I admit to being out of my element on this, so I may not be phrasing things correctly, but reading through this discussion it seemed like there would be lots of public metadata for a would-be attacker to work with.
I admit to being out of my element on this, so I may not be phrasing things correctly, but reading through this discussion it seemed like there would be lots of public metadata for a would-be attacker to work with.
Thank you lawl & 18pfsmt for highlighting protection of metadata vs. content. At this time protecting content seems like the minimum bar by which one should measure, with metadata protection being the ultimate goal without sacrificing performance or convenience.
Signal for example is great when it comes to confidentiality and actually easy enough to use so my mom messages me on signal, not so great when it comes to not leaking metadata. Nobody else I know uses Tox. But I know that when I use Signal it's a trade-off I'm fine with, but I'm aware of it.
Your comments and 18pfsmts got me thinking about metadata from a different angle than I had been considering prior--that of a state actor's capability to observe the entire network. Your comments never came across as negative.