The move to their own "cloud" as the primary sync system pretty much ensures other sync methods will never get properly fixed. I wouldn't have recommended 1Pw to people looking for non-cloud sync in the past, and now I definitely wouldn't.
The move to their own "cloud" as the primary sync system pretty much ensures other sync methods will never get properly fixed. I wouldn't have recommended 1Pw to people looking for non-cloud sync in the past, and now I definitely wouldn't.
That said, I refuse to use cloud-stored browser-accessed password managers, and it's looking more and more like they're pushing for that to be the only option. Not there yet, but oh boy are they pushing it down into the deepest corners of the website.
> That said, I refuse to use cloud-stored browser-accessed password managers
There seems to be a disconnect here?
Ben Woodruff
AgileBits
Desktop app: I can stop updating, firewall the app, use offline, airgap a computer, I have many options for reducing my attack surface.
Website: I have literally no way of locking down a version, possible-but-I-haven't-seen-it to be notified of changes (but likely not block them), and it would be rather trivial for the site to ship new JS that simply uploads your password once entered.
Not that I think you are. I assume you'll approach that with the same level of care as you've given your apps (which has been fantastic). But I do think that you're a gigantic payout if someone successfully breaks in. Why should I throw my eggs into such a large, internet-connected basket?
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For comparison, injecting a malicious update into the apps to do the equivalent of a trivial, invisible JS change means: 1) getting a change into the binary (maybe they brought their own tho), 2) breaking into your app-signing system which is hopefully among your most-secure locations[1], 3) distributing the app to both customers and employees with a visible update notification, and 4) not getting caught before I download it. For each app. Websites are far, far easier to take control of.
[1]: I'm not aware of any server-side security-oriented frontend-web stack which would mitigate this in the slightest. I hope there is though! I'd love to read up on it if anyone knows of one.
It is finicky! There are multiple components outside of 1Password control when you are using Dropbox, iCloud, or WiFi sync.
We do our best to find, troubleshoot, workaround these issues. We have built an entire Troubleshooting and Diagnostics utility just for that: https://support.1password.com/diagnostics/
For the majority of users sync with third-party services works well. However, there cases when it gets finicky.
I don't use any third-party services. I use what 1Pw calls "Folder" sync, as it's the only non-cloud method available. 1Pw on Mac #1 saves a binary file to disk, and 1Pw on Mac #2 loads that file from disk. There's no components here out of 1Pw's control. Sometimes, 1Pw simply doesn't write the file on Mac #1, as I can tell by the modification timestamp.
I ran 1PasswordTroubleshooting.app, and sent in the 400KB report it generated. The response I got from tech support mentioned nothing about what might have been found in that file (or what they expected to find, which could prevent data from getting from the application to the filesystem). They simply gave the usual spiel about restarting/upgrading.