> apologies for the previous short comment.
> Jeez that reads harsh. Apologies, it's late.
All good, friend.
> ... It's really time to move on.
But is it? I fear that if this is a genuine issue, why would I want to move on from it? Essentially npm is enabling people to build bridges in the same way steel is helping people to build actual bridges. If there was a flaw in some steel production process, I wouldn't ignore it. People could suffer.
Extreme(?) examples a side, if it's an issue, why not aim to solve it? This seems to pop up a lot, so perhaps it's time for a (long-term) solution?
> Use org modules/private modules and the problem is solved.
Yes! This is where I personally see the long-term solution: pick your top-level deps, (permanently) cache them locally and validate them, then implement/use them. Only update the cache when you're confident the remote, official copy has been changed in a manner that's safe for you and or your users.
> I absolutely believe that npm is ripe for *potential abuse, although I have yet to have any issues.
How do you know you've not had any issues? If I was attacking you via some sort of "side channel" attack, like breaching and injecting bad code into an NPM module I know you're using, how would you know it's happened?
Are you using a CI/CD process? The changes are high that you are and therefore unless you've version/commit pinning, it's likely you're blind to those deps being updated during your build process, enabling me to perform said "side channel" attack.
> No one has time for Breitbart-esque fearmongering, or the regurgitation of stale points while an ample selection of real world problems exist to be solved.
If it's being regurgitated so much, perhaps it is a "real world" problem to be solved.