).
TL;DR: When Time becomes greater than money, I'd rather have the CAD guy CAD it up, and the machinist make it.
In my first year of Mech Eng they sent us all off to a machine shop to learn to weld, use a lathe, etc, I couldn't give an example to you now, but it really does make a difference, you start to think as well as "how will this work" but also "how will this be made", "how can this be repaired", "how will someone get at this part to replace it", etc etc.
Exactly. In the long run, re-inventing the wheel is costly. Costly enough that Chuck graduates with his PhD, while the other ends up failing out and working at a machine shop.
Also, a constant criticism of Chuck's counterpart, Mike, was that everything he built was constantly over-engineered, and took to damn long. If anything, his machine shop experience hampered his ability to design or refine his design skills past an undergraduate level.
A semester of welding, lathing, and whatnot will likely not help a professional MechE, as easily half their CAD designs will be fabricated completely by machine. Understanding a precision machinist's complaints will not come into the field.
If you're designing shaping, molding, machining, etc. parts having an idea of manufacturing processes is essential to elegant solutions at low cost.
The other way would be like an artist who instructed someone to paint his masterpiece from his initial sketch. A lot is lost in translation.
Real, actual mechanical engineers think otherwise.
The problem is that it is entirely too easy to "CAD up" a design that is almost unmanufacturable, or that is ridiculously difficult or expensive to manufacture. Having experience actually building or fixing things is a hedge against this. Years ago, young engineers fresh out of school were put to work on the production floor for a few months to learn these lessons. When I graduated as an EE, the small company I went to work for wouldn't let me do anything other than documentation and repair for a year for the same reason.
It was an extremely valuable year!
http://www.amazon.com/Skunk-Works-Personal-Memoir-Lockheed/d...
Yes, my father is the author.
of course they didn't fly nearly as many F104s as the other airforces but still, a '0' where elsewhere the percentages of losses are some of the largest of all fighter jets ever recorded should at least make for an interesting investigation. Not that it matters anymore with the F104 being retired from service but there might be something to be learned from that.
>Use a small number of good people
This is agile and extreme-programming at it's best.
I can't even tell how many years the design of the F-22 has taken, but that timeline lists 13 planes delivered in 2003. 13 per year versus 28 a day.
Now, obviously modern planes are much more complex than they were in 1943, and they should take longer to design and build. But how much longer? How much is the bureacracy actually hurting?
The problem is, it's also insanely easy to disrupt manufacturing that distributed. If it ever came to a war where bombs/rockets/cruise missiles were hitting our soil, it would be nearly impossible to ramp up production of this jet, much less protect the facilities involved in designing/making it.
I don't know the loss rate we've encountered in Iraq and Afganistan (I know its much lower than the Blackhawks) but even if you're losing 61/year for a long enough timeline....
But the goal of the project was propping up the European aerospace industry...
What the people we put in harms way actually need to get their jobs done seems to be of relatively little importance.
Edit: Also apparently the Gloster Meteor (thanks arethuza!)