The financial cost of not knowing things
medium.com
medium.com
One thing the FDA doesn't consider that I think they should is the cost of not approving a drug. Safety and effectiveness is not black and white when faced with uncertainly.
There is an excellent lecture by Richard Epstein on this topic [0].
tldr: The FDA doesn't allow pre-stage 3 access to drugs because it would, in part, reduce demand to be part of stage 3 trials. However, it's much more complicated than that.
[0] Chicago's Best Ideas: "Clinical Trials on Trial: How Should the FDA Do Its Job?" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IEhzoh86N9M
As an interesting aside: "Not knowing what you don't know" is known as second order ignorance or the Dunning-Kruger affect [1]. The "orders of ignorance" beyond this one stage are quite interesting when analysing how we learn. Andy Hunt describes this in great detail in "Pragmatic Thinking and Learning".
I have always suspected it's possible to reduce your propensity for 2nd order ignorance through more varied learning. For financial decision making I can imagine this as a key meta skill where you must identify unknowns quickly and accurately and be able to intuit their potential impact... as each decision can appear to have very little in common to previously encountered ones such that knowledge accumulation alone does not result in significant accumulation of skill.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
I suppose the point is that we all have 2nd order ignorance (just pick a context until you find it), but we act inappropriately upon it to varying degrees depending on... what might as well be called wisdom i suppose, you could call it the anti-dunning-kruger effect I suppose.
Internship (what was once called apprenticeship) made (and makes) a lot of sense where the employer supplies knowledge (arts and crafts being a typical example), nowadays to actually be considered for an internship you need to have a full, recognized cycle of uni-level study (which is the thing that in theory should have already provided you with all the knowledge - bar the experience - needed for your profession).
One thing is having a (lower paid but with "full dignity") entry-level job, and another is having "stages", "internships" and similar, where very often the young people is not actually taught anything and are just a replacement for generic secretarial or similar activities.
are you speaking from experience here? i have had several internships, and at each one they let me fix a couple trivial bugs in production before giving me a toy project they have no intention of actually using. my peers have had very similar experiences. i would actually have loved to be given a full engineer's assignment.
No, not really personal experience, due to age I am way past any internship or apprenticeship possible offer, but I have (much younger than me) cousins and sons of friends that went into the stuff (a couple still are).
Also, you are speaking about a very definite field (I presume software engineer or similar), while I was more broadly speaking, an internship at - say - a legal firm or - still say - an accounting firm or other "generic" office, where internships usually (not always) revolve around data entering, making photocopies and similar.
A couple of questions — which was prompted by your blog
What situations is there no value in research ? Corrollary — are there ways you can systemically reduce your risk by increasing your gut feel for probabilities without reesearch ? Final one — you make the great point on unknown unknowns — apart from systemically working through all possible states and thinking through various envrionmental changes — are there any systemic approaches to reducing this risk. In working with startups — I would summarise an alternative approach that covers all 3 by the following pieces of accepted wisdom from startups.
Launch early — to validate in the market with real people Talk to customers to build an empathy or gut feel for relative priorities of stuff — and what really matters I think these two principles go some way to solving the problems you are highlighting through a different approach.
I’m sharing — as I’m sure you have considered this appraoch — and have a reason for discarding it.
I wrote a bit about it here https://medium.com/@nilanp/building-conviction-the-art-of-pr...
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I think your question 1 is partially answered by the inequality — it provides a upper bound for how much utility you could gain from the research. More practically, perhaps a decision maker could use gut feeling to break it down into quartiles — outcomes which are worst case (0th quartile), below average (1st quartile), average (2nd quartile), above average (3rd quartile) and best case (4th quartile). If the estimated cost of research is much less than ROI(3rd quartile) minus ROI(1st quartile), then the research seems worthwhile even for “typical” outcomes. If the estimated cost of research is greater than ROI(4th quartile) minus ROI(0th quartile) then the research is obviously not worthwhile (that’s the inequality).
I think your questions 2 and 3 are the questions I would also like to see answers to :) I think that given decision makers come from a variety of (often non-mathematical) backgrounds, tools should be simple and easy to use/remember, which is why I’m focusing on using things like “worst case scenario” and “above average scenario” and so on. That way we get to combine quantitative analysis and gut feeling to get good outcomes from typical decision makers.
And yes — I completely agree that the agile “release often, get feedback early” and the startup “move fast and break things” philosophies are designed for revealing information quickly so that you can make good decisions as early as possible (thus also maximizing the utility of that information). As a general work pattern, I put this under a kind-of “don’t be stupid” mentality — even if this maybe wasn’t obvious 25 years ago. I think the topic of the article is to be able to address specific, large decisions (like exercise 2).
2. Regardless of the answer, worst case you'd be spending $250k this year to make 500k over the next few years, which is a terrific return on capital. Buy it, information is useless here.
3. Studies showing 95% confidence are wrong more than 50% of the time. The answer is let private companies decide if they think the odds are good enough to conduct expensive trials.
4. The current ROI for pharma companies is below cost of capital and will be negative in 2 years. It's not a great business anymore. https://endpts.com/pharmas-broken-business-model-an-industry...
I'm not sure if these are the answers the author is expecting, but they seem to be the correct ones to me.
Edit: also, the cost of a drug is mostly development. Production is dirt cheap once it's been developed. The model here of a cheaper drug is just wrong. They might be cheaper, which would force A's cost down, etc, but has nothing to do with cost of production.
Information isn't useless in this example. For some unexplained reason you have already obtained information for no cost which doesn't make any sense.
The real scenario is: cost overrun by $250k to $1 million over x months, profit increase between $50k to $100k per year. How much are you willing to spend to obtain 100% certainty?
re #2, I started thinking about how this purchase would be made - cash or debt. Also, I would want to know the cash flow of the business to ensure it could support the 6 month integration costs.
That is why we pay so much for insurance. That is why we pay so much for hedging. That's why we do risk assesments and keep risk registers. All the machine-learning age adds is the potential for better identifying opportunities and the potential for measuring past performance more accurately, in order that we may extrapolate better. It isn't going to answer the big question that CEOs are paid for, and that is "how much risk an I willing to take, what potential reward would I need too make that worthwhile"
It's so obvious that information and understanding is directly tied to wealth. The growing gini coefficient within developed countries as partially attributable to the information super highway that's enabling the intelligent to hyper charge their mental models of the world with a just in time information delivery system to boot.
The whole system is speeding up for the top 5%. Focussing on the cost shrouds the true takeaway. The money is all on the growth side and the intellectually impoverished are getting left behind.
> ~16 hours. Because 20% × $2000 / ($25/hour).
I'm not sure if I have understood, I think in this example, the expected loss here is, 0 x 80% + -2000 * 20% = -400, thus the answer, is my understanding correct?
If you interpret it as buying a camera or not buying a camera, a 20% risk of the camera being useless, then the EVPI is 20% * $2000 = $200: you would be willing to pay up to $200 for certainty about whether the camera would be good or not. The EVPI serves as an upper bound on more realistic Value of Information quantities like Expected Value of Sample Information (EVSI; the value from a reduction of posterior uncertainty by a sample of data eg a small survey). If, for example, there were some piece of information you could buy for <$100 which reduced the risk to 10%, you would want to buy it; if you could do that by doing research for <4 hours and you value your time at $25, then it would be profitable to do that research. Similarly, if you could somehow reach certainty, you would need to do so at under 16 hours (not exactly 16 hours!)
#2 is also wrong because it ignores discounting/opportunity cost (imagine the integration cost could be $499,999 instead). #3 can't be answered because it omits the side-effects and magnitude of the gain, which affect both the net benefit and EVSI (smaller differences are less profitable and harder to detect) and 95% 'confidence' does not mean 95% probability the drug is better, which is the fallacy of inverting the p-value. (For a good paper on how you'd actually do drug approval in an decision-theoretic way, see https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2641547 ) Not to mention again discounting, and elasticity of demand to boot.
(I wouldn't call it 'LessWrong methodology', though. LWers pretty much never do a formal true subjective Bayesian decision analysis, and to the extent they do, you should be calling it LessWrong indoctrinating itself into the 'Raiffa-Schlaifer-Savage methodology', as they preceded us by ~60 years.)
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/books/review/the-influ...
The book was on FT's short list for best of 2017.
So true.