With personal password managers, no third party is issuing tokens for access - just you. So it’s unlikley to be chosen for an attack - because it’s too hard for the attacker to acquire the credentials for access without detection.
With personal password managers, no third party is issuing tokens for access - just you. So it’s unlikley to be chosen for an attack - because it’s too hard for the attacker to acquire the credentials for access without detection.
No third party issues tokens in WebAuthn either - you have your one or a couple of authenticators you use everywhere, and those authenticators create their credential keypairs locally on the device (and a separate keypair is created for each site - they're not shared between sites).
Password managers don't protect against this. People have given attackers their entire password vault, all you need is a convincing story about some security audit and you needing to review all their passwords. Users believe this.
The solution there is to take away the things a user can leak (passwords) and replace them with things that can only be stolen (tokens). We can train users to never give away their yubikey. Of course some will still fall for social engineering but for a yubikey/equivalent it's fully acceptable to say "never ever never give to anyone, no matter what they say".
With a hardware key you gain the advantage of the attackers having to physically gain access to that key.